DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
District 4
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)
FATAL ROOF FALL ACCIDENT
No. 53 Mine (I.D. 46-08598)
R. & S. Coal Co., Inc.
Worth, McDowell County, West Virginia
February 3, 1998
by
Ernie Ross, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr., District Manager
Release Date: April 20, 1998
BACKGROUND
The No. 53 Mine is operated by R. & S. Coal Co., Inc. The mine is located five miles up Buzzard Branch Hollow, off of West Virginia Route 52, near Northfork, West Virginia. The principal officers of R. & S. Coal Co., Inc., are Robert L. Johnson, president; Vickie Simpson, secretary; and Raymond Simpson, superintendent/foreman/electrician/safety director. The mine is under contract from Bluestone Coal Corporation, Beckley, West Virginia. The principal officers of Bluestone Coal Corporation are Jimmy Justice II, president; Byrd White III, vice president; Dale Wright, vice president; and Terry Miller, treasurer.
The mine is developed into the Pocahontas No. 6 coalbed from the surface by four drift openings. The Pocahontas No. 6 coalbed averages 42 inches in height. Coal production began on January 6, 1997. The mine produces approximately 280 raw tons of coal daily on one production shift. One continuous-mining machine and two shuttle cars are utilized for the extraction of coal from the working faces, and the coal is transported from the working section to the surface via a belt conveyor. The immediate mine roof consists of soft and firm laminated shale and is primarily supported with 42-inch resin-grouted bolts. The mine has encountered numerous "kettle bottoms" and thin laminated slips in the immediate mine roof. The immediate laminated roof layers generally fall during mining of the working faces or shortly thereafter, according to Danny Reed, continuous-mining-machine operator. Supplemental supports utilized are posts, cribs, and conventional bolts. Ventilation is induced into the mine by a Pauls 5-foot blowing fan which produces about 40,000 cubic feet of air per minute. This mine does not liberate a measurable amount of methane.
Employment is provided for seven persons, working one 8-hour shift, five days per week.
The miners are members of the United Mine Workers of America.
The last Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) complete Safety and Health Inspection was completed on January 21, 1998.
STORY OF EVENT
On Tuesday, February 3, 1998, the day shift began at 7:00 a.m. The (001-0) Mains crew, under the supervision of Raymond Simpson, superintendent/foreman/electrician, entered the mine and traveled to the section. Simpson stated that rock, which had fallen in the No. 7 working place, had to be loaded out at the start of the shift. Johnny W. Mullins, a roof-bolter operator/fill-in section foreman, was instructed to go to the section belt feeder to watch as the rock was being dumped into the belt feeder, in order to prevent the belt from gobbing off. Mullins left the belt feeder after all of the rock had been run through the feeder. He then traveled to his roof-bolting machine which was located at the supply hole, two crosscuts outby the last open crosscut in the No. 2 entry.
Two Galis Model 300 roof-bolting machines, equipped with approved safe-shield Automated Temporary Roof Support (ATRS) systems, are utilized on the (001-0) Mains section. The left-side machine is used to install roof bolts in the No.1 through No. 4 working faces, and the right-side machine is used to install roof bolts in the No. 5 through No. 8 working faces. Mullins operated the left-side roof-bolting machine and William Roberts operated the right-side machine.
Mullins discovered that there was no electric power on the roof-bolting machine when he arrived. He then checked his trailing cable from the machine to the power center. Simpson was at the power center when Mullins arrived. Simpson informed Mullins that the monitoring system for his roof-bolting machine was in need of repair. Simpson sent Ronnie Dean McComas, shuttle-car operator, to the surface to obtain the parts needed to repair the monitoring system. Mullins and Randy Simpson, general laborer/shuttle-car operator, operated the two shuttle cars until the monitoring system was repaired on the roof-bolting machine.
Normal mining of the working faces continued during the course of the day. The continuous-mining machine loaded the fallen rock in the No. 7 working place, then moved to the No. 8 working face. Mining was also conducted in the crosscuts between No. 6 and 7, No. 3 and 2, No. 5 and 6, and the face of No. 4 heading.
Mullins returned to his roof-bolting machine after the monitoring system was repaired. He loaded bolting supplies onto the bolting machine, and the machine was then trammed inby in the No. 2 entry to the crosscut between No. 3 and 2 entries.
At about 1:45 p.m., mining in the face of No. 4 heading had been completed and the continuous-mining machine was backed outby the last open crosscut. A reflector was hung at the last row of roof bolts, according to Danny Reed, continuous-mining-machine operator. Simpson, Reed, and McComas began work to change out cutter bits and to clean out water sprays on the continuous-mining machine.
Mullins completed bolting in the crosscut between No. 3 and 2 entries, then moved the machine to the No. 4 working place. This was the only place not bolted on the left side of the section. The front operator control levers were positioned directly beneath the last row of permanent roof supports, where the machine was stopped. Mullins then pulled trailing cable from the roof-bolter's cable reel, in order to hang the cable across the 4 left crosscut opening. He then proceeded to hang the cable across the opening but needed additional cable slack. Mullins asked Simpson, who was working nearby changing bits on the continuous-mining machine, to pull more cable from the cable reel. Simpson pulled the additional cable needed to complete the hanging of the cable.
Mullins returned to the roof-bolting machine and cleaned the dust collection box. Simpson asked Mullins for a chew of tobacco while he was cleaning out his dust box. Mullins threw a bag of tobacco to Simpson. Simpson then turned around, facing the continuous-mining machine, and resumed working on the cutter bits. The rear of the roof-bolting machine was approximately 13 feet in front of the continuous-mining machine, where Simpson, Reed, and McComas were working.
At about 2:10 p.m., the sound of a mine roof fall was heard. Simpson stated that he immediately turned toward the roof-bolting machine and could not see Mullins' cap light. He then traveled to the front operator's side of the roof-bolting machine and observed Mullins lying on the mine floor inby the roof-bolting machine. The safe-shield ATRS was not pressurized against the mine roof at this time.
Simpson attempted to pull Mullins outby toward the roof-bolting machine, but was unable to move him. Mullins' hard hat and cap light were caught underneath the edge of the slicken-sided shale, which had fallen inby the ATRS. The section of slicken-sided shale, which struck the victim, was measured to be 4-1/2 feet wide by 6 feet 9 inches in length, and from 0 to 12 inches in thickness. The victim's hard hat was 4-1/2 feet inby the last row of permanent roof supports. Simpson severed the victim's cap light cord and pulled him under the supported roof. Simpson checked the victim for vital signs and found none.
Simpson instructed the crew to get the first-aid supplies and to call outside for an ambulance. The victim was removed from the site and placed in the bucket of an S & S scoop and transported to the surface. An ambulance from Widener's Ambulance Service, Inc., Northfork, West Virginia, arrived at the mine at 2:30 p.m. and transported the victim to Welch Emergency Hospital, Welch, West Virginia. He was pronounced dead at 3:40 p.m. by Dr. Krevak.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) was notified at 2:50 p.m. on February 3, 1998, that a fatal accident had occurred, and MSHA personnel arrived at the mine at 5:00 p.m. A 103(k) order was issued to ensure the safety of the miners until the accident investigation could be completed.
The Mine Safety and Health Administration and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted an investigation with the assistance of the operator and their employees.
All parties were briefed by the mine operator as to the circumstances surrounding the accident. A discussion was held with everyone available who had knowledge of the accident. Representatives of MSHA and the State traveled to the accident scene on February 3, 1998, to secure the area and make preliminary findings. Representatives of all parties traveled to the accident scene on February 4, 1998, where a thorough examination was conducted. Photographs and relevant measurements were taken and sketches were made at the accident site. Interviews of individuals known to have knowledge of the facts surrounding the accident were conducted in the conference room at the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training Office, Welch, West Virginia, on February 5, 1998.
The physical portion of the investigation was completed on February 6, 1998, and the 103(k) order was terminated.
DISCUSSION
Records indicated that all required training had been conducted in accordance with Part 48, Title 30 CFR.
Records indicated that the required examinations were being conducted in accordance with Part 75, Title 30 CFR.
Interview statements indicate that procedures for installing roof bolts in the working faces differ between the left- and right-side roof-bolter operators. Johnny Mullins (victim) operated the roof-bolting machine located on the left side of the section. Mullins reportedly would tram the bolting machine into the area to be bolted, then stop the machine. He would utilize a marking stick, 4 feet in length, with a piece of marking chalk taped to the end, to mark an "X" to indicate the placement of the first row of roof bolts. The safe-shield ATRS was not pressurized against the mine roof until the bolting machine was advanced to the location where the first roof bolt was marked. Observations of the roof-bolt installation patterns throughout the section revealed numerous "X" chalk marks visible under and near the roof-bolt bearing plates installed in the No. 1 through 4 entries. The subject marking stick was transported on the roof-bolting machine, according to Raymond Simpson, foreman.
The investigation revealed that the subject "marking stick" was found at the supply hole located in the second crosscut outby the last open crosscut in the No. 2 entry.
Examination of the accident site revealed one smudged chalk mark on the left side of the No. 4 working place. This mark was measured to be 48 inches inby the last roof bolt. The left ATRS support pad was measured to be 16 inches from the mine roof and the right support pad was 19 inches from the mine roof. The ATRS system functioned properly when tested and would make contact with the mine roof.
William Roberts, right-side roof-bolter operator, stated that he did not use a marking stick to mark the placement of roof bolts. He indicated that he used a pre-measured distance on the boom of the roof-bolting machine to indicate the correct spacing. The machine would be advanced to where a fitting on the boom would be placed directly beneath the last row of installed roof bolts. This would indicate the proper distance for the next row of roof bolts. The safe-shield ATRS would be pressurized against the mine roof upon advancement of the roof-bolting machine to the pre-measured fitting on the boom.
- The victim operated a Galis, Type 300, approval No. 2F-2070A-1, serial No. 30011701763, roof-bolting
machine, equipped with an approved safe-shield ATRS, to install roof bolts on the left side
of the 001-0 section.
- At the start of the shift, the roof-bolting machine operated by Mullins was located at the supply
hole, two crosscuts outby the last open crosscut, in the No.2 entry.
- Mullins had been a certified mine foreman since 1987 and had filled in for the section foreman on
different occasions. He was not performing the duties as a foreman on the day of the accident.
- The victim had about 25 years total mining experience, with 1 year and 1 month at this mine. He
reportedly had at least 13 years experience as a roof-bolting-machine operator.
- At about 1:45 p.m., mining in the face of No. 4 heading had been completed, and the continuous-mining
machine was backed outby the last open crosscut. A reflector was hung at the last row of
roof bolts according to Danny Reed, continuous-mining-machine operator.
- Mullins completed bolting in the crosscut between No. 3 and 2 entries, then moved the machine
to the No. 4 working place. The front operator control levers were positioned directly beneath the
last row of permanent roof supports when the machine was stopped.
- The rear of the roof-bolting machine was approximately 13 feet in front of the continuous-mining
machine, where Simpson, Reed, and McComas were working.
- Interview statements revealed that Mullins used a stick, with a piece of marking chalk taped to one
end, to make an "X" on the mine roof where the inby rows of roof bolts were to be installed.
- The marking stick, which was reportedly kept on the roof-bolting machine, was found at the
section supply hole, located in the second crosscut outby the last open crosscut in the No. 2 entry.
- At about 2:10 p.m., the sound of a fall was heard. Simpson stated that he immediately turned
toward the roof-bolting machine and could not see Mullins' cap light.
- Simpson traveled to the front operator's side of the roof-bolting machine and observed Mullins
lying on the mine floor inby the roof-bolting machine. The safe-shield ATRS was not pressurized
against the mine roof at this time.
- Simpson attempted to pull Mullins outby toward the roof-bolting machine, but was unable to
move him. Mullins' hard hat and cap light were caught underneath the edge of the slicken-sided
shale.
- The section of slicken-sided shale which struck the victim was measured to be 4-1/2 feet wide
by 6 feet 9 inches in length and from 0 to 12 inches in thickness.
- Examination of the accident site revealed one smudged chalk mark on the left side of the working
place. This mark was measured to be 48 inches inby the last roof bolt.
- The left ATRS support pad was measured to be 16 inches from the mine roof, and the right-side
support pad was 19 inches from the mine roof.
- The accident occurred at approximately 2:10 p.m. while the victim was inby the supported roof, apparently to mark roof-bolt placement.
CONCLUSION
The accident and resultant fatality occurred when the victim proceeded inby the last row of permanent roof supports and was struck by a falling section of slicken-sided shale roof. A smudged chalk mark was present on the left side 48 inches inby the last roof bolt in the No. 4 working face. This would indicate that the victim had been in the process of marking the unsupported mine roof for roof bolt placement. The safe-shield ATRS had not been pressurized against the mine roof and the roof-bolting machine was not operating at the time of the accident.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A 103(k) order was issued to ensure the safety of the miners until an accident investigation could be completed.
A 104(a) citation was issued which stated in part that Johnny W. Mullins, roof-bolter operator and occasional section foreman, proceeded inby the last row of permanent roof support in the No. 4 working place. This is a violation of Part 75.202(b), Title 30 CFR.
Respectfully submitted by:
Ernie Ross, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Approved by:
Richard J. Kline
Assistant District Manager
Earnest C. Teaster, Jr.
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB98C04