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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

Report of Investigation

Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Dimension Granite)

Fatal Machinery Accident
June 11, 2000

Mt. Airy Mine and Mill
The N.C. Granite Corporation
Mt. Airy, Surry County, North Carolina
Mine I.D. 31-00037

Accident Investigators

Larry R. Nichols
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Charles E. McDaniel
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Gharib Ibrahim, P.E.
Civil Engineer

Wayne L. Maxwell
Mine Safety and Health Specialist


Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Southeast District
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212; Birmingham, AL 35209
Martin Rosta, District Manager





OVERVIEW


Randy D. Potts, gang saw operator, age 32, was fatally injured on June 11, 2000, when he entered an area between two sawed blocks of granite and was crushed. Potts had entered the area to replace the rear middle wedge that had fallen out. The front middle wedge either kicked-out, due to weight, or fell out, allowing the rough end (slab) of one of the sawed blocks to fall, pinning him against the other block.

The accident occurred because of management's failure to provide adequate blocking devices to secure the end blocks. Failure to establish procedures to reinstall fallen wedges between sawed blocks and the lack of signs to warn persons of the hazard were contributing factors.

Potts had a total of 14 years mining experience, all at this operation. He had received training in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.

GENERAL INFORMATION


Mt. Airy Mine and Mill, a surface dimension stone operation, owned and operated by The N.C. Granite Corporation, was located along State Highway 103-E, within the city limits of Mt. Airy, Surry County, North Carolina. The principal operating official was Don Shelton, president and CEO. The quarry normally operated one 8-hour shift a day, five days a week. The mill normally operated two 12-hour shifts a day, seven days a week. Total employment was 100 persons.

Large blocks of granite were mined by drilling closely spaced vertical holes approximately 10 feet deep, to a natural seam. Black powder and detonating cord were used to free the blocks. This process was repeated to subdivide blocks into smaller sizes. The blocks were loaded onto flatbed trucks by forklifts and transported to the saw sheds to be sawed into slabs. The finished product was used for building stones and monuments. Waste material was crushed, screened, stockpiled and sold for decorating rock.

The last regular inspection of this operation was completed on December 16, 1999. A regular inspection was conducted following the investigation.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT


On the day of the accident, Randy Potts (victim) and Billy Semones, gang saw operator helper, reported to work at 4:00 p.m., two hours prior to their normal starting time, to help the day crew replace the blades on the No. 3 gang saw. This task was completed at about 5:00 p.m..

Semones then washed and shoveled out the No. 3 saw bay while Potts went to the storage yard to take measurements of the granite blocks that were to be loaded into the No.3 gang saw bay area. The rail cart, with the two blocks, was set in place in the No. 3 saw bay area and sawing commenced at about 7:30 p.m.. Potts stayed at the No. 3 saw because of problems with the shower heads while Semones started washing down the ends of the sawed blocks of granite in the No. 4 saw bay.

At about 10:45 p.m., Potts and Semones went to the No. 4 gang saw to prepare the two sawed blocks of granite for removal to the storage yard. Potts withdrew the saw blades about half-way up in the sawed blocks and inserted small wedges in the cuts from the front of the block. Semones obtained an empty five gallon bucket, went up the steps to the top of the sawed blocks to remove the small cut wedges. After these wedges were removed, Semones returned and emptied his bucket in a storage barrel. Potts proceeded to withdraw the blades, so the rail cart could be pulled from the saw bay. Apparently, the wedges that were installed between the granite block and the rail cart's support arm were knocked out during this maneuver. It is believed that the rear middle wedge between the two blocks fell out at this time.

When Semones returned from emptying his bucket, Potts informed him that the rear middle wedge had fallen out and they would have to replace it. Potts instructed Semones to get another wedge. Semones left and traveled a short distance when he heard a thump and Potts yelled for help. He ran back and saw Potts pinned shoulder to shoulder, between the end-cut slab and the other block. He immediately went up the steps, got on top of the block and tried to push the fallen slab off Potts, but could not move the slab.

Semones then telephoned 911. EMS personnel arrived on the scene within four minutes after receiving the call and detected no vital signs. Potts was extricated and transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. The cause of death was determined to be traumatic asphyxia.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


At 11:50 p.m., on June 11, 2000, Harry L. Verdier, assistant district manager was notified of the accident by a telephone call from David Vernon, MIS director for The N.C. Granite Corporation. An investigation was started the same day and an order was issued under the provisions of 103(k) of the Act to ensure the safety of the miners. MSHA conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine management, mine employees and the miners' representative.

DISCUSSION


1. The accident occurred at the No. 4 gang saw located in the No. 2 gang saws building. All four saws located in this building were manufactured by Giorgini Maggi, driven by 60-horsepower, 480-volt electric motors.

2. Large granite blocks were taken from the quarry to the yard outside the gang saw building, where typically two blocks were placed on a rail cart. The base of the cart was made of steel rails and cross ties. To create a level base to place the uncut-blocks on the cart, several wet uniform piles of Portland cement were placed on the wooden cross ties. Small flat stones were then placed on top of the cement, creating a level surface. After the cement cured the uncut-blocks were then placed on top of the leveled stones. Four to five inches of wet Portland cement was then added at the bottom, beside the block, to lock the block into place.

3. The cart, with the blocks positioned on it, was then pulled into the gang saw building by a wire rope cable and winch, for sawing process.

4. The accident occurred in gang saw No. 4, where two blocks of granite had already been sawed on a previous shift.

5. The size of the first block of granite was approximately 22-inches thick, 63.5- inches high, and 122-inches wide. This block was sawed into 2-inch thick slices, creating a total of nine slices. The end slab that pinned the victim came from this block. It was approximately 63-inches high, 122-inches long, and the width tapered from 6 inches at the top to 1 inch at the bottom. It weighed approximately 2000 pounds.

6. The second block was approximately 35-inches thick, 70-inches high, and 122-inches wide. This block was sawed into 1-inch thick slices, creating a total of 30 slices.

7. The two blocks were placed on the cart with a space between them and also a space between the block and the frame of the cart. Wood wedges were placed between the outside face of the block and cart frame. These outside wedges were 4-inches thick by 11-inches long and the width of the wedge tapered from 10 inches at the top to 7 inches at the bottom. Two of these wedges were used on each side.

8. After the blocks were cut to a depth of approximately 12 to 20 inches, small wooden wedges (1 x 1 x 2.5 inches) were inserted to hold open the cuts made by the saw blades so they could move freely. Wooden braces were placed between the two blocks to prevent the sawed slabs from toppling to the inside. These wooden braces were 2-inches thick by 4-inches wide, and 28-inches long. Reportedly, these wedges were installed from the top of the blocks.

9. The rail cart at the No. 4 gang saw was wet and slippery.

10. Illumination in the area was sufficient.

CONCLUSION


The root cause of the accident was management's failure to provide adequate blocking devices to secure the end blocks. Management's failure to establish written safe operating procedures for persons working with gang saws and the lack of signs to warn persons of the hazard were contributing factors.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


Order No. 7778666 was issued on June 11, 2000, under the provisions of Section 103 (k) of the Mine Act:
A fatal accident occurred in the No. 2 building at the No. 4 gang saw when an employee was crushed between two slabs of granite. This order is issued to assure the safety of persons at this operation until the affected area can be returned to normal operations as determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary. The operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all action to restore operations in the affected area.
This order was terminated on June 23, 2000. Conditions that contributed to the accident have been corrected and normal operations can resume.

Citation No. 7776430 was issued on June 12, 2000, under provisions of 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR, Part 56.20011:
A gang saw operator was fatally injured at this operation on June 11, 2000, when he entered between two sawed granite blocks to insert a wedge. The blocks had been sawed into slabs, and the outside slab from one block fell, pinning the victim against the other block. Signs warning against safety hazards that were not immediately obvious to persons, were not posted at all approaches to the saws.
This citation was terminated on July 11, 2000. Warning signs have been posted at all approaches to the gang saw. Also training has been given and newly designed wedges are being used.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB2000M20

APPENDIXES

A. Persons Participating in the Investigation
B. Persons Interviewed


APPENDIX A

Persons Participating in the Investigation

The N.C. Granite Corporation
Don Shelton, president & ceo
Carlos Goad, senior vice president of operations
Fred Hyatt, vice president of operations
Tim Burkhart, safety director
Johnny Beamer, general superintendent
Terry Hall, cut stone superintendent
Billy Ray Semones, gang saw helper
Clyde Johnson, gang saw operator
Jerry Hooker, foreman
Gary Burkhart, assistant foreman
Leon Woodbury, gang saw operator
Dale Goins, gang saw operator
Charlie Goins, gang saw helper
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Jointers Union Local 8222-T
Burnard Allen, union president
Surry County Emergency Services
John Q. Shelton, director emergency services
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Larry R. Nichols, supervisory mine inspector
Charles E. McDaniel, mine safety and health inspector
Gharib Ibrahim, civil engineer
Wayne L. Maxwell, educational field services

APPENDIX B

Persons Interviewed

The N.C. Granite Corporation
Fred Hyatt, vice president of operations
Jerry Hooker, foreman
Billy Ray Semones, gang saw helper
Clyde Johnson, gang saw operator
Leon Woodbury, gang saw operator
Dale Goins, gang saw operator
Charlie Goins, gang saw helper
Surry County EMS
John Q. Shelton, director emergency services