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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 4

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE
FATAL MACHINERY ACCIDENT

No. 1 Mine (ID No. 46-07430)
Daniel's Branch Coal Co., Inc.
Hampden, Mingo County, West Virginia

April 18, 1995

By

Curtiss Vance, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Gerald D. Dransite
Electrical Engineer Intrinsic Safety and Instrumentation Branch

Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Michael J. Lawless, District Manager


OVERVIEW

Abstract

On Tuesday, April 18, 1995, about 2:10 a.m., a fatal machinery accident occurred in the No. 7 entry of the Southwest Mains working section, 002-0 mechanized mining unit.

The maintenance crew was performing mechanical repairs to the hydraulic system of the No. 3 Eimco Model 2810 continuous-mining machine (Serial No. 70880111). James L. Porter, electrician's helper, was positioned on the chain conveyor of the continuous-mining machine to observe the repairs for hydraulic fluid leaks.

The accident occurred when the maintenance foreman started the continuous-mining machine and activated the gathering pan switch on the radio remote control send unit. An electrical short circuit inside the radio remote control send unit caused inadvertent activation of the chain conveyor. Porter was pulled into the conveyor boom where he sustained crushing injuries when he became trapped between the boom and the mine roof.

The accident and resultant fatality occurred because electrical power was not removed from the continuous-mining machine during mechanical repairs and testing.


GENERAL INFORMATION

Daniel's Branch Coal Co., Inc., No. 1 Mine, located at Hampden, Mingo County, West Virginia, is developed from the surface by five drift entries into the Lower Cedar Grove coalbed that averages about 110 inches in height. The mine began production on February 29, 1988.

The immediate mine roof consists of sandy shale supported by 48-inch mechanical-type roof bolts, 6-inch by 10-inch roof-bolt plates, and 4-foot to 16-foot metal straps as needed during normal mining cycles. Supplemental roof supports, such as timbers, cribs, and wooden headers, are installed in areas containing adverse roof conditions.

This mine operates only one coal producing section. The coal is extracted by using the room-and-pillar method. The full pillar recovery method is utilized in the 002-0 mechanized mining unit.

The mine employs a total of 44 miners underground and 5 employees on the surface daily. The day and afternoon shifts produce coal.

The midnight shift performs equipment and general mine main- tenance. Coal production averages about 3,960 tons daily.

The mine liberates 13,594 cubic feet of methane in a 24-hour period. Ventilation is induced into the mine by a 6-foot blowing fan which produces about 100,000 cubic feet of air per minute. A single-split system ventilates the working section.

Eimco Model 2810 continuous-mining machines are used to mine coal from the working faces. Coal is transported from the continuous-mining machine by shuttle cars. Belt conveyors are then used to transfer coal to the surface.

The day, evening, and night shifts work from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., and 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., respectively. The mantrip portal time ranges from 15 to 20 minutes. The miners and supplies are transported underground by track-mounted battery-powered personnel carriers and supply cars.

A regular safety and health inspection was ongoing at the time of the fatal accident. The last Mine Safety and Health Administration regular safety and health inspection was completed on January 23, 1995.


DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT

On Monday, April 17, 1995, James L. Porter, electrician's helper, began his regular shift at 3 p.m. Prior to the end of the evening shift, Porter discussed equipment breakdowns with Jimmy Cline, the chief midnight shift electrician for Daniel's Branch Coal Co. Porter informed Cline that he and Curtis Blevins, electrician, would stay late to work on the No. 3 Eimco Model 2810 continuous-mining machine.

About 12 a.m., April 18, Cline arrived at the No. 7 entry of Southeast Mains section where Porter and Blevins were working on the No. 3 Eimco Model 2810 continuous-mining machine. Porter informed Cline that he had discovered a ruptured hydraulic hose on the continuous-mining machine.

The conveyor boom was raised near the mine roof and securely blocked with crib blocks. Cline then walked to the No. 4 entry where electricians, Gary Jeffery and Mike Hawks, were repairing a shuttle car.

After Porter and Blevins replaced the ruptured hydraulic hose, Porter started the continuous-mining machine to check for leaks at the hose connections. When Porter started the machine, he noticed that the main hydraulic pump had ruptured.

Porter walked up the No. 4 entry and informed Cline that the pump had ruptured when the continuous-mining machine was started.

Cline instructed Porter to replace the pump and to check the hydraulic system for blockage.

Porter and Blevins began replacing the hydraulic pump. Cline informed Porter that he was going to the surface to get parts for the shuttle car.

Porter and Blevins replaced the main hydraulic pump. Porter then replaced the relief valve in the hydraulic pilot pressure system.

When Cline returned from the surface, Porter informed him that the new relief valve was not operating properly. Porter was sitting on the chain conveyor of the continuous-mining machine and started the hydraulic pump motor with the radio remote control send unit (RRCSU) to show Cline that the new relief valve was not operating properly.

The new relief valve was removed by Porter and the old relief valve was cleaned and reinstalled into the hydraulic system. Porter remained on the chain conveyor and used the RRCSU to start and stop the pump motor several times to determine if the pump was operating properly. Porter attempted to raise the ripper head; however, his cap light battery was too weak to operate the remote control unit.

Porter then disconnected the RRCSU from his battery and gave the unit to Cline who was standing beside the continuous-mining machine. Porter remained on the chain conveyor. Cline connected the RRCSU to his battery and informed Porter that he was starting the continuous-mining machine and would attempt to raise the gathering pan.

Cline started the continuous-mining machine and depressed the control for the gathering pan to the raised position. The chain conveyor engaged, carrying Porter toward the discharge end of the conveyor boom. Cline immediately stopped the continuous-mining machine with the panic switch on the RRCSU. Porter was crushed between the mine roof and the conveyor boom.

The crib blocks that had been used to secure the boom of the continuous-mining machine in the raised position were removed. Cline then lowered the conveyor boom using the machine-mounted controls. After the boom was lowered, Cline and Blevins discovered Porter was lying on the mine floor. Porter had apparently fallen as the conveyor boom was lowered.

Cline assessed Porter's vital signs and found none. Cline instructed Blevins to contact the other miners for assistance. Cline called the dispatcher and requested ambulance service.

William Hawks, emergency medical technician, arrived at the accident site within a few minutes. Hawks assessed Porter and began to administer cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Porter was then loaded onto a stretcher and transported to the surface. Attendants from Stafford Ambulance Service continued emergency treatment and transported Porter to the Man Appalachian Regional Hospital. Porter was pronounced dead on arrival by Dr. DeLara.


INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT

The Mine Safety and Health Administration was notified of the accident by Jimmy Cline, at 2:30 a.m., Tuesday, April 18, 1995. Representatives of the Mine Safety and Health Administration and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted the investigation.

The Mine Safety and Health Administration issued a 103(k) Order to ensure the safety of all persons. Jimmy Cline had lowered the continuous miner boom from the original position at the time of the accident to remove the victim. Otherwise, the scene had not been disturbed. Photographs and measurements were taken and an engineering survey by Guyandotte Consultants, Inc. was conducted prior to any further disturbance of the accident scene.

The employees present at the accident scene gave initial statements concerning the accident. Persons known to have information surrounding the accident were interviewed on April 20, 1995, in MSHA's Mount Gay field office conference room.

The physical portion of the investigation was completed on April 25, 1995, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.


DISCUSSION

Examinations

The electrical records indicated that the No. 3 Eimco 2810 continuous-mining machine, Serial No. 70880111, had been removed from service on February 24, 1995.

Training

The records indicated that Porter, Blevins, and Cline had received all requisite training as required by 30 CFR Part 48.

Physical Factors

  1. The No. 3 Eimco Model 2810 continuous-mining machine had been removed from service 53 days prior to the accident.

  2. According to interviews, the lid for the hydraulic oil tank on the No. 3 Eimco Model 2810 continuous-mining machine had come loose, allowing fine coal dust to enter the oil tank, contaminating the oil. The contaminated oil caused the hydraulic system to clog prior to February 24, 1995, the date the continuous-mining machine was removed from service.

  3. The Moog, Inc., Model 129-188-DO1, radio remote control send unit, Serial No. 240, used to operate the No. 3 Eimco 2810 continuous-mining machine on April 18, 1995, the day of the accident, was a repaired unit that was delivered to Daniel's Branch Coal Co., Inc., on March 28, 1995, by Eimco, Inc.

  4. The discharge end of the chain-conveyor boom on the No. 3 Eimco Model 2810 continuous miner was blocked in its highest position in close proximity to the mine roof. The seam height at the accident site was 110 inches.

  5. According to Curtis Blevins, electrician, the electrical power had been provided to the continuous-mining machine the entire time mechanical repairs were being performed.

  6. The victim was positioned midway on the chain conveyor of the continuous miner during the mechanical repairs and during attempts by himself to test the machine with a radio remote control send unit.

  7. Jimmy Cline, chief electrician, was directing the repairs to the Eimco continuous miner and to a shuttle car at another location. Cline allowed Porter to position himself on the chain conveyor of the energized continuous-mining machine while tests of the hydraulic system were being conducted.

  8. Tests conducted at the MSHA Approval and Certification Center revealed that the Moog radio remote control send unit was defective. The misrouting of a wiring bundle from the switch panel assembly to the logic board allowed a portion of wires in the wiring bundle to be pinched between a burred terminal screw head and wiring bundle connector damaging insulation on wiring. An intermittent short circuit existed between a switch terminal center screw and a conductor with damaged insulation. Test simulations indicated that the short-circuit condition was of an intermittent nature. Inadvertent activation of the chain conveyor could occur by activation of any switch function.


CONCLUSION

The accident and resultant fatality occurred because electrical power was not removed from the continuous-mining machine during mechanical repairs and testing.

An electrical short circuit inside the radio remote control send unit activated the chain conveyor which contributed to the accident.


CONTRIBUTING VIOLATIONS

A 104(d)(1) Citation No. 3968678 was issued, stating in part that electrical power had not been removed from the continuous-mining machine during mechanical repairs, a violation of Section 75.1725(c), Title 30 CFR.

A 104(a) Citation No. 3968679 was issued, stating in part that the Moog Model 129-188DOl radio remote control unit was not maintained in a safe operating condition. An electrical short circuit inside the unit caused unexpected activation of the chain conveyor, a violation of Section 75.1725(a), Title 30 CFR.



Respectfully submitted by:

Curtiss Vance, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector


Approved by:

Billy G. Foutch
Assistant District Manager

Michael J. Lawless
District Manager

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon [FAB95C12]