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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Underground Coal Mine

Fatal Powered-Haulage Accident
January 31, 2002

Huff Creek No. 1 Mine
Lone Mountain Processing, Inc.
Holmes Mill, Harlan County, Kentucky
ID No. 15-17234

Accident Investigators

Robert D. Clay
Coal Mine Safety and Health inspector

William R. Johnson
Supervisory Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

William H. Sharp Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Ventilation Specialist

Originating Office
Coal Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 7
3837 S. U.S. Hwy 25 E. , Barbourville , Kentucky , 40906
Joseph W. Pavlovich, District Manager


OVERVIEW


Abstract


At approximately 5:35 a.m. on Thursday, January 31, 2002, a fatal powered-haulage accident occurred at the Lone Mountain Processing, Inc., Huff Creek No. 1 Mine.

Frank Jenkins, a 32 year old mobile roof support operator with 11 years of total mining experience, suffered fatal injuries as a result of being struck by and run over with a Stamler battery powered coal hauler. The victim was discovered entangled in a piece of brattice cloth , lying approximately 20 feet into the No. 3 entry.

According to witness accounts , the last time the victim was seen alive was only moments prior to the accident , when he was observed dragging a piece of brattice cloth from the No. 5 entry towards the No. 4 entry.

There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. Based upon the physical evidence observed at the scene and statements obtained during interviews, it is the consensus of the accident investigation team that the accident and resultant fatality occurred when the No. 1 Battery Operated Stamler BH-Coal Hauler traveled off of the roadway into the No. 4 Entry and ran over the victim, who reportedly could not be readily seen.

It is the further consensus of the accident investigation team that the accident occurred as a result of the mine operator's failure to maintain an operable warning device and to sound the same in locations where persons may be endangered by the movement of the equipment.

Additional recommendations to prevent such an accident from re-occurring include; equipment operators maintaining a safe distance between the equipment being operated and other miners in the area and, all miners being instructed to constantly be aware of the location(s) of equipment and travel routes in areas or locations where they cannot be readily seen by equipment operators.

GENERAL INFORMATION


The Huff Creek No. 1 Mine is located approximately two miles west of Holmes Mill, in Harlan County, Kentucky. Lone Mountain Processing, Incorporated, a subsidiary of Arch Coal, opened the mine in July, 1993. One shaft and two slope openings access the underground workings. Coal is transported out of the mine by belt conveyors. Mining first began in 1993. The mine has four continuous mining machine sections. In 2001, the mine produced 3,016,000 million tons of coal. The mine property is owned in fee by Ark Land Company which is a holding company for Arch Minerals. Miners are not represented through a collective bargaining agreement.

The No. 3 Rt. Panel off of No. 3 South section, where the fatal accident occurred, is a 5-Entry retreating working section that began development on July, 2001. The No. 1 Entry is the section's return entry. The No. 2 Entry is a neutral entry. A 48 inch section conveyor belt is located in the No. 3 Entry. The No. 4 entry is also a neutral entry and the No. 5 entry is the section's intake entry. These entries are developed on 80 to 90-foot centers with crosscuts on 80-foot centers. The average daily production at the mine is 3,000 tons. The mine employees approximately 166 persons, including 160 underground employees and 6 employees on the surface. The mine works three eight hour shifts per day. One shift is an alternated maintenance non-production shift and two are production shifts. This schedule is normal for five days per week, with major maintenance and rehabilitation work being done on weekends.

The Principal officers of the operations are as follows:
Thomas Baumgarth .......... President
James E. Florczar .......... Vice President
Arnold Hammons .......... Mine Manager
Jim Vicini .......... Safety Manager
The last Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspection was completed on December 27, 2001. The Non-Fatal Days Lost (NFDL) incident rate for this mine for 2001 was 7.97 compared to the National Underground NFDL rate of 6.32.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT


On Wednesday, January 30, 2002, the midnight shift crew, under the supervision of Billy R. Wilson, Section Foreman, entered the mine at 10:30 p.m. and traveled via diesel powered personnel carrier to the 001 working section . Wilson and the crew of eight miners arrived on the section at approximately 10:50 p.m.. This crew relieved the evening shift on the section , upon which time the evening shift crew left the working section and exited the mine. Mining began in the No. 2 Entry using a remote controlled Joy Model 14-10 CM continuous mining machine and Stamler BH-Coal Hauler , Model BH-Series Ram Cars for haulage to the dumping point which was located three crosscuts away. After second mining was completed in the No. 2 Entry , the continuous mining machine was moved to the No. 5 Entry , at which time a maintenance problem developed with the machine that took approximately 2 hours and 30 minutes to repair.

Frank Jenkins , victim, a mobile equipment operator, had previously been in the No. 5 Entry along with the continuous mining machine operator , Lenny Gilliam , and continuous mining machine helper, David Hartford , observing as repairs were being made to the machine . According to statements obtained during interviews, Jenkins was last seen dragging a large piece of brattice cloth towards the No. 4 Entry . Further according to statements received this was done to prevent the brattice cloth from becoming entangled in the continuous mining machine bits and being wrapped around the head portion of the machine when it restarted. At approximately 5:35 a.m., Thursday, January 31, mining in the No. 5 entry was resumed. Matt Marsee, the No. 1 ram car operator, was returning from the battery charging station where he had just completed changing out his depleted batteries. As Marsee returned to the pillar line he observed the continuous mining machine located in the No. 5 entry intersection. According to his statement, Marsee concluded that the machine must have been ready to begin mining at that location. Marsee stated that he determined that he would have to turn left into the No. 4 Entry, " battery -end- first", to be able to approach the machine with the Stamler BH-Coal Hauler bucket end. As soon as Marsee arrived at the continuous mining machine, Gilliam, inquired as to whether he had seen Jenkins. Marsee replied that he had not. Gilliam reportedly advised Marsee that Jenkins had left moments earlier dragging a large piece of brattice cloth towards No. 4 entry out of the way of the mining machine. At this time, Marsee exited his machine and traveled to the adjacent No. 4 entry intersection to where he had just turned the Stamler BH-Coal Hauler. As Marsee came into the intersection he observed the victim, Jenkins, lying on the mine floor, entangled in a large piece of brattice cloth. Jenkins, who was located in the No. 4 Entry for reasons unknown, had apparently been struck and run over by the #1 Stamler BH-Coal Hauler operated by Marsee. According to statements obtained during interviews, upon discovering Jenkins , Marsee notified the continuous mining machine operator, Gilliam, and his helper Hartford, of what had occurred.

At the time of being notified of the accident, Foreman Wilson was located three cross cuts outby the accident location and was reportedly in the process of calling out the results of his pre-shift examination. The foreman first used the mine telephone to call to the surface for assistance and then traveled immediately to the accident site. Wilson examined Jenkins and detected no vital signs. Moments later, Greg Miles, Section Foreman on the nearby 002 working section, also an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), hurried to the accident site and examined Jenkins. Upon completion of a patient assessment, Miles determined that Jenkins had apparently died from injuries sustained. Soon after Miles had determined that Jenkins had died, another foreman (also an EMT), Ronnie Smith, arrived at the accident site and confirmed Miles' finding.

Jenkins was then placed onto a stretcher and transported 145 cross cuts, approximately 13,500 feet, to the surface. Upon arrival on the surface emergency personnel examined the victim with representatives of the Keokee Fire and Rescue Squad, who had been notified earlier. The Harlan County Coroner, Phillip Bianchi, was dispatched to the mine site by Kentucky State Police Post 10.

Upon his arrival and a subsequent examination of the victim, Bianchi pronounced the victim dead at 8:10 a.m. The cause of death was listed as "crushing injuries to the head, torso, and extremities" as a result of " being overrun by a large piece of coal mining machinery".

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


At approximately 6:00 a.m. on January 31, 2002, Kevin Doan, Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector of MSHA's Harlan, Kentucky Field Office, was notified of the accident by David Mcknight, Foreman. Doan immediately contacted MSHA Supervisor Robert Rhea, who subsequently notified Jim Langley, Acting Assistant District Manager. Langley immediately assembled and dispatched an accident investigation team which arrived at the mine at 6:55 a.m. A 103 (k) Order was issued to ensure the safety of the miners until an investigation could be conducted.

MSHA conducted the investigation jointly with the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals along with the assistance of mine management and the miners.

Interviews of eight miners, were conducted on February 1, 2002 at the MSHA, Harlan, Kentucky Field Office . Also present during the interviews were; Marco Rakovich, Attorney for Lone Mountain Processing, Inc. and J. Phillip Giannikas, Attorney-Office of the Solicitor. None of those interviewed requested that their statements be kept confidential.


PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED


The investigation revealed the following as physical factors related to the accident:

1. The accident occurred approximately 2.55 miles inby the drift opening in the No. 4 Entry on the (001 MMU).

2. Measurements taken at the accident scene revealed that the overall mining height was 58 inches, as measured from the mine floor to the mine roof.

3. The accident occurred adjacent to the left center of the No. 4 Entry, 33 feet inby Survey Station No. 1581.

4. The width of the roadway at the accident scene measured approximately 21.5 feet. The roadway was timbered to a width of 20 feet in the accident area. The approved roof control plan limits entry widths to 20 feet.

5. The Model BH-Series Stamler battery powered Stamler BH-Coal Hauler, Serial Number BH10-1022 is 36 feet in length, 10 feet & 3 inches wide, and has a ground clearance of 8 inches.

6. No mechanical deficiencies were found with operating functions of the battery powered Stamler BH-Coal Hauler which would have contributed to the accident. Functioning tests were performed on the Stamler BH-Coal Hauler by the Mine Safety and Health Administration and the Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals. Complete examinations were conducted of the lights, panic switches, bars, all functions of the foot and hand controls, brakes, steering, and electrical components. However, the sounding device, which consisted of a bell installed in the machine operator's deck was found to be inoperative due to a missing spring in the hammer mechanism. (Note: Operable warning devices were required on all self-propelled rubber-tired haulage equipment used in this mine by Safeguard No. 7456458, issued on June 4, 1998.)

7. An interview with the Stamler BH-Coal Hauler operator involved in the accident revealed that his visibility was limited due to the mining height and restriction of the canopy opening. Statements obtained during this interview also revealed that the warning device had not been sounded at the time the machine entered the No. 4 Entry, despite decreased visibility.

8. The Stamler BH-Coal Hauler was being trammed with the battery end pointed towards the victim and pillar line in the No. 4 Entry. According to his statement, the machine's operator was facing in the direction of travel at the time of the accident, but did not see the victim.

DISCUSSION


The operator of the subject Stamler BH-Coal Hauler stated in interview that he was unaware of the location of the continuous mining machine as he had just returned from changing batteries. The travel route taken by the machine's operator necessitated a directional change in order to approach the continuous mining machine for proper loading. This was the reason for the coal hauler's turn into the No.4 Entry. There was no apparent reason for the victim's presence at that location. Therefore, an examination of work practices and procedures in place on the working section was undertaken by the accident investigation team.

Normal work procedures for changing out depleted coal hauler batteries appeared to have been followed. Additional interviews of the remaining coal hauler operators indicated that the travel routes to the continuous mining machine's location were familiar to the other operators and that they had examined these workings during the course of the working shift in question. A 'dip' or depression existed in the roadway located in the crosscut immediately outby the subject roadway. The presence of the 'dip' resulted in close clearance problems while negotiating this roadway and was therefore not being used.

The reason for the victim's presence at the accident location could not be ascertained by the investigators.

TRAINING


Records indicate that all required training had been conducted in accordance with Part 48, Title 30 CFR.

CONCLUSION


There were no eyewitnesses to the accident . Based upon the physical evidence observed at the scene and statements obtained during interviews, it is the consensus of the accident investigation team that the accident and resultant fatality occurred when the No. 1 Battery Operated Stamler BH-Coal Hauler traveled off of the roadway into the No. 4 Entry and ran over the victim, who reportedly could not be readily seen.

It is the further consensus of the accident investigation team that the accident occurred as a result of the mine operator's failure to maintain an operable warning device and to sound the same in locations where persons may be endangered by the movement of the equipment.

Additional recommendations to prevent such an accident from re-occurring include; equipment operators maintaining a safe distance between the equipment being operated and other miners in the area and, all miners being instructed to constantly be aware of the location(s) of equipment and travel routes in areas or locations where they cannot be readily seen by equipment operators.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


1. A 103 (k) Order No. 7531871 , was issued to ensure the safety of the miners and to preserve the accident scene until an investigation could be completed.

2. A 104(a) Citation No. 7531943 was issued for failure to maintain an operable warning device.

3. A Notice to Provide Safeguards, No. 7531938 under Section 314(b) of the Mine Act 75.1403-10 (F) , requiring operators of mobile equipment to sound an audible alarm where persons may be endangered.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB02C04




APPENDIX A


Those who were present and/or participated in the investigation are listed follows:

Lone Mountain Processing, Inc. - Officials
David Williams .......... General Mine Foreman
Arnold Hammons .......... Mine Manager
Jimbo Vicini .......... Safety Manager
Ronnie Smith .......... Foreman/EMT (1st Shift)
Donnie Feltner .......... Safety Department
Billy R. Wilson .......... Section Foreman (3rd. Shift)
Greg Miles .......... Section Foreman/(3rd Shift)
Marco Rakovich .......... Attorney
Lone Mountain Processing, Inc. - Employees
William Middleton .......... Shuttle Car Operator
John Wyrick .......... Shuttle Car Operator
Mike Stewart .......... Roof Bolt Machine Operator
Charles Caldwell .......... Roof Bolt Machine Operator
David Hartford .......... Continuous Mining Machine Helper
Lenny Gilliam .......... Continuous Mining Machine Operator
John Wade .......... Repairman
Matt Marsee .......... Shuttle Car Operator
Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals
Tracy Stumbo .......... Chief Accident Investigator
David Disney .......... Deputy Supervisor
Ronnie Hampton .......... Supervisor
Sherill Fouts .......... Inspector/Electrical
Daven Hoskins .......... Inspector/Accident Investigator
George Johnson .......... Inspector/Accident Investigator
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Robert Rhea .......... Supervisory CMS&H Inspector
William R. Johnson .......... Supervisory CMS&H Inspector
Daniel Johnson .......... Supervisory CMS&H Inspector
William Sharp .......... CMS&H Inspector/Accident Investigator
Robert Clay .......... CMS&H Inspector/Accident Investigator
Kevin Doan .......... CMS&H Inspector
Stanley Sturgill .......... CMS&H Inspector
J. Phillip Giannikas .......... Attorney-Office of the Solicitor
Harlan County Coroner's Office
Phillip Bianchi .......... Harlan County Coroner