MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Western District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
Accident Investigation Report
Open Pit Nonmetal Mine
(Borax)
Fatal Accident (Drowning)
Layne Christensen Company
ID No. PU3
at
U. S. Borax, Incorporated
Boron Operations
Boron, Kern County, California
ID No. 04-00743
August 18, 1998
By
David Kerber
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
and
Harvey Brooks
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Originating Office:
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Western District Office
2060 Peabody Road, Suite 610
Vacaville, CA 95687
James M. Salois
District Manager
Charles R. Rojas, driller, age 22, drowned at about 4:30 p.m. on August 18, 1998 when he fell into a sump containing three feet of water. Rojas had two years of mining experience, the past two months as a driller at this operation. He had received training in accordance with 30 CFR Part 48. Annual refresher training had been conducted on January 5, 1998.
MSHA was notified at about 7:30 p.m. on the day of the accident by a telephone call from the safety manager for the mining company. An investigation was started the same day.
Boron Operations, an open pit borax ore mine, owned and operated by U. S. Borax, Inc., was located near Boron, Kern County, California. Principal operating officials were T. Scott Griffin, vice president; Robert Deal, manager of primary process; Mark Ellis, manager of government and public affairs; and Terry Cleveland, safety manager. The mine was normally operated three, eight-hour shifts a day, seven days a week. A total of 680 employees worked at the mine.
The victim was employed by Layne Christensen Company, an independent contractor located in Fontana, California. Principal operating officials were Kleigh Hirschi, district manager; James Wright, health and safety coordinator; and Robert Crews, field superintendent. The contractor had worked at the mine for several years drilling de-watering wells and normally worked one, ten-hour shift a day, on a cycle of ten days on and four days off. A total of three employees was working at the mine site.
Borax ore was extracted by drilling and blasting rock from multiple benches in the pit. Broken material was loaded by shovel into trucks and hauled to the crushing area. After crushing, material was dissolved, separated, crystallized, and dried. It was shipped for use as a basic ingredient in numerous manufacturing processes, including fiberglass insulation, glassware, and ceramics.
The last regular inspection of this operation was completed on March 31, 1998. Another inspection was conducted following this investigation.
The accident occurred at the drill site located south of the plant area near the south entrance to the mine. On the morning of the accident, a sump had been dug by Ed Sauzer Backhoe Service, Inc., an independent contractor. The sump was designed to hold water and cuttings from the well which was to be drilled that day. It was 15 feet long, 12 feet wide, six feet deep, with nearly vertical walls, and contained about three feet of water. Sauzer installed yellow caution tape around three sides of the sump and tied the tape ends to the drill truck. The edge of the sump on the driver's side of the cab was not marked and was four feet from the truck's running board.
The drill involved in the accident was mounted on the frame of a 1994 GMC flat-bed truck. The truck's diesel engine was equipped with a power take-off (PTO) which ran a hydraulic pump to operate the drill. Support vehicles at the drill site included a water truck and a flat-bed supply truck.
During the drilling process, Quik-Foam, a soap solution, was added to the water at a ratio of � cup per 100 gallons of water. The soapy water was used for dust suppression and for lifting cuttings from the drill hole. Foam filled the sump and covered a 900 square foot area to a level 12 inches above the ground. The foam had obscured the edges of the sump at the time of the accident.
The weather was hot, dry, and clear.
On the day of the accident, Charles Rojas (victim) reported for work at 7:00 a.m., his regular starting time. This was the first day the equipment was going to be used at this location. Rojas, Shane Sautter, driller, and Robert Crews, superintendent, moved the water truck, drill truck, and supply truck into position. The sump had already been dug.
Sautter and Rojas started drilling the six-inch pilot hole at about 9:30 a.m. and finished at about 2:30 p.m. At that time, they switched to a ten-inch bit and started drilling the finished hole. Quik-Foam was added to the drill water and foam filled the sump and covered the adjacent area.
After drilling about 180 feet, an air line came loose, shutting down the drill. The line was repaired and at about 4:30 p.m. Rojas walked to the cab of the drill truck to restart the truck engine and engage the PTO. At 4:40 p.m. Sautter finished cleaning out the drill hole and added another section of steel. About ten minutes later, Sautter looked around the drill for Rojas but did not see him. Sautter finished drilling the hole at about 5:00 p.m., shut off the drill, and went looking for Rojas. Crews told Sautter that he had not seen Rojas, so Sautter drove to the guard house and talked to the guard on duty who also said she had not seen Rojas. Sautter then returned to the drill site and began probing the sump hole with a piece of pipe.
By about 5:25 p.m. the foam had dissipated to about one foot above water level and Sautter found Rojas lying face down in the water. Sautter jumped into the sump and turned Rojas over. He then called the guard, asking her to call for emergency assistance. A few minutes later, emergency response teams arrived and Rojas was pronounced dead at the scene by the county coroner. Death was attributed to drowning.
The primary cause of the accident was the unsafe access created by the drill truck being positioned too close to the sump and the edge of the sump being obscured by foam.
U. S. Borax, Inc.
Order No. 7966659 was issued on August 18, 1998, under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act, to ensure the safety of persons at the operation until the affected area of the mine could be returned to normal operation.
This order was terminated on August 19, 1998, after it was determined that the mine could safely return to normal operation.
Citation No. 7966665 was issued on August 18, 1998 under provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR Part 56.11001:
A contractor employee drowned at this operation on August 18, 1998, when he fell into a six-foot deep drill sump containing water about three feet deep. A safe means of access was not provided to the driver's side door of the drill truck, in that the door was about four feet from the sump edge and there was nothing in place to restrain anyone from falling into the sump. Foam generated by the drilling filled the sump and extended beyond the perimeter, obscuring the edge of the sump.
This citation was terminated on October 7, 1998. Metal poles with chain were installed around the sump. "Keep Out" signs were posted. The sump was moved to a location rear of the drill operator so it was visible.
Layne Christensen Company
Citation No. 7966664 was issued on August 18, 1998 under provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.11001:
A contractor employee drowned at this operation on August 18, 1998, when he fell into a six-foot deep sump containing water about three feet deep. A safe means of access was not provided to the driver's side door of the drill truck, in that the door was about four feet from the sump edge and there was nothing in place to restrain anyone from falling into the sump. Foam generated by the drilling filled the sump and extended beyond the perimeter, obscuring the edge of the sump. Superintendent Crews was at the site the entire shift and was aware that employees were exposed to this hazard. Failure to correct the hazard demonstrated a lack of reasonable care constituting more than ordinary negligence and an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
This citation was terminated on October 7, 1998. Metal poles with chain were installed around the sump. "Keep Out" signs were posted. The sump was moved to a location rear of the drill operator so it was visible.
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB98M33