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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Underground Coal Mine

Fatal Roof Fall Accident
September 6, 2000

Rockhouse Mine #1
Rockhouse Energy Mining Company
Sidney, Pike County, Kentucky
ID No. 15-17651

Accident Investigators

Robert J. Newberry
Mining Engineer

William C. Cole
Coal Mine Safety and Health Specialist

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 6
4159 North Mayo Trail
Pikeville, KY 41501
Carl E. Boone, II, District Manager


Release Date: November 17, 2000



OVERVIEW

At approximately 6:50 p.m. on Wednesday, September 6, 2000, a fall of roof occurred in the No. 5 entry of the 001-0 MMU at the Rockhouse Mine #1 of Rockhouse Energy Mining Company. Gary Cochran, section electrician, was working to construct a wooden crib in order to provide roof support for access to the Joy 14CM-15 remote controlled continuous mining machine which had become immobilized inby permanent roof support due to an electrical problem, when draw rock fell on him resulting in fatal injuries. The rock measured approximately eleven feet long with a width ranging from 52 inches on the inby end to 86 inches at the outby end and with a thickness ranging from 2 to 10 inches.

The accident occurred due to the employee being positioned inby permanent or temporary roof support. Draw rock was present in varying thickness across the working section. According to eyewitnesses, the victim, Raymond Fletcher (section foreman), and Tony Ward (scoop operator) were in the process of constructing a wooden crib in an attempt to provide temporary roof support to access the continuous mining machine. A section of draw rock fell from the roof in the area immediately inby permanent support.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Rockhouse Energy Mining Company, Rockhouse Mine #1, is located on Kentucky Route 468, approximately four miles from Sidney, Pike County, Kentucky. Rockhouse Energy Mining Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of A. T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., located in Richmond, Virginia.

The principal company officers of Rockhouse Energy Mining Company are:
James D. Slater ................................... President
Gary Varney......................................... General Manager
Kenneth H. Deskins............................. Superintendent
Jeffrey Bennett..................................... Safety Director
Rockhouse Mine #1 was placed in active status on March 17, 1995. Coal is produced on three active mechanized mining units (MMU's) using continuous mining machines, shuttle cars, scoops, and roof bolting machines. The 001 MMU is located approximately three miles from the drift portals and is developed by room and pillar mining into the Elkhorn No. 3 coal seam which has an average mining height of 70 inches. The company uses two continuous mining machines on each MMU, operated one at a time on the left or right side of the working section, to extract and load coal. Shuttle cars are used for coal haulage to an underground feeder. Coal is then transported to the surface by a series of belt conveyors.

The mine currently employees 93 persons and operates five days per week, using six crews working eight-hour shifts. The crews alternate between the day and evening shift on a weekly basis. Maintenance is conducted on the night shift. The mine produces an average of 3,877 tons of coal daily and liberates 275,600 cubic feet of methane in 24 hours.

The last complete safety and health inspection of the mine by the Mine Safety and Health Administration was completed on June 30, 2000.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

On Wednesday, September 6, 2000, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the second shift crew for the 001 section entered the mine for the regularly scheduled production shift. The crew consisted of the following persons:
Raymond Fletcher ................................Section Foreman
Dale Mullins ..........................................Right Side Miner Operator
Tony Ward ............................................Scoop Operator
Greg Mullins...........................................Left Side Miner Operator
Ronnie Chaney......................................Roof Bolter Operator
William Maynard....................................Roof Bolter Operator
Randy Fields.........................................Shuttle Car Operator
Myron Deskins......................................Shuttle Car Operator
Gary Cochran (victim)...........................Section Electrician
The crew arrived on the 001 section about 5:00 p.m. and began their assigned duties. Greg Mullins, Randy Fields, and Myron Deskins began working in the No. 3 entry while Dale Mullins cleaned and checked his machine. After mining the extended cut in the No. 3 entry, the shuttle car operators moved to the No. 5 entry where Dale Mullins began mining the eight feet wide stump along the right rib. The stump was left when the previous shift mined through from the cross-cut between the No. 4 and No. 5 entries. Mining progressed in the No. 5 entry until approximately 75 percent of the cut had been mined. Mullins heard a "pop" and the machine lost its power as he was loading Deskins' shuttle car. Greg Mullins and the victim, Gary Cochran, were in the No. 3 entry performing maintenance on the left-side continuous miner.

Dale Mullins told Fields that the continuous miner was "down" and asked him to check the breaker at the power center. Fields checked the breaker and reported that it was set in the "on" position. Gary Cochran (victim) was summoned to the No. 5 entry to repair the continuous miner. According to Dale Mullins, Cochran told him that it was probably a grounded motor and that roof support would have to be installed to access the machine.

Fields told Raymond Fletcher that the right-side continuous miner was "down". Fletcher went to No. 5 entry where the right-side continuous miner was located and was told that the machine had lost power. Tony Ward had arrived in the area by that time and Fletcher sent Ward to get crib blocks. Ward took the battery powered scoop down the No. 4 entry to a location about 500 feet outby the face where crib blocks were stored. He transported about 21 crib blocks to the face area in the No. 5 entry. Ward, Fletcher and Cochran began placing the crib blocks about two to three feet inby the last row of roof bolts. Cochran was placing the sixth or seventh block in the crib when a section of the roof collapsed trapping him underneath. The left side of the rock was lying on the boom of the continuous miner and the right side of the rock pinned Cochran to the floor.

Dale Mullins, Ward and Fletcher attempted to move the rock but were unsuccessful due to the size and weight of the rock. Fletcher yelled across the section for help and Dale Mullins went to the mine phone to summon help from the surface. Six or seven members of the crew attempted to move the rock but could not. Ward went to get the diesel-powered forklift but when he returned with it, the forklift's engine stalled and would not restart. After Dale Mullins returned to the accident scene, another attempt to lift the rock and free Cochran was successful.

Myron Deskins administered CPR and a faint pulse was detected. The victim was carried to the track where they waited until Bobby Smith, mine foreman, and Gary Thacker, second shift chief electrician, arrived. The victim was placed in the front compartment of the mantrip. Smith and Thacker administered CPR, while Eddie Justus operated the mantrip. An ambulance from Appalachian First Response was waiting on the surface. Smith accompanied the ambulance crew and assisted them. The victim was transported to Williamson Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 9:45 p.m.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT

Jeffrey Bennett, safety director for Rockhouse Mine #1, called the home of Anthony Webb, district staff assistant, and reported the accident at 7:48 p.m. on September 6, 2000. Webb notified the appropriate MSHA personnel, who traveled to the mine and met with officials from the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals and Rockhouse Energy Mining Company. A joint investigation team traveled to the accident scene to conduct an initial investigation to evaluate possible safety hazards that might exist relevant to the accident A 103(k) order was issued specifying the affected area as the 001-0 MMU to ensure the safety of the miners and allow MSHA personnel to conduct an investigation of the accident. Preliminary data about the victim was obtained. MSHA headquarters and technical support were notified and they dispatched personnel to assist the accident investigators.

On Thursday, September 7, 2000, a joint investigation team comprised of representatives from Rockhouse Energy Mining Company, Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals and MSHA entered the mine to conduct an investigation and determine the cause of the accident.

The immediate area of the accident was photographed, sketched, videotaped, and measured to the extent possible. The area was examined and measured by William Gray and John Cook, mining engineers from MSHA technical support.

A plan was developed by the operator to access the continuous miner and recover it from the unsupported area. After setting a sufficient number of posts and jacks to access the machine, an onboard breaker was reset and the machine was trammed by remote control to an area outby under permanent support.

A schedule for interviewing the eyewitnesses and other persons at the mine was set up for the following day, September 8, 2000. Additional interviews of workers from other sections of the mine were conducted on Tuesday, September 12, 2000. A total of 29 interviews of miners and management officials were conducted during the investigation.

DISCUSSION

The investigation revealed the following factors relevant to the accident:
  1. The Rockhouse Mine No. 1 is operating in the No. 3 Elkhorn coal seam. Although the seam height is approximately 36-to-44 inches, both bottom and top rock have been consistently taken throughout the mine. The mining height in the vicinity of the accident on the 001 Section was approximately 72 inches. One location along the right rib in the No. 5 Entry outby the accident scene was measured at 69 � inches, consisting of 16 inches of bottom rock, 35 � inches of coal and 18 inches of roof rock.

  2. The 001 Section of the Rockhouse Mine No. 1 is a multiple continuous-mining machine section, operating two remote control Joy 14CM-15 continuous mining machines (one at a time). The section is ventilated with a single split of air. This section is currently developing the main entries for longwall panels.

  3. The accident occurred in the No. 5 Entry of the 001 Section, approximately 80 feet inby Spad 8289. The No. 5 Entry is actually the sixth entry from left to right, as the 001 Section had recently picked up an additional entry on the left side of the section, and designated it as the "0" entry.

  4. The crosscut from the No. 4 to No. 5 Entries had been mined by the day shift. The 40 foot maximum cut depth restriction prevented mining all the way to the right rib of the No. 5 Entry. Because the No. 5 Entry was only mined up to the approximate center of the crosscut, a small "stump" of coal was left along the right side rib.

  5. The No. 5 Entry outby the accident scene was measured to be 17' 10" wide, and the crosscut from No. 4 Entry to No. 5 Entry was 19' wide.

  6. Overburden at the accident location was approximately 550 feet.

  7. Entry and crosscut centers in the 001 Section were generally 80 feet by 80 feet. Two blocks outby Spad 8289 a row of larger pillars was left, with crosscut centers of 120 feet.

  8. The immediate roof in the area of the accident consisted of dark gray, thinly laminated shale. The mine roof on the section, including the area outby the accident scene, was supported with 48-inch-long, fully grouted, No. 5 rebar, installed in a four-foot by four-foot pattern. Eight-inch by eight-inch bearing plates were standard throughout the area.

  9. The roof fall material consisted of two large slabs of thinly laminated dark shale. The larger of the two slabs was trapezoidal in shape, approximately 11 feet long, with the width ranging from 52 inches at the inby end to 86 inches at the outby end. This piece ranged in thickness from 2 to 10 inches. The second slab was approximately 30 inches wide by 54 inches long by 8 inches thick.

  10. At the time of the accident, the victim was inby permanent support, reportedly assisting in the construction of a crib being built in order to access the continuous mining machine which had lost power inby permanent roof support (roof bolts).

  11. At the time of the investigation, a partially constructed crib consisting of eight crib blocks (6" by 6" by 36" long) was located under the larger of the rock slabs. The slab was resting on the miner tail boom and the mine floor adjacent to the right rib. The partially-constructed crib was in contact with the rock slab, but did not appear to have any weight on it.

  12. A pile of thirteen other crib blocks was outby the partially-constructed crib. No cap pieces or wedges were observed in the vicinity of the accident.

  13. After the roof fall, a CLA diesel forklift (Gator) was brought to the scene to assist in lifting the rock from the victim. The Gator was not used, however, as the entire 001 Section crew combined to shift the slab sufficiently to remove the victim.

  14. The maximum cut depth listed in the roof control plan is 40 feet. At the time of the accident, an electrical condition had de-energized the continuous miner which was located in the right side cut of the No. 5 Entry approximately 37 feet deep. The left side of the No. 5 Entry had been mined to an approximate depth of 21 feet from the last full row of roof bolts.

  15. Adequate roof support was not provided where persons were required to work or travel. Posts or jacks were not installed prior to constructing a wooden crib inby permanent roof support (roof bolts).

  16. No additional permanent supports (roof bolts) were installed prior to proceeding inby the previously installed roof bolts to construct the wooden crib.

  17. No posts or jacks were installed to provide additional support while constructing the crib.

  18. Sound and vibration tests were not performed prior to proceeding inby to construct the crib.
CONCLUSION

The accident occurred due to the employees being allowed to work inby permanent or temporary roof support. The Joy 14CM-15 remote controlled continuous mining machine became immobilized inby permanent supports by an electrical problem. According to eyewitnesses, the victim and co-workers were in the process of constructing a wooden crib in an attempt to provide roof support to access the continuous mining machine. A section of draw rock fell from the roof in the area immediately inby permanent support.

No additional permanent supports (roof bolts) were installed prior to proceeding inby the previously installed roof bolts to construct the wooden crib. No posts or jacks were installed to provide additional support while constructing the crib nor were any readily accessible on or near the working section. Sound and vibration tests were not performed in the area prior to constructing the crib. The result was a failure of the immediate roof in the area where the wooden crib was being constructed.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
  1. A 103(k) Order (No. 7373621) was issued on September 6, 2000, to Rockhouse Energy Mining Company, Rockhouse Mine #1, to ensure the safety of the miners working in the area.

  2. A 104(a) Citation (No. 7368962) was issued for performing work on the 001-0 MMU after a 103(k) Order had been issued after a fatal roof fall A survey crew was mapping the area on the section when the investigation team arrived on mine property.

  3. A 104(d) Order (No. 7373434) was issued for failure to support the roof where persons work or travel.

  4. A 104(d) Order (No. 7373435) was issued for not following the approved roof control plan. Permanent roof support was not installed as close as practical to the work area of the equipment immobilized inby permanent support.

  5. A 104(d) Order (No. 7373436) was issued for not conducting sound and vibration tests prior to installing roof supports.

  6. A 104(d) Order (No. 7373437) was issued for failure to maintain a supply of supplementary roof support materials such as posts or jacks, cap boards and wedges, and the tools and equipment necessary to install the materials at a readily accessible location on the working sections or within four crosscuts of the working section.


Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB00C25

Diagram of Accident Scene


APPENDIX A

List of Persons Participating in the Investigation

Rockhouse Energy Mining Company Officials
Drexal Short . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Senior Vice President (A. T. Massey Coal Company)
James Slater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . President, Sidney Coal Company
Johnny Robertson . . . . . . . . . . Safety Director (Massey Coal Services)
Ken Deskins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Superintendent
James Pinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . .General Mine Foreman
Jeffrey Bennett . . . . . . . . . . . . .Safety Coordinator
Mark Heath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Attorney (Heenan, Althen and Roles)
Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals
Tracy Stumbo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chief Investigator
Michael Elswick . . . . . . . . . . . . .Accident Investigator
Raymond D. Slone . . . . . . . . . . .Accident Investigator
Randy Smith Safety . . . . . . . . . . Inspector
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Robert Newberry . . . . . . . . . . . .Mining Engineer
William Cole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coal Mine Safety and Health Specialist
Kenneth Murray . . . . . . . . . . . . .Supervisory Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Steve Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supervisory Coal Mine Health and Safety Inspector
Susan Barr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Attorney
Don Braenovich . . . . . . . . . . . . .Coal Mine Safety and Health Specialist
John South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Accident Investigation Coordinator
Gerald W. McMasters . . . . . . . .Conference Litigation Representative
William Gray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mining Engineer
John Cook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mining Engineer
Harold Thornsbury . . . . . . . . . . .Training Specialist
APPENDIX B


List of Persons Interviewed
Kenneth Deskins . . . . . . . . . . . .Superintendent
Dale Mullins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Tony Ward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Scoop Operator
Raymond Fletcher . . . . . . . . . . .Section Foreman
William Maynard . . . . . . . . . . . .Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Ronnie Chaney . . . . . . . . . . . . . Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Randy Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Shuttle Car Operator
Myron Deskins . . . . . . . . . . . . .Shuttle Car Operator
Greg Mullins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Bobby Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mine Foreman
Gary Thacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Chief Electrician
Kelly Sanson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Tommy Maynard . . . . . . . . . . . Electrician
Darrell Sanson . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mechanic/Electrician
Doyle Borger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chief Electrician
James Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electrician
Timothy May . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Electrician
Denny Moore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electrician
Gregory Stanley . . . . . . . . . . . . .Chief Electrician
Ernest Thacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Chief Electrician
James Stanley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Electrician
Michael Sincell . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Wayne Pinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Donnie Stacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Wayne Mollett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Thomas Craig . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Curry Electrician
Garey McClanahan . . . . . . . . . . .Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Bobby Sesco . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Robert Fuller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Michael Thacker . . . . . . . . . . . . .Electrician