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United States
Department of Labor
Mine Safety and Health Administration

Coal Mine Safety and Health Administration

Report of Investigation

Underground Coal Mine

Fatal Fall of Roof
June 27, 2001

Solar No. 7 Mine
Genesis, Inc.
Hooversville, Somerset County, Pennsylvania
I.D. No. 36 05123

Accident Investigators

Thomas H. Whitehair II
Coal Mine Safety & Health Inspector

Dan S. Baran
Coal Mine Safety & Health Inspector

William J. Gray
Mining Engineer

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 2
RR 1, Box 736, Hunker, Pennsylvania 15639
Cheryl McGill, District Manager

Release Date: September 10, 2001


OVERVIEW


David Dupont, Jr., Continuous-Mining Machine Operator, was operating a radio-remote controlled continuous-mining machine in the crosscut between the No. 3 and the No. 4 entry of the 1st Left active working section. He had just completed mining the left side of the extended cut. At approximately 8:10 p.m., Joshua Ream, Off-Standard Shuttle Car Operator, prepared to tram his loaded shuttle car away from the continuous-mining machine when he heard the roof fall occur. Howard Hanes, Section Foreman, also heard the roof fall and ran to the continuous-mining machine where he observed the mining-machine operator under the fallen section of mine roof.

The fatality occurred because the continuous-mining machine operator was inby permanent roof supports when the roof fall occurred. Contributing factors to this fatality were: (1) Failure of mine management and the continuous-mining machine operator to recognize the hazard associated with turning the crosscut to the right, while operating the machine from the right side. From this location, it was not possible to see the cutter head while maintaining a position outby the second row of permanent roof supports; and (2) Streamers were not provided on the second outby row of permanent roof supports. The streamers provide identification of the second outby row of permanent roof supports

GENERAL INFORMATION

The Solar No. 7 Mine, I.D. No. 36 05123, operated by Genesis, Inc., is located 1 mile east of the junction of Rt. 30 and LR. 55083 in Hooversville, Somerset County, Pennsylvania. The mine is opened by four drifts into the Upper Kittanning coalbed. The coal seam has a maximum cover of 400 feet and ranges in thickness from 42 to 50 inches. Employment is provided for 31 persons underground and 4 persons on the surface. The mine produces coal two shifts with one maintenance shift each day, six days per week. The mine operates one continuous-mining machine section which produces an average of 1,513 tons of coal daily. Coal is transported from the face area to the section loading point by shuttle cars. Coal is then discharged onto a series of belt conveyors to the surface. Coal is transported by truck to local power generating stations.

The principal officials of the Genesis, Inc. are as follows:
President............................................................John Garcia
Superintendent...................................................Thomas Turner
Engineer............................................................ Paul Parsons
Secretary............................................................Andrew Fusco
The last complete quarterly Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) regular safety and health inspection was completed on June 25, 2001.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT


On June 27, 2001, the afternoon shift crew consisting of nine persons supervised by Howard Hanes, Section Foreman, entered the mine at their regularly scheduled starting time of 2:30 p.m. The crew traveled from the surface to the 1st Left working section, mechanized mining unit (MMU) 007-0 via battery powered rubber tired personnel carriers. They arrived on the section at approximately 2:55 p.m.

At the beginning of the shift, Hanes helped David Dupont Jr., Continuous-Mining Machine Operator, clean the water sprays and change bits. Production was then started in the No. 7 entry and continued in entries 6 and 5, then back again in entries 7 and 6. After mining was completed in the No. 6 entry, the continuous-mining machine was moved to the No. 3 entry.

Dupont Jr. assisted the foreman in marking the center line and rib lines for the crosscut between No. 3 and No. 4 entries. At approximately 7:00 p.m., mining was started for this crosscut. The foreman remained with Dupont Jr. until approximately 7:25 p.m. when he left to start his preshift examination.

Dupont Jr. began turning the crosscut and mined the right side at an angle. He then mined the wedge to the projected left rib, cutting off the left corner of the crosscut. He repositioned the continuous-mining machine and mined the right side of the crosscut through into the No. 4 entry. He moved the mining machine to the left side of the cut and mined it through into the No. 4 entry, loading the off-standard shuttle car operated by Joshua Ream. At approximately 8:10 p.m., Ream was preparing to pull away from the continuous-mining machine when he heard the roof fall and the continuous-mining machine shut off. Shortly thereafter, Ream heard Hanes shout for help. Hanes, who was in the No. 5 entry when the roof fell, immediately ran to the continuous-mining machine where he observed Dupont Jr. under a section of mine roof. The roof rock fell, the left side hitting the mining machine and the right side crushing Dupont against the mine floor.

Hanes, an Emergency Medical Technician, immediately checked Dupont for vital signs. No vital signs were detected. The crew members helped in the recovery. A lifting jack was used to raise the rock off the victim and a crib was built to support the rock. Dupont was removed and transported to the surface where he was pronounced dead at 10:30 p.m. by Wallace Miller, Somerset County Coroner. The victim was then transported to the Conemaugh Medical Hospital, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, where an autopsy was performed.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


At approximately 9:40 p.m., on June 27, 2001, James Biesinger, MSHA Johnstown Field Office Supervisor, was notified by Paul Parsons, Engineer, that a serious accident had occurred. An MSHA accident investigation team was assembled. The team consisted of an accident investigator, a roof control specialist, mining engineer, mining geologist and an education and field services specialist. Prior to the arrival of the accident investigation team, MSHA inspector, Donald Huntley, traveled to the mine and issued a 103 (K) Order to insure the safety of the miners until an investigation could be conducted. MSHA and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection jointly conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine management and miners. Interviews were conducted at the mine site. The onsite investigation was completed on June 29, 2001. The miners elected not to have representation during the investigation.

DISCUSSION


The following is a discussion of the relevant factors identified during the accident investigation.
  • The 1st Left section is a seven-entry single-unit continuous-mining machine development section, operating with one Joy 14-CM-12 continuous miner, three Joy 21SC shuttle cars, two standard and one off-standard. Entries and crosscuts were driven a maximum of 20 feet wide. Entry centers of 45 feet and crosscut centers of 50 feet resulted in pillar sizes of roughly 25 feet by 30 feet. The section is ventilated with a single split of air and exhausting ventilation is used. The height was 48 to 49 inches.


  • The width at the mouth of the crosscut was measured to be approximately 31 feet. The width of the actual crosscut, inby the notched areas, measured between 18 and 19 feet. The overburden at this location was approximately 200 feet. No rib sloughage or other signs of significant pillar stresses were observed anywhere in the immediate vicinity of the accident site.


  • The immediate roof generally consists of sandstone ranging in thickness from 2 to 40 feet. However, as observed in the general vicinity of the accident, the top several inches of coal is interlaminated with pyrite-bearing mudstone, which is overlain with approximately 3 inches of thinly laminated shale. The shale separates easily along rock cleavage planes. Above this is a well-cemented, hard siltstone that contains subtle rock cleavage.


  • The mine roof on the section was typically supported with 42-inch long, fully grouted resin roof bolts, installed on a maximum 4 foot crosswise 5 foot lengthwise pattern. In the No. 3 entry, just outby the accident scene crosscut, 48 inch long fully grouted resin roof bolts were installed in conjunction with metal straps in recognition of a weakened roof zone. This zone was characterized by slickensided fault surfaces.


  • The roof fall material fell out along a slickensided fault surface. The nearly horizontal fault surface is parallel to the roof of the No. 3 entry. Near the right rib, the fault surface begins to gradually ramp up to the roof of the right crosscut. Within 10 feet of the No. 3 entry's right rib, the fault has risen 18 inches into the roof of the crosscut, as exposed in the fall area. The rock separated along a polished surface, lubricated by water. The fallen rock measured approximately 27 feet long diagonally, at its longest point and approximately 12 feet wide. It ranged in thickness from a feather edge to 18 inches.


  • The continuous-mining machine was on the left side of the crosscut from the No. 3 to the No. 4 entry. Both the left and right side mining passes had cut through into the No. 4 entry. See Appendix No. 3 for basic cut sequence. The distance between the last row of permanent roof supports in the No. 3 entry to the first row of permanent roof supports in the No. 4 entry was 35 feet. The right side of the crosscut had been mined 31 feet 3 inches and the left side was mined 31 feet 2 inches. The approved roof control plan limits cut depths to a maximum of 30 feet.


  • The approved roof control plan requires that "the continuous-mining machine operator (remote-control station) and other persons in the area shall not expose any portion of their body inby the second outby row of permanent supports (next to last row) while the mining machine is in operation." Dupont Jr. was recovered on the right side of the crosscut (No. 3 to No. 4 entry), approximately 5 feet inby permanent supports and 9 feet inby the second outby row of permanent supports. The investigation revealed that during the recovery of Dupont Jr., he was found in a sitting position, with his legs crossed and his body bent over the remote control unit which was located on his lap. It was determined from testimony and by the location of the lifting jack under the rock, the victim was 5 feet inby the last row of permanent roof supports when the roof fall occurred.


  • The approved roof-control plan requires that streamers be installed on the second outby row of permanent roof supports for extended cut mining. The purpose of the streamers is to identify the location of the second outby row of permanent roof supports which marks the inby boundry a miner can be positioned during mining. During the onsite investigation and after interviews with the crew, it was determined that no streamers were hung. Interviews with the section crew indicated that streamers were normally used, however, the only streamer found on the section at the time of the accident was hanging from the victim's mine belt.


  • The Joy 14-CM-12 , radio controlled continuous-mining machine, Serial Number JM4136R, measured 33 feet 6 inches from the bits to the end of the conveyor boom.


  • During the onsite investigation, mining activity prior to the accident was recreated by positioning the off-standard and standard shuttle cars behind the Joy continuous-mining machine. The mining machine was located in the same position as when the accident occurred. This was done to determine the relative locations of the shuttle cars in reference to the second outby row of permanent roof supports.


  • Interviews with the section crew indicated Dupont Jr. operated the continuous-mining machine from the right side in order to watch the mining machine cable. Based on the onsite investigation, it was determined that when the machine operator was located on the right side of the machine and making a turn to the right, he would not have visibility around the corner to the front of the machine and be able to maintain a position outby the second row of permanent roof supports.


  • Training records were reviewed. No training deficiencies were noted.
  • CONCLUSION


    The fatality occurred because the continuous-mining machine operator was inby permanent roof supports when the roof fall occurred. Contributing factors to this fatality were: (1) Failure of mine management and the continuous-mining machine operator to recognize the hazard associated with turning the crosscut to the right, while operating the machine from the right side. From this location, it was not possible to see the cutter head while maintaining a position outby the second row of permanent roof supports; and (2) Streamers were not provided on the second outby row of permanent roof supports. The streamers provide identification of the second outby row of permanent roof supports.

    ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


    The following citations/orders were issued due to conditions revealed during the investigation:
    1. A 103(k) Order was issued to ensure the safety of all persons in the mine until an investigation was completed and all areas and equipment were deemed safe.

    2. A 104 (a) Citation was issued for violation of 30 CFR 75.202 (b). The continuous- mining machine operator traveled inby the last row of permanent roof support while remotely operating the Joy continuous-mining machine, Serial No. JM 4136, in the crosscut between the No. 3 and No. 4 entries on the 1st Left (MMU 007-0) working section. A roof fall occurred and the continuous-mining machine operator was fatally injured.

    3. A 104(a) Citation was issued for violation of 30 CFR 75.220(a)(1). The operator's approved roof-control plan was not being complied with on the 1st Left (MMU 007-0) working section. The continuous-mining machine operator traveled inby the last row of permanent roof support while remotely operating from the right side of the Joy 14CM12 continuous-mining machine, Serial No. JM4136R, in the crosscut between the No. 3 and the No. 4 entries. The plan requires that during mining with a remote control miner, all persons shall be positioned in an area that will afford protection to themselves and others from unsupported roof and moving equipment. A roof fall occurred and the continuous-mining operator was fatally injured.

    4. A 104(a) Citation was issued for violation of 30 CFR 75.220 (a) (1). The operator`s approved roof-control plan was not being complied with on the 1st Left (MMU 007-0) working section. Streamers were not placed on the second outby row of permanent roof supports while mining an extended cut in crosscut No. 3 to No. 4 entry.

    5. A 104(a) Citation was issued for violation of 30 CFR 75.220 (a)(1) under a spot inspection. The operator`s approved roof-control plan was not being complied with on the 1st Left (MMU 007-0) working section. A cut was taken in the crosscut between No. 3 and No. 4 entries that exceeded the maximum allowable depth of 30 feet.

    Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
    Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB00C10




    APPENDIX 1


    The following persons provided information and/or were present during the investigation:

    The following persons provided information and/or were present during the investigation:
    Genesis, Inc. Officials
    Paul Parsons ............... Manager of Engineering
    Thomas Turner ............... Superintendent/ Mine Foreman
    Howard Hanes ............... Section Foreman
    Joseph Yuhas ............... Attorney
    Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
    Joseph Sbaffoni ............... Division Chief
    Ellsworth R. Pauley ............... Inspector Supervisor
    Lynn D. Jamison ............... Mine Inspector
    Mine Safety and Health Administration
    Carol M. Boring ............... Staff Assistant
    Thomas H. Whitehair II ............... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Dan Baran ............... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    Don Huntley ............... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
    William Gray ............... Mining Engineer, PH&STC Roof Control Division
    Sandin E. Phillipson PH.D. ............... Mining Geologist, PH&STC Roof Control Division
    Jerry Vance ............... Education and Field Services Training Specialist
    County of Somerset
    Wallace Miller ............... Coroner
    Somerset Area Ambulance
    Wilma Manges ............... Business Office Manager


    APPENDIX 2
    List of Persons Interviewed

    Genesis, Inc.
    Thomas Turner ............... Superintendent/Mine Foreman
    Howard N. Hanes ............... Section Foreman
    Douglas L. Custer ............... Roof Bolting Machine Operator
    Michael Deist ............... Roof Bolting Machine Operator
    David M. Custer ............... Shuttle Car Operator
    David Dupont Sr. ............... Shuttle Car Operator
    Joshua W. Ream ............... Shuttle Car Operator
    Allen Fulmer ............... Scoop Operator
    Randy L. Stigers ............... Electrician/Mechanic