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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Limestone)

Fatal Machinery Accident
December 21, 1999

Sterling Materials
Sterling Ventures, LLC dba Sterling Materials
Verona, Gallatin County, Kentucky
Mine I.D. 15-18068

Accident Investigators

Larry R. Nichols
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Elton L. Hobbs
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Jose J. Figueroa
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Terrence M. Taylor
Civil Engineer

Steven J. Vamossy
Civil Engineer

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Southeastern District
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212; Birmingham, AL 35209
Martin Rosta, District Manager


OVERVIEW


On December 21, 1999, Isidro Obil, laborer, age 22, was critically injured when he became entangled in a conveyor belt tail pulley. He died on December 23, 1999.

The accident occurred because the self-cleaning tail pulley was not guarded and Obil was shoveling spillage from under the conveyor while it was running. Obil had a total of three weeks, two days mining experience, all with this company. He had not received training in accordance with 30 CFR Part 48.

GENERAL INFORMATION


Sterling Materials, an underground limestone mine, owned and operated by Sterling Ventures, LLC dba Sterling Materials, was located on Highway 42, 8 miles east of Warsaw, Gallatin County, Kentucky. The principal operating official was Sam Van, superintendent. The mine was normally operated one, 10-hour shift a day, 5 days a week. Total employment was 37 persons.

The mine was opened to the surface by two declines that served for entry of persons and conveying material. Room and pillars in the mine were developed by conventional drilling and blasting. Broken limestone was loaded and trammed to the underground portable crusher by front-end loaders. The material was crushed to a minus 4 inch size and transported to the surface mill by a series of conveyor belts where it was crushed, sized and stockpiled. The finished product was sold for use in road construction and agriculture lime.

The last regular inspection of this operation was completed October 22, 1999. A regular inspection was conducted following this investigation.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT


On the day of the accident Isidro Obil (victim) reported to work at 7:00 a.m., his normal starting time. He and Placido Lino, laborer, were transported underground by Christopher Pulliam, crusher foreman. The two men were instructed by Pulliam to grease the tail and head pulley bearings on the discharge conveyor belt before start-up. After start-up, they were to shovel spilled material from underneath and along side the belt. Obil did not speak or understand English, and Lino translated these instructions to Obil. Spillage of material beneath the discharge conveyor was a continual problem and needed to be shoveled about every 20 minutes while the conveyor was running.

Upon arrival at the crusher station, Obil and Lino greased the tail and head pulley bearings, then returned to the crusher control booth while Pulliam started the conveyor belts for warm-up. Brian Crawford, crusher operator, arrived at the crusher station and Pulliam left the area.

Crawford started feeding the crusher and production was started for the day. Obil and Lino left the control booth and walked to the tail pulley area where they were to clean spilled material. With the crusher and conveyor belts in operation, Obil began to shovel material from along side the conveyor, working within 4 to 5 feet of the unguarded tail pulley. Lino went to the opposite side of the conveyor, across from Obil, and began shoveling also.

Roy DiMatteo, welder-maintenance man, arrived at the crusher area at about 8:30 a.m., to grease two water pumps. DiMatteo told Lino that he would need some help. Lino turned and walked a short distance toward DiMatteo's vehicle when the discharge conveyor belt stopped. He looked toward the conveyor tail pulley area and saw a cap lamplight illuminating the floor. He and DiMatteo ran to the area. Crawford, who was investigating the cause of the belt stoppage, found Obil caught in the tail pulley and tried to free him. While Lino went for help DiMatteo stayed to help Crawford. Several other employees arrived at the site and after Obil was freed, first-aid was administered. Obil was transported to the surface where he was transferred to an ambulance and transported to a local hospital. He was transferred to a hospital in Cincinnati, Ohio, where he died on December 23, 1999. The cause of death was determined to be suffocation.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


At about 10:30 a.m., on December 21, 1999, Richard Jones, mine safety and health inspector was notified of the accident by a telephone call from Penny Van, office manager for the company. An investigation was started the same day and an order was issued under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Act to ensure the safety of the miners. MSHA conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine management and mine employees. There was no designated miners' representative at the mine.

DISCUSSION


1. The portable crushing unit was located underground. It consisted of a Lippmann-Milwaukee Feeder with 4 inch openings and a vibrator; a Hazemag impact crusher; and a 40-foot long discharge conveyor belt.

2. The accident occurred at the conveyor belt's self-cleaning tail pulley assembly which was not provided with a guard.

3. The portable crusher was supported by two variable depth plate girders, spaced eight feet apart. The supports were cribbed to a concrete foundation at three locations on each side.

4. The belt was �-inch thick and 48 inches wide. It was driven at a speed of 400 feet per minute by a 20-horsepower, 480-volt electric motor running at 1800 revolutions per minute. The belt's tail pulley was self-cleaning and 12 inches in diameter.

5. Spillage of material underneath the discharge conveyor was a constant problem to the extent that two people were employed solely to keep the area clean. Obil and Lino had been hired to clean the material from under and around the conveyor and this had been their only assigned task for the past three weeks.

6. Shovels and a three-inch diameter high-pressure water hose were used to clean the spilled material from underneath and along side the discharge conveyor belt. Spilled material needed to be cleaned every 20 minutes. A pick and two shovels were near the tail pulley, but it was unclear whether any of these tools were being used by the victim at the time of the accident.

7. Two guards, one on each side of the conveyor, were found lying on the ground near the discharge belt. Both guards were made of expanded metal and had a trapezoid shape. The guard found on the side where Obil was working measured 65 inches wide at the top, 88 inches wide at the bottom and was 29 inches high. The guard found on the side where Lino had been working side measured 60 inches wide at the top, 83 inches wide at the bottom and was 28-3/4 inches high. Holes had been drilled into the guards for fastening to metal clips welded to the bottom of the plate girders.

8. The guards were designed to be bolted to the crusher unit. The bolt holes on one of the guards were spaced 53-3/8 inches apart. The mounting clips on the support girder for that guard were 48-3/8 inches apart. The bolt holes on other guard were spaced 49-1/4 inches apart. The mounting clips on the support girder for that guard were 50-1/8 inches apart. Based on these measurements, the bolt holes did not line up with the mounting clips and and the crusher foreman stated during the investigation that wires had been used to hang the guards from the clips.

9. On the day of the accident, the first task assigned to Olio and Lino was to grease the tail and head pulley bearings. During the investigation the guards were wired in place so employees could demonstrate how the bearings were greased. With the guards in place, it was necessary to get down on one knee and reach under the guard to grease the tail pulley bearings.

10. Hardened spilled material had accumulated around the perimeter of the tail pulley. A narrow area adjacent to the tail pulley had been cleared to gain access around the tail pulley. Clearance between the tail pulley and the material was 15 to 24 inches on the side where Obil was working , 17 inches behind the pulley and 6-1/2 to 16 inches on the other side. Variability of these dimensions was due to the slope of the material around the tail pulley perimeter. The uneven and wet ground made movement in this area difficult. Vertical clearance between the ground and the plate girders at the tail pulley was 62 inches.

11. The victim had not received the required MSHA 40-hour new miner training prior to being assigned work duties. An MSHA training form 5000-23 had been completed indicating the Obil had been trained in 8 hours of classroom training prior to being assigned to work underground.

12. The company stated that they had procedures in place to conduct workplace examinations.
However, documentation of obvious violations and hazardous conditions were not available.

13. Illumination was provided by a 1500-watt electric light. Mine electric cap lamps were also used by employees. Illumination was sufficient.

CONCLUSION
The cause of the accident was the company's failure to ensure the conveyor tail pulley was guarded prior to assigning persons to shovel spillage near it. Contributing to the accident was management's failure to provide the 40 hours training before assigning work duties. Failure to conduct a thorough examination of the crusher discharge conveyor for hazardous conditions and promply correcting such conditions were also contributing factors.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


Order No. 7781941 was issued on December 21, 1999, under provisions of Section 103 (k) of the Mine Act:
A laborer was fatally injured at this operation on December 21, 1999, when he became entangled with the self-cleaning tail pulley on the underground crusher discharge conveyor belt. This order is issued to assure the safety of persons at this operation until the affected areas can be returned to normal operations as determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary. The mine operator shall obtain approval from the authorized representative for all actions to return affected areas of the mine to normal.
This order was terminated on January 7, 2000. Conditions that contributed to the accdient have been corrected and normal operations can resume.

Citation No. 7776427 was issued on December 22, 1999, under provisions of 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR, Part 57.14107a:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on December 21, 1999, when a laborer, whose clothes became entangled with an unguarded pulley, was pulled into the moving machine parts. The victim was assigned to clean up spilled material from under the discharge belt. His duties required him to work in the immediate area of an unguarded self-cleaning tail pulley. Failure to guard the tail pulley is a serious lack of reasonable care which constitutes more than ordinary negligence and is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
This citaton was terminated on January 7, 2000. A guard has been installed on the tail pulley assembly that prevents contact with moving machine parts. Employees have been instructed that guards on equipment shall be in place before equipment start up.

Citation No. 7776428 was issued on December 22, 1999, under provisions of 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR, Part 48.5:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on December 21, 1999, when a laborer, whose clothes became entangled with an unguarded pulley, was pulled into the moving machine parts. The victim had not received the required 40 hour new miner training prior to being assigned work duties.
This citation was terminated on January 7, 2000. Management has committed to follow their training plan and provide new miners with 40 hours of training before assigning work duties.

Order No. 7776429 was issued on December 22, 1999, under provisions of 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR, Part 57.18002a:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on December 21, 1999, when a laborer, whose clothes became entangled with an unguarded pulley, was pulled into the moving machine parts. A thorough workplace examination of this area would have revealed that the guards were not in place. Failure to conduct a thorough workplace examination is a serious lack of reasonable care which constitutes more than ordinary negligence and is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
This order was terminated on January 7, 2000. Persons assigned to conduct workplace examinations at this mine have been instructed to complete a thorough examination. Any condition that poses a safety and health hazard to employees will be corrected immediately.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB99M52

APPENDIX A

Persons Participating in the Investigation

Sterling Ventures, LLC dba Sterling Materials
Alex Boone ................. owner
Sam Van ................. mining superintendent
Christopher D. Pulliam ................. crusher foreman
David R. Jiles ................. mine foreman
Richard B. Crawford ................. crusher operator
Roy DiMatteo ................. welder-maintenance man
Lester Hicks, Jr. ................. scaler
Jody L. Florer ................. pug mill operator
Placido Lino (Carlos) ................. laborer
Darrell Lewis ................. office clerk
Penny Van ................. office manager
Marcus P. McGraw ................. attorney
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Larry Nichols ................. supervisory mine inspector
Elton L. Hobbs ................. mine safety and health inspector
Jose J. Figueroa ................. mine safety and health inspector
Terence M. Taylor ................. civil engineer
Steven J. Vamossy ................. civil engineer
APPENDIX B

Persons Interviewed

Sterling Ventures, LLC dba Sterling Materials
Sam Van ................. mining superintendent
Christopher D. Pulliam ................. crusher foreman
David R. Jiles ................. mine foreman
Richard B. Crawford ................. crusher operator
Roy DiMatteo ................. welder-maintenance man
Lester Hicks, Jr. ................. scaler
Jody L. Florer ................. pug mill operator
Placido Lino (Carlos) ................. laborer