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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 4

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND MINE

FATAL FALL OF RIB

White Knight Mine (I.D. 46-08055)
Elk Run Coal Company, Inc.
Sylvester, Boone County, West Virginia

September 9, 1996


by

Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Coal Mine Safety and Health, District 4

William J. Gray
Mining Engineer
Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center

Jon A. Braenovich
Mining Engineering
Coal Mine Safety and Health, District 4

James E. Cline
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Specialist
Coal Mine Safety and Health, District 4


Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Earnest Teaster, Jr., District Manager

OVERVIEW

Abstract



On Monday, September 9, 1996, at approximately 9:40 a.m., the victim was performing maintenance on a cable conduit near the right front side of a Fletcher RRII roof-bolting machine on the West Mains section in the last open crosscut between the No. 2 and No. 3 entries. He was positioned 3 feet from the coal rib. The total rib of coal and rock approximately 50 feet long fell, with a section of this rib approximately 14 1/2 feet in length, 25 inches in width, and 13 1/2 inches in thickness, striking the victim in the upper torso and lower extremities, crushing him against the roof-bolting machine. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed on the victim from the accident site to the surface, without response. An ambulance from the Whitesville Fire Department was waiting on the surface. The victim was transported to the Charleston Area Medical Center and pronounced dead at 12:01 p.m. on September 9, 1996, by Dr. Ieanez.

The accident and resultant fatality were a result of management's failure to identify and effectively control hazardous rib conditions on the West Mains section, where miners were required to work or travel.

Background



The White Knight mine is operated by Elk Run Coal Company, Inc., and is located along Route 3 near Whitesville, Boone County, West Virginia. The mine enters the Powellton coal seam through six drift openings and averages 36 to 84 inches in height. Employment is provided for a total of 75 miners, 72 working underground and 3 working on the surface. There are two production shifts and one maintenance shift which produce coal 5 to 6 days a week. The mine produces an average of 6,200 raw tons of coal daily from two continuous-mining-machine super sections. The West Mains and the Southwest Mains sections are mining on the advance. The West Mains section started in January 1996, developing seven entries approximately 4,900 feet off Southeast Mains. Coal is transported from the working section to the surface via belt conveyors. Employees and supplies are transported into the mine by battery-powered, track-mounted haulage equipment.

The immediate mine roof is comprised of sandstone and laminated shale. The roof is supported with 48-inch, 5/8-inch-diameter, resin-grouted rods and combination bolts. The supports are installed on 4-foot lengthwise and 4- to 5-foot crosswise spacings. The main headings are developed on 70- by 70-foot centers. The roof control plan in effect at the mine was approved by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) on November 14, 1995.

Ventilation is induced into the mine by a 6-foot-diameter blowing fan that produces 329,200 cubic feet of air per minute. Methane liberation for the mine is undetectable.

The last AAA inspection at this mine was completed on June 6, 1996.

Elk Run Coal Company, Inc., is a subsidiary of A. T. Massey Coal Company. The principal officers of Elk Run Coal Company, Inc., are James Slater, President; Dwayne Francisco, Vice President; Roger L. Nicholson, Secretary; James S. Twigg, Treasurer; Doug Williams, Superintendent; Gary Lilly, Mine Foreman; and Frank Foster, Safety Director.

STORY OF EVENT



On Monday, September 9, 1996, the day-shift West Mains section crew, under the supervision of Robert Cottle, section foreman, entered the mine portal at 7:00 a.m via a battery-powered, track-mounted personnel carrier. At about 7:40 a.m., the crew arrived at the West Mains section and Cottle examined the working places. The section crew was instructed to commence their regular mining cycles. Roger Callison, electrician, was instructed to report to the No. 23 left-side Fletcher RRII roof-bolting machine, located at the last open crosscut between the No. 2 and No. 3 entries of the West Mains section, to repair the metal cables attached to the ATRS System. After completing this assignment, Callison decided to perform maintenance work on an electrical cable conduit near the right-side drill boom of the roof-bolting machine. He was in a sitting position beside the roof-bolting machine with his back approximately 3 feet from the coal rib. Approximately 9:40 a.m., the total rib of coal and rock approximately 50 feet long fell, with a section of this rib approximately 14 1/2 feet in length, 25 inches in width, and 13 1/2 inches in thickness, striking the victim in the upper torso and lower extremities, crushing him against the roof-bolting machine.

At the time of the accident, roof support was being installed in the face of No. 3 Left. It is unknown if mining induced stress onto the pillar block.

About 15 minutes prior to the fatal accident, James Facello, roof-bolting-machine operator, had observed the victim repairing the roof-bolting machine. According to Facello, the area where the victim was working appeared to be normal; no bad coal ribs were detected. Bruce Brown, roof-bolting-machine operator, stated he was walking past the roof-bolting machine where the victim was working to obtain a longer wrench to install roof bolts. He was walking from the face of 3 left, when he observed the victim pinned against the front right side of the roof-bolting machine. Brown ran to the No. 2 entry where he met and informed Cottle of the accident. Cottle called for help on the section. Efforts were started immediately to remove the victim from underneath the coal/rock ribs. Emergency Medical Technicians immediately started checking for vital signs, and none were found during the examination.

Facello obtained large first-aid boxes from the power station. Pete Quesenberry, continuous-mining-machine operator, brought three Simplex jacks to the accident scene. Scott Lancianese, face man, Quesenberry, Cottle, and Brown attempted to use the Simplex lifting jacks to move the rock and coal materials off the victim. After several unsuccessful attempts with the lifting jacks, it was decided to use a long metal chain to secure the rock and remove the rock materials with a scoop that was nearby. Attempts were made from the front of the roof-bolting machine and then from the rear of the roof-bolting machine. Meanwhile, a telephone call was made to the surface to have someone call an ambulance and to clear the track haulage for emergency removal of the victim.

David Asbury, evening-shift foreman, and Gary Lilly, general mine foreman, were outby the section examining evaluation points with William Ross, MSHA ventilation specialist. Asbury went to the belt-haulage system where a pager phone was available. Hearing about the accident on the phone, he came back and informed Lilly and Ross. They immediately went to the West Mains section. According to Ross, CPR and first aid for the victim were already in process. Around 10:35 a.m., the victim was placed on a backboard, with CPR still in progress, and transported via the man trip to the surface. Ross immediately posted closure signs in the area around the accident scene, issued a 103(k) Order, and advised management to withdraw the entire section crew and pull the electrical power to the West Mains section. Most of the section crew, who were EMTs, traveled to the surface with the victim.

An ambulance from Whitesville Ambulance Service was waiting on the surface about 11:10 a.m. The victim was transported to the Charleston Area Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead at 12:01 p.m. by Dr. Ieanez.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT



MSHA was notified of the accident at 10:30 a.m., on September 9, 1996. MSHA accident investigation personnel began to arrive at the mine about 12:00 p.m.

MSHA and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted an investigation with the assistance of mine management personnel and miners from Elk Run Coal Company, Inc. An engineer from the Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center was assigned to the investigation team and conducted on-site examinations of the West Mains section.

MSHA and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training conducted interviews of seven individuals believed to have direct knowledge of facts surrounding the accident. The interviews were conducted at the Elk Run Coal Company, Inc., training room at Sylvester, West Virginia, on September 10, 1996. The physical portion of the investigation was completed September 12, 1996, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.

DISCUSSION



Training



Records indicate that training had been conducted in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48. An examination of the victim's training records revealed that he had received all required training.

Roof Control



The mine roof in the face area where the accident occurred, as well as in other areas on the section, was supported primarily by 48-inch resin-grouted rods. These rods were being installed on 4- to 5-foot crosswise and 4-foot lengthwise spacing as required by the approved roof control plan. Entries and crosscuts were developed on 70- by 70-foot centers to a width of 20 feet in accordance with the approved roof control plan. An abandoned mine was located in an overlying seam, adjacent to the mining in the West Mains section. Even though this overlying mine was not above this section, it may have influenced roof and rib conditions. This overlying mine is approximately 180 feet above the White Knight mine.

Statements taken during interviews revealed that the West Mains section had experienced rib sloughage when the section was started approximately 1 year ago. When loose, unconsolidated ribs were encountered, they were taken down with a slate bar.

According to the preshift examiner's report on the West Mains section, an adequate examination had been conducted prior to the accident, and no hazardous conditions had been documented.

It was revealed during the accident investigation that the West Mains section was bolted according to the approved roof control plan. Roadway widths on the West Mains working section were not excessive. There were numerous unconsolidated ribs observed on the West Mains section by the accident investigation team. No roof falls were observed during the investigation. The immediate roof consisted of 0 to 26 feet of shale with a 10-inch coal rider seam, and 0 to 40 feet of sandstone was the composition of the main overhead roof strata. The immediate roof and mine floor varied from wet to damp. The method of mining was room and pillar.

Physical Factors

  1. The width of the crosscut between No. 2 and No. 3 entries measured 19 feet 7 inches.

  2. The measured height at the accident scene was 84 inches.

  3. Maintenance work was being performed at the right front side of the roof-bolting machine, underneath the storage rack near the front tire.

  4. The roof-bolting machine was a Fletcher RRII dual-head machine.

  5. The victim was in a sitting position with his back to the solid coal rib, about 3 feet from the rib.

  6. The victim was working alone at the roof-bolting machine.

  7. The large section of the coal/rock rib that struck the victim measured approximately 14 1/2 feet in length, 25 inches in width, and 13 1/2 inches in thickness.

  8. The accident occurred about 9:40 a.m. The victim was transported to the surface to an awaiting ambulance about 11:05 a.m.

  9. More than eight coal/rock ribs were loose and separated throughout the seven entries on the West Mains section.

  10. An abandoned mine was located 180 feet above in an overlying seam in an area adjacent to the West Mains section.

  11. The area of the accident had approximately 1,000 feet of cover, which exerted pressure on the coal pillars. (This condition may have been compounded by the close proximity of overlying mine workings.)

  12. The West Mains section had two sets of mining equipment developing seven entries on a single split of air.

  13. An adequate preshift examination was not conducted on the West Mains section, in that there were numerous unconsolidated ribs where persons must travel. The ribs were not controlled to protect persons from hazards related to the falls from the ribs.

  14. Investigators' observations at the area where the accident occurred revealed excessive rib sloughage.

  15. An autopsy performed by the State Medical Examiner indicated that the cause of death was compression asphyxia and multiple injuries.

CONCLUSION



The accident and resultant fatality were a result of management's failure to identify and effectively control hazardous rib conditions on the West Mains section where miners were required to work or travel.

CONTRIBUTING VIOLATIONS



A 104(d)(1) Citation, No. 3961581, was issued for a violation of Section 75.360, 30 CFR. The Citation stated that during a fatal accident investigation, it was revealed that an adequate preshift examination was not conducted on the 020 Mechanized Mining Unit, West Mains section, in that loose, broken rock/coal ribs and unsupported hanging rock brows were allowed to exist throughout the section. These conditions existed starting at the No. 1 entry and going into the No. 7 entry and faces. The rock and coal ribs measured 10 to 12 inches in thickness, 2 to 4 feet in width, and 3 to 40 feet in length in six locations on the section. Dates, times, and initials were not present in places where persons were required to work or travel. These conditions were not documented in the preshift examiner's book kept in the surface mine office. These hazardous conditions were a contributing factor of the accident.

A 104(d)(1) Order, No. 3961582, was issued, stating in part that the roof and ribs of areas where miners are required to work and travel were not supported or otherwise controlled to adequately protect persons from hazards related to the falls of roof and ribs on the West Mains section, a violation of Section 75.202(a), 30 CFR.



Respectfully Submitted by:

Jerry E. Sumpter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

William J. Gray
Mining Engineer

Jon A. Braenovich
Mining Engineer

James E. Cline
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Specialist


Approved by:

Richard J. Kline
Assistant District Manager

Earnest C. Teaster, Jr.
District Manager


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Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB96C22