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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 4

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)

FATAL ELECTRICAL ACCIDENT

Glem Company (A80)
Charleston, Kanawha County, West Virginia

at

Still Run No. 4, ID No. 46-08726
Century Energy Corporation
Elite Consulting (management services)
Itmann, Wyoming County, West Virginia

March 13, 2001

by

Roger Richmond
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Michael G. Kalich
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector (Electrical)

Arlie Massey
Electrical Engineer, A&CC, Triadelphia, West Virginia

Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Edwin P. Brady, District Manager

Release Date: June 26, 2001



OVERVIEW


On Tuesday, March 13, 2001, an electrical contractor was fatally injured when he contacted high voltage power while installing pole mounted capacitors. The victim and two workers had completed the installation of the capacitors located approximately 675 feet from the mine substation and had installed a size 14 twisted pair wire from the substation to the capacitors to provide 120 volt control power for a capacitor switching device. The victim, two co-workers and three mine employees were standing at the mine substation when the plug for the twisted pair wire began to smoke and arc. The victim pulled the plug form the receptacle, picked up the plug to examine it and received a fatal electrical shock (See Sketch). A phase imbalance caused by a defective switch on one of the capacitors induced a current flow onto the frame of the capacitors and the ground wire extending down the pole to a ground rod. The frames were common with the neutral wire of the control power conductor. When the victim contacted the neutral wire, he became a parallel path for this current flow, and was subjected to approximately 3,326 volts.

GENERAL INFORMATION


The Still Run No. 4 mine, operated by Century Energy Corporation, is located at Itmann, Wyoming County, West Virginia. The mine entered active producing status on October 2, 2000.

Employment at the time of the accident included 38 underground employees and 3 surface employees.

The mining method is room and pillar with coal extraction and haulage utilizing a continuous-mining machine, shuttle cars, and belt conveyors. The mine entered the Firecreek seam through 5 drift openings. There are no shaft or slope openings. Presently there is one active MMU. Methane liberation was 19,357 cubic feet per day, 2nd quarter, January through March. The average height of the Firecreek coal seam is 60 inches.

Mine Officials for Century Energy Corporation are listed below:
> James E. Trent President Rockview, WV 24880
Robert J. Toler Secretary Rockview, WV 24880
Jimmy L. Williams Superintendent POB 217, Rockview, WV 24880
The victim, Charles Lilly, was employed by the Glem Company, an electrical contractor in Mullens, West Virginia. This company installs and maintains high-voltage distribution systems at mine sites and various locally-owned community electrical systems.

Riverside Energy, Inc., Sam Hatcher, President, manages the coal property and hired Century Energy Corp. to mine the coal reserve as a contract miner. Riverside Energy, Inc., also contracts with the Glem Company to install and maintain the high-voltage distribution system on the property. Riverside Energy owned the capacitors involved in this accident and hired the Glem Company to move and install the capacitors at the Century Energy, Inc., Still Run No. 4 mine.

Elite Consulting Company, Kenny Bowles, owner, provides management services to Century Energy, Inc., mine. At the request of Sam Hatcher, Riverside Energy, Inc., Kenny Bowles phoned the Glem Company manager, Jack Harris, and told him to have the capacitors moved from an old mine site to the Century Energy, Inc., Still Run No. 4 mine site.

Triangle Safety Services, Don Cook, Director, conducts training for Century Energy, Inc., employees and provides consulting services to the operator when dealing with MSHA and health and safety issues.

The last AAA inspection was completed on December 28, 2000.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT


Between 9:30 a.m., Monday, March 12, 2001, through the time of the accident on Tuesday, March 13, 2001, Still Run No. 4 mine experienced problems with the high voltage fuses blowing at the American Electric Power Company's (AEP) metering point approximately 2� miles from the Still Run No. 4 mine site. Three coal mines are supplied power from this metering point. The Still Run No. 4 mine is owned and operated by Century Energy Corporation. The Still Run No. 9 mine and No. 7 mine are owned and operated by Camp Creek Service Center. When the high voltage fuse blew, all three mines were idled until AEP replaced the fuse. Every time an outage occurred it was on the same phase and at the same location.

Riverside Energy manages the coal owned by Pocahontas Coal Company, and the three mines are contracted by Riverside Energy to mine coal. Samuel Hatcher, president of Riverside Energy, contacted Rick Mitchell of A. E. P., who in turn contacted Century Energy Corporation to try and find a solution to their electrical problem.

At approximately 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, March 13, 2001, Kenneth Bowles, owner of Elite Consulting, presently managing Century Energy Corporation, discussed the power problem with an A. E. P. field representative. The field representative understood the problem but was unable to provide a solution. The field representative called his office for help in finding a solution to the problem. The field representative informed Bowles that his people felt a solution to the problem would be to move a bank of capacitors from the Still Run No. 1 mine to the Still Run No. 4 mine site. Samuel Hatcher stated that the capacitors were purchased from A. E. P. three or four years earlier and that the Still Run No. 1 mine had finished mining about 1� weeks ago and that the capacitors were available. Bowles contacted Glem Company, an electrical contractor, to move the capacitors from the Still Run No. 1 mine to the Still Run No. 4 mine. Jack Harris, manager of Glem Company, instructed three employees, Charles Lilly, Crew Foreman, James Mills, Lineman, and Richard Harris, lineman helper, to take the bank of capacitors from the Still Run No. 1 mine and install them at the Still Run No. 4 mine location. The Glem employees arrived at the Still Run No. 4 mine site between 11:00 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. The Glem employees followed Sam Hatcher to the Still Run No. 1 mine to obtain access to the capacitors. The Glem employees removed the bank of capacitors from the pole at the Still Run No. 1 mine and installed them on the pole at the Still Run No. 4 mine site. This pole is approximately 675 feet from the mine high voltage substation. This substation is a 12,470 volt totally enclosed substation, enclosed by a 6-foot chain link fence with three rows of barbed wire.

Between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, March 13, Bowles called Hatcher to discuss energizing the capacitors. Hatcher spoke with one of the Glem employees and asked how long the main power would be off. He stated that the power would be off between 1 and 2 hours. Hatcher asked if the Glem employees objected to doing the work later, at 11:00 p.m. By waiting until 11:00 p.m., the Still Run No. 7 and No. 9 mines could produce coal on the evening shift. The Glem employees agreed to do the work at 11:00 p.m. Hatcher called Bowles and asked if he had a problem with the work being done at 11:00 p.m. Bowles stated that he was fine with the decision to do the work at that time.

During the process of installing the capacitors, Lilly asked Ronnie Boothe, an employee of Elite Consulting, presently employed by Century Energy Corporation as an outside utility man, for some wire to run power from a 110-volt outlet on the substation to the automatic oil switches on the capacitors. Boothe gave Lilly a roll of 14/2 solid twisted telephone wire. Lilly ran the wire from the substation along the high wall but did not have enough wire to reach the bank of capacitors. Lilly went back and asked Boothe for another roll of wire and Boothe gave Lilly another roll. Lilly made a splice in the wire and made the connection to the automatic re-closures on the bank of capacitors. Lilly asked Boothe for a 120-volt, 3 prong plug. Boothe provided Lilly with the plug and Lilly connected the plug to the 14/2 solid twisted telephone wire at the substation where Lilly then plugged the 120-volt, 3 prong plug into a GFI (ground fault interrupter) receptacle. The power was on at the substation but the capacitors were not energized at this time. An attempt to actuate the automatic oil switches on the bank of capacitors was made; however, they would not operate with the 120-volt control power. Lilly did not remove the plug from the receptacle at this time.

At approximately 6:30 p.m., the A. E. P. high voltage fuse blew. Jimmy Williams, mine foreman/superintendent for Century Energy Corporation, Still Run No. 4 mine, sent the underground employees home except for Charles Halsey, underground foreman, and David Bailey, mine electrician, both employees of Century Energy Corporation and Ronnie Boothe, the outside utility man, an employee of Elite Consulting. Charles Lilly asked Bowles if they could complete the connection of the capacitors to the high voltage line. Glem Company employees completed the work while AEP was restoring the power. Lilly left the mine site to open disconnects. Once the disconnects were open, he (Lilly) called Mills by radio and told him the power was off. Mills made the connections from the capacitors to the high voltage line.

After AEP restored power to the main line, Lilly re-closed the disconnects after Mills completed his work. Lilly returned to the mine site and closed the oil switches on the capacitors manually with a hot stick because an attempt to close them automatically had failed earlier. At approximately 8:00 p.m., Bailey, the second shift electrician, Halsey, underground foreman, and Boothe, the outside utility man, were waiting at the substation for Lilly to put the disconnects in at the capacitors. Lilly and his crew traveled from the capacitors to the substation where Lilly told Bailey that the disconnects were in. Bailey began closing the disconnects at the mine substation from right to left. When the third and final disconnect was put in, a flash occurred at the front, lower section of the substation. The plug on the 14/2 solid twisted telephone wire began smoking and arcing. Lilly ran inside the fenced area and pulled the plug from the receptacle and threw it on the ground. Lilly then picked up the plug to examine it and received a fatal electrical shock. Bailey stated that it appeared as though fire shot out of Lilly's right shoulder, then Lilly fell to the ground. Bailey stated that Lilly was still energized because there were sparks jumping from his coveralls to the fence that surrounded the substation. Bailey stated that Halsey, Boothe, and one of the Glem employees started to run toward Lilly. Bailey threw his arm out to stop the Glem employee and screamed at Halsey and Boothe to stop. Bailey pulled the disconnects at the substation but Lilly was still energized. Mills ran to pull the disconnects at the capacitors, but could not reach them due to the pole and weeds at the bottom of the pole being on fire. Mills ran back to the substation, donned high voltage gloves and used side cutters to cut the 14/2 twisted telephone wire. Mills cut the wire about half way between the substation and the capacitors. Mills then ran back to the substation and cut the wire again inside the fenced area. Mills, Bailey, Halsey, Boothe, and Harris picked Lilly up and carried him outside of the fenced area. Boothe called 911 as soon as the accident occurred and the ambulance arrived within 2 minutes after Lilly was carried out of the fenced area. Halsey checked Lilly for a pulse as soon as they removed him from the fenced area. Halsey stated that the ambulance arrived at that time and CPR was started on Lilly.

Two ambulance services responded to the 911 call, Upper Laurel Ambulance Service, and Jan Care. Attendants from both ambulance crews worked with Lilly. Lilly was transported to the Raleigh General Hospital where he was pronounced dead by Dr. Jean Bernard Poirier at 10:00 p.m. on March 13, 2001.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) was notified of the accident by Don Cook, safety director for Triangle Safety Services at 10:05 p.m., Tuesday, March 13, 2001. MSHA personnel arrived at the accident scene at 12:40 a.m. MSHA personnel and representatives of the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training, jointly conducted the investigation. A 103(k) closure order was issued to ensure the safety of all persons until the investigation could be completed.

Photographs, sketches, audio/video recordings, and an engineering drawing of the area of the accident were made. Interviews were conducted in the conference room of the MSHA Pineville Field Office, Pineville, West Virginia (See Appendix A). Statements were taken from persons considered to have knowledge of the facts surrounding the accident. Those persons who took part in the investigation are listed in the Appendix. The on-site portion of the investigation was completed and the 103(k) order terminated on March 19, 2001.

DISCUSSION


Training

The investigation and examination of records and interviews with management and employees revealed that Charles E. Lilly was not MSHA qualified to perform electrical work. Testimony revealed that none of the Glem Company employees present were qualified electricians. The employees of Glem Company received annual refresher training under the approved Part 48 training plan of Triangle Safety Services, ID No. WTH, Don Cook, MSHA approved instructor. The four employees received Annual Refresher Training on September 23, 2000.

Although the Glem Company employees are not required to be MSHA-qualified to perform electrical work, they must be either MSHA-qualified or under the direct supervision of a person qualified by MSHA to perform electrical work when they are working on mine property. The Glem Company management made no provisions to have a qualified person present while the electrical work was performed. The Glem Company employees received no training or instructions in the proper installation of the capacitors. This lack of knowledge on the safe installation procedures and the manufacturers recommended installation guidelines contributed to the fatal accident.

Physical Factors

1. There had been intermittent power outages caused by a blown fuse at the AEP metering point approximately 2 � miles from the mine site. The same phase had blown at least four times prior to the accident.

2. The victim used a 14/2 solid twisted telephone wire to supply 120 VAC power to the capacitor switching controller. This was plugged into a 120 VAC , GFCI receptacle at the mine substation and ran along the highwall about 675 feet to the pole mounted capacitors. The white conductor of the twisted pair was connected to the wye or neutral point of the capacitors. The incoming transmission line was 12, 470 volts.

3. EQUIPMENT:
Incoming Transmission Line; 12470VAC, Solid Grounded Wye, 3-Wire. Note that the fourth or grounded conductor was not carried to the mine site with phase conductors.

Fused Disconnects; Westinghouse 100Amp Tubes with 40Amp Fusible Links.

Capacitors; Westinghouse DYNA-VAC, 150KVAR, 7200 Volts AC, Style 1N02150A09A, Two parallel capacitors per phase, Total Bank = 900KVAR.

Switches; Westinghouse Type CSL Oil Switch, RatedVoltage 14.4KV, Design Voltage 15.0KV, Rated Continuous Amps 200, Switching Amps 200, Control Voltage 120VAC 60Cy, Style 632A986A01.

Capacitor Switching Control; Built for AEP, Powerflex, Pacific Scientific, Fisher Pierce Division, Model 4844D-BJ66C-29888, Weymouth, MA 02189, Inductive Sensor Unit

Mine Substation; Mining Controls Incorporated, Beckley, WV, Model 31451-49377-1098, 1750KVA Substation Rebuild, Volts 12470-4160/480.
4. CAPACITOR BANK:
-The capacitors were examined and no defects were found. The capacitors measured 16 microfarads per pair.

-The capacitor inductive pickup was installed in center phase line drop to the fused disconnects. It should have been installed in one phase of the incoming line. This mis-installation played no part in the electrocution.

-A 6-foot copper rod was driven into the ground at the base of the pole (butt ground) to create a ground/neutral point for the capacitor installation. The "wye" point of the capacitors was connected to the butt ground.

-The value of the butt ground measured 300 ohms the day after the incident. Five days later, after receiving rain on the area, the butt ground measured 195 ohms.

-One of the three oil switches to the capacitors would not operate and was permanently open.

-Control power for the capacitor switching controller was attempted to be obtained through a 14/2 AWG telephone wire which ran along the highwall for a distance of 175 feet to the mine power center. A 120-Volt three-prong plug was installed on the 14/2 wire for plugging into a ground fault circuit interrupter outlet. The control voltage for capacitor switching controllers should be derived at the capacitor bank location to reduce any unnecessary transfer of voltage potentials.

-The "white" conductor of the 14/2 telephone wire was connected "in common" with the capacitor wye point and butt ground.
5. During the investigation, one of the oil switches to the capacitors was found to be inoperative. With one switch on the capacitor bank inoperative and the remaining two switches closed, a voltage unbalance is created at the wye point of the capacitors. Calculations (calculations in Appendix B) show this voltage is 3326 volts. Estimating the butt ground resistance at 195 ohms measured after the rain, and assuming the utility ground bed is 5 ohms, 16.6 amperes of current flow into the butt ground can then be calculated.

6. An electrical phase imbalance in the capacitor bank, caused by a defective switch for one of the capacitors, resulted in an electric current flow on the grounding conductor from the capacitor frame to the single grounding rod at the base of the pole. The neutral conductor of the control power wire was common with the grounding conductor on the pole which resulted in the voltage-to-ground on the conductor to be approximately 3,326 volts. When the victim picked up the plug to examine it, he became a parallel path to ground for the current flow which resulted in a fatal electrical shock.

CONCLUSION


It is the consensus of the investigative team that failure to examine and/or test the electrical equipment prior to placing it in service resulted in the fatal accident. The capacitors were found to be in an unsafe operating condition. The installation did not conform to the manufacturer recommended specifications. The employees were not properly trained or given the necessary instruction to safely install the capacitors.

ENFORCEMENT ACTION


1. A 103(k) Order, No. 4715794, was issued to the operator to ensure the safety of all miners until an investigation could be completed and the mine deemed safe.

2. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188717 was issued to the operator for a violation of 77.502. The citation stated, "It was determined that electric equipment involved in the accident was not properly examined, tested and maintained by a qualified person to assure safe operating conditions. The following dangerous conditions were found to exist: (1) One of the three oil switches used to control the capacitors was not working properly. The electrical contact tips were worn and not making proper contact. Bolts that held the switching mechanism in place were missing or loose. The oil inside the switch was contaminated. (2) The capacitors were not installed according to manufacturers recommendations. (3) The resistance of the capacitor frame ground was too high to provide a proper low resistance grounding medium. (4) A 14/2 TW twisted pair telephone wire, without ground conductor, was used to supply 120 volt control power. (5) Control power for capacitor bank location, this would reduce transfer of voltage potentials. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001. ALSO LIST AS OPERATOR: ELITE CONSULTING COMPANY."

3. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188719 was issued to the operator for a violation of 77.501. The citation stated, "It was determined that electrical work was performed by persons who were not qualified or were not under the direct supervision of a qualified person as provided by 77.103. The following electrical work was performed: (1) A 120 volt control circuit was installed with wiring connection made inside a junction box and plug end installed. (2) Splices were made in the 120 volt control wire. (3) Installation of capacitors and connection to the 12,470 volt power conductors. (4) Lock and tag out. (5) Installation of grounding conductors. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001. ALSO LIST AS OPERATOR: ELITE CONSULTING COMPANY."

4. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188721 was issued to the operator for a violation of 77.516. The citation stated, "It was determined that improper wiring methods were used to supply the 120 volt control power for the capacitor switching circuit. A 14/2 TW twisted pair telephone wire, without ground conductor, was used. A 120 volt three-prong plug was installed on the 14/2 wire and plugged into a ground fault circuit interrupter outlet at the mine substation. The 14/2 wire ran for 733 feet along the highwall, lying on the ground, and suspended on trees at some locations to the pole mounted capacitors. Splices were made in the 14/2 wire. The capacitor manufacturer recommends control power be derived at the capacitor bank location. Reference the following articles of the 1968 National Electrical Code: 250-59 which requires a grounding conductor to be run with the power supply conductors; 300-4 which provides for protection against damage; 310-1(a) which requires that conductors have mechanical strength, insulation, and ampacity adequate for the conditions; 400-4 which prohibits use of cords for this application; and 400-5 which requires cords to be used in continuous lengths without splices. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001. ALSO LISTED AS OPERATOR: ELITE CONSULTING COMPANY."

5. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188723 was issued to the operator for a violation of 77.701. The citation stated, "It was determined that the metallic frame of the capacitor bank was not properly grounded to a low- resistance ground field. A copper rod was driven into the ground at the base of the pole (butt ground) to create a ground/neutral point for the capacitor installation. The value of the butt ground was measured and found to be 195 ohms. Regulation requires that the grounding conductor extend to a low-resistance ground field. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001. ALSO LISTED AS OPERATOR: ELITE CONSULTING COMPANY."

6. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188725 was issued to the operator for a violation of 77.1710(c). The citation stated, "It was determined that the victim was not wearing protective gloves when he pulled the 120 volt control power plug from the receptacle and then picked up the plug. The plug was arcing and smoking. The victim received a fatal electrical shock as power fed back on the control wire from the capacitor bank. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001. ALSO LISTED AS OPERATOR: ELITE CONSULTING COMPANY."

7. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188716 was issued to the contractor for a violation of 77.502. The citation stated, "It was determined that electric equipment involved in the accident was not properly examined, tested and maintained by a qualified person to assure safe operating conditions. The following dangerous conditions were found to exist: (1) One of the three oil switches used to control the capacitors was not working properly. The electrical contact tips were worn and not making proper contact. Bolts that held the switching mechanism in place were missing or loose. The oil inside the switch was contaminated. (2) The capacitors were not installed according to manufacturers recommendations. (3) The resistance of the capacitor frame ground was too high to provide a proper low resistance grounding medium. (4) A 14/2 TW twisted pair telephone wire, without ground conductor, was used to supply 120 volt control power. (5) Control power for capacitor switching was not derived at the capacitor bank location, this would reduce transfer of voltage potentials. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001."

8. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188718 was issued to the contractor for a violation of 77.501. The citation stated, "It was determined that electrical work was performed by persons who were not qualified or were not under the direct supervision of a qualified person as provided by 77.103. The following electrical work was performed: (1) A 120 volt control circuit was installed with wiring connection made inside a junction box and plug end installed. (2) Splices were made in the 120 volt control wire. (3) Installation of capacitors and connection to the 12,470 volt power conductors. (4) Lock and tag out. (5) Installation of grounding conductors. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001."

9. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188720 was issued to the contractor for a violation of 77.516. The citation stated, "It was determined that improper wiring methods were used to supply the 120 volt control power for the capacitor switching circuit. A 14/2 TW twisted pair telephone wire, without ground conductor, was used. A 120 volt three-prong plug was installed on the 14/2 wire and plugged into a ground fault circuit interrupter outlet at the mine substation. The 14/2 wire ran for 733 feet along the highwall, lying on the ground, and suspended on trees at some locations to the pole mounted capacitors. Splices were made in the 14/2 wire. The capacitor manufacturer recommends control power be derived at the capacitor bank location. Reference the following articles of the 1968 National Electrical Code: 250-59 which requires a grounding conductor to be run with the power supply conductors; 300-4 which provides for protection against damage; 310-1(a) which requires that conductors have mechanical strength, insulation, and ampacity adequate for the conditions; 400-4 which prohibits use of cords for this application; and 400-5 which requires cords to be used in continuous lengths without splices. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001."

10. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188722 was issued to the contractor for a violation of 77.701. The citation stated, "It was determined that the metallic frame of the capacitor bank was not properly grounded to a low- resistance ground field. A copper rod was driven into the ground at the base of the pole (butt ground) to create a ground/neutral point for the capacitor installation. The value of the butt ground was measured and found to be 195 ohms. Regulation requires that the grounding conductor extend to a low-resistance ground field. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001."

11. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7188724 was issued to the contractor for a violation of 77.1710(c). The citation stated, "It was determined that the victim was not wearing protective gloves when he pulled the 120 volt control power plug from the receptacle and picked up the plug. The plug was arcing and smoking. The victim received a fatal electrical shock as power fed back on the control wire from the capacitor bank. This condition contributed to the accident that occurred on March 13, 2001."

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB01C02




APPENDIX A


The following persons were interviewed, provided information, and/or were present during the investigation:

Century Energy Corporation
*David G. Bailey .......... Mine Electrician
Clarence Bower .......... Mine Electrician
*Charles B. Halsey .......... Underground Foreman
Elite Consulting
*Kenneth Bowles .......... Consultant (Self-Employed)
Ronnie L. Boothe .......... Surface Utility Man
Glem Company
*Jack Harris .......... Manager
*James R. Mills .......... Lineman
*Richard Harris .......... Lineman Helper
Riverside Energy
*Samuel D. Hatcher
Triangle Safety Services
Don Cook
West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training
Bobby J. Thornsbury .......... Electrical Inspector
Tom Harmon .......... Electrical Inspector
Mike Rutledge .......... Safety Inspector
Terry Farley .......... Investigator
Don Dickerson .......... Assistant Inspector-at-Large
Mine Safety and Health Administration
William C. Sperry .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector/Electrical Specialist
Preston White .......... Training Specialist
Michael G. Kalich .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector/Electrical/Accident Investigator
Roger D. Richmond .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector/Accident Investigator
Larry E. Cook .......... Supervisory Electrical Engineer
Arlie Massey .......... Technical Support Electrical Engineer
*Persons Interviewed