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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

Report of Investigation

Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Limestone)

Fatal Machinery Accident
January 27, 2000

Jellico Stone Company
Hinkle Contracting Corporation
Jellico, Campbell County, Tennessee
Mine I.D. 40-00057

Accident Investigators

Billy K. Terry
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Donald L. Walker
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

George H. Gardner
Civil Engineer

Eugene D. Hennen
Mechanical Engineer

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Southeastern District
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212; Birmingham, AL 35209
Martin Rosta, District Manager



OVERVIEW


On January 27, 2000, Vadis R. Godbey, driller, age 49, was fatally injured when the drill he was operating tipped over and fell partially down a highwall. The drill had been positioned and as the derrick was being raised, one of the leveling jacks sank into the ground, causing the drill to become unstable and fall over.

The accident occurred because the drill had been positioned parallel to the edge of the highwall on loose unconsolidated material. Godbey had a total of 11 years, 9 months mining experience, all as a driller with this company. He had received training in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.

GENERAL INFORMATION


Jellico Stone Company, a crushed limestone operation, owned and operated by Hinkle Contracting Corporation, was located on Route 25, approximately 3 miles southwest of Jellico, Campbell County, Tennessee. The principal operating official was Henry Hinkle, president. The mine was normally operated one, 8-hour shift a day, 5 days a week. Total employment was 14 persons.

The mine consisted of a multiple-bench quarry accessed by declined roadways. After overburden was removed, the material was drilled, blasted and loaded by front-end loaders into haul trucks. Limestone was transported to the primary crusher where it was crushed, screened, sized and conveyed or hauled to stockpiles. The finished product was sold for use as construction aggregate.

The last regular inspection of this operation was completed July 12, 1999. A regular inspection was conducted following the investigation.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT


On January 25, 2000, two days prior to the accident, Vadis R. Godbey (victim) and Lucas Piercy, driller helper, were instructed by Roy Sutton, equipment manager to lay out a drill pattern on the northwest upper bench. Godbey and Piercey laid out the pattern which consisted of four rows of 11 holes each and then drilled the first two rows of holes. Severe cold weather came into the area and they had to suspend drilling, leaving the remaining holes undrilled. Due to the weather, the mine did not operate the next day.

On the day of the accident, Godbey reported for work at 11:30 a.m., four and one-half hours later than his normal starting time, because of inclement weather. After arriving at the mine site, Godbey ate lunch. At approximately 12:30 p.m., he drove the truck-mounted drill to the bench area accompanied by Piercy. Godbey and Piercy inspected the site and discussed the procedure they would use to drill that day.

The area where they were working was near the edge of highwall approximately 200 feet above the quarry floor. Loose unconsolidated material covered the area about 10 to 15 feet away from, and to the edge of the highwall, where overburden had been pushed off the edge.

Piercy backed the drill rig into position and Godbey began set-up procedures over the predetermined hole location. This included lowering the leveling jacks and raising the derrick from the carrier cradle to the vertical lock and drill position. Communication between Godbey and Piercy was accomplished by use of hand signals during drill set ups. Piercy would normally stay inside the carrier cab end of the equipment during drill set up and drilling while Godbey operated controls from inside the operator's cab.

Godbey and Piercy had drilled 14 holes without incident with the drill rig positioned parallel to the highwall bench. After Piercy positioned the drill over the fifteenth hole, he exited the carrier cab and went to get something to drink. Godbey had extended two of the three leveling jacks down on solid rock. The third jack, located under the drill operator's cab, had been positioned about 6 feet from the edge of the highwall on loose unconsolidated material. Godbey was raising the derrick when the jack located under the operator's cab, sank into the ground, causing the derrick's center of gravity to shift. As a result, the drill overturned and slid off the highwall.

Piercy immediately ran to the edge of the highwall and yelled to Godbey but did not get a response. He went to the pick-up truck and radioed the scale house operator who called 911.

The drill came to rest, upside down, approximately 45 feet down the highwall with the derrick stuck in material that had accumulated on an old bench. Emergency personnel arrived at the scene but were unable to access Godbey due to the position and instability of the drill. After the drill was secured, Godbey was extricated from the operator's cab by rescue personnel. He was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead due to multiple head trauma.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


At about 6:00 p.m., on January 27, 2000, Martin Rosta, district manager was notified of the accident by a telephone call from Lowell Manning, safety director for Hinkle Contracting Company. An investigation was started the same day and an order was issued under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Act to ensure the safety of the miners. MSHA conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine management and mine employees. The miners did not have, nor request representation during the investigation.

DISCUSSION


1. The drill involved in the accident was a 1999 Ingersoll Rand T4BH, mounted on a rubber-tired truck chassis. The drilling rig was powered by a Caterpillar 3408, 525-horsepower engine. The gross weight of the vehicle was approximately 64,000 pounds, including the 3,150 pounds of drill steel.

2. The drill was supported by three leveling jacks during drilling. Each jack consisted of a hydraulic cylinder mounted in a crosshead. Two jacks, located on the drilling end of the chassis, were referred to as the dust collector side (DCS) leveling jack and the cab side (CS) leveling jack. The jacks on the drilling end of the chassis rested on a shoe which consisted of a circular pad 18 inches in diameter, with three inches truncated from the edge. The surface area of these shoes was estimated to be 227 square inches. There was a single jack on the non-drilling end of the chassis known as the non-drilling end (NDE) leveling jack. The shoe for this leveling jack measured approximately 254 square inches and did not have a three inch truncation from the edge.

3. There was a circular bubble level permanently mounted on the console in the drill operator's cab. The purpose of the leveler was to verify that the drill was level prior to, and during drilling.

4. The distribution of loading on the jacks was dependent on the position of the derrick or tower. According to manufacture's data, the following load distribution applied when the tower was up and down and did not account for drill steel in the carousel:

Leveling JackTower Up Tower Down
Nondrilling end17,160 pounds 25,280 pounds
Cab side 22,340 pounds 17,500 pounds
Dust collector side 21,520 pounds 18,270 pounds


5. The accident occurred on the northwest bench. The working bench was approximately 300 feet long and 95 to 120 feet wide. The lower highwall extended vertically downward, approximately 40 to 50 feet to an old strip bench, then continued down approximately 150 feet to the quarry floor. The strip bench was covered with an accumulation of loose soil and rock material which had been pushed or dropped down from the current working level.

6. The area being drilled in preparation for blasting, was approximately 130 feet by 45 feet. Holes were drilled to a depth of 25 to 30 feet at twelve-foot spacing. Each row was offset four feet from the previous one, in an effort to control the direction of cast material.

7. The work surface was nearly horizontal and consisted predominantly of sound and relatively smooth rock. There was evidence of some mud seam intrusions in the upper highwall at the accident area. The outer 6 to 10 feet of the work area consisted of a soft, cohesive brown clay material containing broken rock fragments. From below the edge, it was evident that the soft soil and rock mixture extended about 6 to 8 feet deep (vertically) above the solid rock stratum in the highwall (below the work area). The soft area was composed of material which had been cast over the edge using a front loader.

8. Ingersoll Rand's manual for this drill recommended: "Locate drill on level ground if possible. Install cribbing (blocking) under each jack to ensure a stable lifting platform in case the ground is broken or soft.". It further stated: "Make sure you are on solid, level ground before raising the derrick. Use cribbing (blocking) if you are not sure.". At the time of the accident, there was no cribbing under the jack that sank into the ground.

9. The drill was being operated parallel to the edge of the highwall, with the cab side leveling jack on soft ground. No cribbing or blocking was being used. The dust collector side leveling jack and the non-drilling end leveling jack were positioned on solid and competent rock. This was evident from an imprint made in the ground surface by the cab side leveling jack and scratches made on the rock surface by the dust collector side leveling jack and the non-drilling end leveling jack. From this evidence, the position of the drill just prior to the accident could be readily determined.

10. The imprint that the cab side leveling jack made in the ground surface just prior to the accident was located approximately 6 feet from the edge of the highwall. It was found to be approximately 12 inches deep and partially filled with loose and disturbed soil. It was later determined that the hole had further opened up and was intersected by another hole just below the ground surface. This hole was open to a depth of 83 inches. The company indicated that the hole had opened up naturally and was not the result of field exploration or other activities in the area. Apparently, there had been a pre-existing large void in the loose material in this area.

11. The presence of voids and soft fill was consistent with clay and rock mixture having been cast or dropped over the edge of a highwall using a front loader.

12. The ground surface was frozen prior to the accident. The drill was not operated on the day prior to the accident due to cold weather. Since cold weather had been forecasted on the day the accident occurred, work did not begin until 12:30 p.m.. The temperature was 28 degrees and increasing at the time of the accident.

13. As the derrick was raised, the weight on the jacks was redistributed, causing an increase in the weight on the cab side leveling jack.

14. During the previous two set-ups, the drill had been similarly positioned. This was evident from the 6- to 8-inch imprints left in the soft material by the cab side leveling jack adjacent to the previous two drilled holes.

15. The bearing pressure exerted on the ground surface by the cab side jack shoe was determined to be in excess of 14,000 pounds per square foot (PSF). This clearly exceeded the bearing capacity of the soft clay and rock mixture.

16. The drill was positioned with the operator's cab on the side closest to the edge of the highwall. This caused the jack with the greatest loading to be closest to the edge, and also resulted in the operator's cab striking the highwall when the drill rotated over the edge.

17. The leveling jacks were extended as follows, prior to the accident:
Cab side                        36 inches
Dust collector side      27.5 inches
Non-drilling end          45 inches
18. The drill chassis had been positioned and supported by its leveling jacks. The tower was being raised when the accident occurred. The pin which locks the tower in its vertical position, was within 8 inches of its locking position, indicating that the derrick was nearly vertical, but not quite fully raised.

19. The drill fell from the highwall landing upside down with the derrick stuck in soil and loose rock material which had accumulated on an old bench approximately 40 to 50 feet below. This material was similar to that which the cab side leveling jack had been positioned on prior to the accident.

20. Based on measurements of the leveling jacks after the failure, it was estimated that, at the time of the accident, the wheels were elevated about 13 inches above the ground on the drill end of the chassis and approximately 20 inches above the ground on the non-drilling end.

21. The cab side leveling jack was extended 8.5 inches further than the dust collector side leveling jack. This indicated that the cab side jack penetrated 8.5 inches into the ground during the attempt to level it prior to the accident.

CONCLUSION


The root cause of the accident was managements failure to identify the loose unconsolidated material at the drill site as a hazard and require cribbing or other materials to be used to insure solid footing. Positioning the drill parallel to the edge of the highwall was a contributing factor.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


Order No. 7784536 was issued on January 28, 1000, under provisions of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act:
A drill operator was fatally injured on January 27, 2000, when the drill he was operating overturned and fell partially over a highwall. A leveling jack had been positioned on unconsolidated material, causing the drill rig to become unstable and overturn. This order is issued to assure the safety of persons at this operation until the affected areas can be returned to normal operations as determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary. The operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all actions to recover persons, equipment and/or restore operations.
This order was terminated on January 28, 2000. The affected area where the fatal accident occurred, has been inspected and determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary that it can be returned to normal working conditions at this mine.

Citation No. 7784540 was issued on February 29, 2000, under provisions of 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR, Part 56.7003:
A driller was fatally injured at this operation on January 27, 2000, when one of the stabilizing jacks on the truck drill he was operating sank into loose unconsolidated ground, causing the drill to overturn and fall over the highwall. The drill had been positioned on the loose unconsolidated material which remained within 15 feet of the highwall edge, after stripped material had been pushed over the highwall. This loose unconsolidated material should have been detected by the operator upon inspection and corrective action taken before drilling began.
This citation was terminated on January 29, 2000. The operator has instituted safe and correct procedures to use during inspection of areas for drilling and set up procedures of tasks. Foremans, drillers and helpers have been re-trained in inspection procedures.

Citation No. 7784541 was issued on January 29, 2000, under provisions of 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR, Part 56.7052(b):
A driller was fatally injured at this operation on January 27, 2000, when one of the stabilizing jacks on the truck drill he was operating sank into loose unconsolidated ground, causing the drill to overturn and fall over the highwall. The drill had been positioned on the loose unconsolidated material which remained within 15 feet of the highwall edge, after stripped material had been pushed over the highwall. This loose unconsolidated material constituted insecure footing for the placement of the drill.
This citation was terminated on January 29, 2000. The operator has instituted safe and correct procedures to use during inspection of areas for drilling and setting up procedures of task. Drills shall be staged perpendicular to the highwall, where cracks, mud seams or voids are noted cribbing or matting materials shall be used.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB2000M04

APPENDIX A

Persons participating in the investigation

Hinkle Contracting Company

Thomas Hinkle .......... vice president
Jim Mays .......... quarry superintendent
Roy Sutton .......... equipment manager
Lowell Manning .......... safety director
Tracy Bubnick .......... assistant safety director
Kenneth Byrd .......... scale house manager
Lucas Piercy .......... driller helper
Roger Haste .......... driller
Forrest Shelton .......... blaster
Berry Atkins .......... blaster
C. Reed Davis Contractors, Inc.
Danny Fowler .......... operator/mechanic
Ingersoll Rand
Eric Freund .......... field representative
Brandeis
Carson Mitchell .......... field representative
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Billy K. Terry .......... supervisory mine inspector
Donald Walker .......... mine safety and health inspector
George H. Gardner .......... civil engineer
Eugene D. Hennen .......... mechanical engineer
Office of the Solicitor
Donna Sonner .......... attorney
APPENDIX B

Persons Interviewed

Hinkle Contracting Company
Thomas Hinkle .......... vice president
Jim Mays .......... quarry superintendent
Roy Sutton .......... equipment manager
Lowell Manning .......... safety director
Kenneth Byrd .......... scale house manager
Lucas Piercy .......... driller helper
Roger Haste .......... driller
Forrest Shelton .......... blaster
Berry Atkins .......... blaster
Ingersoll Rand
Eric Freund .......... field representative
Brandeis
Carson Mitchell .......... field representative