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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 5

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)

FATAL INJURY ROOF FALL ACCIDENT

Mine #4 (I.D. No. 44-06634)
ParTS Corporation of America
Dewey, Wise County, Virginia

December 9, 1996
(Amended June 9, 1997)

by

Charles Upchurch
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Gary Roberts
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Mattie Beaty
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector


Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
P.O. Box 560, Wise County Plaza, Norton, Virginia 24273
Ray McKinney, District Manager

ERRATA



Kimberly Edwards received critical injuries due to a roof fall accident on December 9, 1996. Mr. Edwards succumbed to his injuries on June 9, 1997.

Amendment acknowledged:


Ray McKinney
District Manager

GENERAL INFORMATION



Mine #4 of ParTS Corporation of America is located one-tenth mile east of Route 620, on the south fork of the Pound River. The mine was opened by four drifts into the Kelly coal seam. The coal seam averages 40-inches in height.

Coal is mined from the active faces with continuous mining machines and transported to the belt feeders in shuttle cars. The coal is then transported to the surface via conveyor belts. Haulage trucks transport the coal from mine property. The mine operates three shifts per day, producing coal on the day and evening shifts and performing maintenance on the owl shift. The mine has 29 underground employees and three surface employees. The mine produces 1,000 tons of coal daily. The mine has two mining sections, one of which was idle at the time of the accident.

The main mine roof strata consists of ten-feet, or more, of sandstone. The immediate roof is from zero to ten-feet, or more, of shale. The mine floor consists of at least ten-feet of shale. The Approved Roof Control Plan, dated September 19, 1995, provides for full roof support in all entries, crosscuts, and rooms. The Roof Control Plan stipulates, at a minimum, the use of 36-inch mechanically anchored roof bolts, 48-inch fully grouted resin rods, or 60-inch point anchor/combination anchor bolts. The maximum entry and crosscut widths are 20-feet, except for the belt entry, which is allowed to be 22-feet. Entries and crosscuts can be developed on 60,70, or 80-feet centers. When adverse conditions are encountered, these centers can be developed from 90 to 125-feet.

On January 23, 1996, a supplement was approved to increase the minimum entry and crosscut centers, developed during adverse conditions, to 150-feet. On April 5, 1996, a supplement was approved to extend development cut depths to 30-feet, utilizing a remote controlled continuous mining machine. On June 12, 1996, a supplement was approved for partial pillar extraction during second mining (pillaring), utilizing a three-cut system. On December 9, 1996, the operator submitted a supplement for extending the cut depths during second mining to 30-feet. This supplement had not been approved at the time of the accident. The Approved Roof Control and Ventilation Plans provided for bleeder entries established on the left side of developed headings.

The ParTS Corporation of America Mine #4 is operated as a subsidiary of Thyssen Mining Construction, Incorporated, Coeburn, Virginia.

Principal officers of ParTS Corporation of America are:
Alfred H. Domjahn.............................. President
Jonathan B. Case.................................Secretary
Ronnie Freeman...................................Superintendent


The last safety and health inspection was completed on September 27, 1996.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT



On Monday, December 9, 1996, the evening shift crew, under the supervision of Claudie Deel, section foreman, entered the mine at 4:30 P.M., and arrived on the 003 section at approximately 4:55 P.M. The area had been developed with seven entries. Pillar mining had been started by the day shift. Two pillars, numbers six and five, had been mined. The number four pillar had a lift removed from the right side, and the number three pillar had a partial lift removed from the right side.

Mining began in the partial lift on the right side of the number three pillar, number four entry, which was left by the day shift. After this lift was completed, breaker timbers were installed across the opening. The continuous mining machine, operated by Jimmy Mullins, was then moved to mine the lift from the left side of the number four pillar. Kimberly Edwards (victim) and Raymond Breeding were operating the shuttle cars, hauling the coal to the section dumping point.

Mining continued until approximately 8:10 P.M., when two sections of mine roof fell, striking Edwards. The sections of roof material measured approximately four feet by four feet and four feet by 12 feet. The material was three to six inches in thickness.

Edwards was extricated from beneath the fallen material by Deel, Mullins, Breeding, and Charles Steffey, mechanic/electrician. First-aid was administered by Deel, an Emergency Medical Technician. Edwards was then transported to the surface, arriving outside at 8:45 P.M. The Pound Rescue Squad had been notified by Mike Sykes, mine foreman, and arrived at 8:48 P.M. Edwards was transported to St. Mary's Hospital, Norton, Virginia. Edwards' medical condition was stabilized at St. Mary's Hospital and he was then transported to Holston Valley Community Hospital, Kingsport, Tennessee, for further treatment.

Edward's injuries resulted in permanent partial paralysis. Kimberly Edwards succumbed to these injuries on June 9, 1997.

PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT



The investigation revealed the following factors relevant to the investigation:
  1. The victim had advanced inby permanent roof support while loading the shuttle car in the left lift of the number four pillar.

  2. This operation had an approved plan for the second mining of pillars using a three-cut system with 20 feet cuts. Conditions observed in the area of the accident indicated the lift removed from the right side of the number three pillar was approximately 36 feet in depth. The lift removed from the left side of the number four pillar was cut to a depth of approximately 33 feet.

  3. Persons performing second mining were not adequately trained in the plan provisions. Second mining was addressed in a supplement to the Approved Roof Control Plan, dated June 12, 1996.

  4. An interview was conducted during the preliminary investigation and according to statements from the the evening shift section foreman, the section crew was instructed in the procedures for setting the posts required for the three-cut pillar plan.

  5. According to statements from employees, received during interviews conducted on December 9 and 10, 1996, the day shift crew also removed lifts from the pillars in depths exceeding the 20 feet stipulated in the approved plan.

  6. Ten posts were installed across the opening created by the lift removed from the right side of the number three pillar. Six of the ten posts were too short, and were installed on end-sections of posts rather than on solid footing.

  7. The ten posts installed across the opening created by the lift removed from the number three pillar had been installed inby permanent supports. The approved plan stipulated that such posts would be installed in areas of permanently supported roof.

  8. The method of mining reduced the areas of the pillars left after mining (stumps) to where persons were exposed to hazards created by roof subsidence and excessive widths. The right lift removed from the number three pillar was mined to a width of approximately 30 feet. The lift removed from the left side of the number four pillar had been mined to a width of approximately 32 feet.

  9. The mining height in the area of the accident was 50 inches. Due to undulations in the mine roof and floor, canopies were not being used on the mining equipment. The undulations created mining heights normally ranging from 36 to 41 inches.

CONCLUSION



The accident was a direct result of the operator's failure to comply with the Approved Roof Control Plan. By mining pillar lifts to excessive depths and widths, a shuttle car operator was placed inby permanently supported roof. This resulted in the shuttle car operator being struck by a section of roof material causing severe and permanently disabling injuries. The victim succumbed from these injuries on June 9, 1997.

VIOLATIONS



The following citations and orders were issued due to conditions and/or practices revealed during the investigation:
  1. A 103-k Order, No. 4566702, was issued to ensure the safety of all persons in the mine until an investigation was completed and the area deemed safe to work.

  2. A 104-d-1 Citation, No. 3787055, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 75.363-a. The section foreman, Claudie Deel, failed to correct and record hazardous conditions that had occurred during the evening shift (4 PM) in the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section, beginning approximately 143 feet inby survey station number 964. The hazardous conditions were as follows:
    1. Left and right pillar splits were mined from 33 to 36 feet deep and 30 feet in width.

    2. The right pillar split was mined through into the No. 5 entry.

    3. The inby "pillar stump" was 4 1/2 ft. in length.

    4. Timbers installed in the left pillar split were not installed on adequate footing (timbers too short).

    5. Persons had traveled inby permanent roof supports to install timbers.

    6. Shuttle car operator had advanced the operator's deck of the 21SC Joy shuttle car inby permanent roof support in the right pillar split.


  3. A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566704, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 75.202-b. Kimberly Edwards, shuttle car operator, traveled inby permanent roof support in the right pillar split of the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section, approximately 166 feet inby survey station number 964 in the No. 4 entry. Two sections of mine roof, 1) 4 ft. x 4 ft. x 3 to 6 inches thick, and 2) 4 ft. x 12 ft. x 3 to 6 inches thick, fell pinning Edwards in the operator's deck of the 21SC Joy shuttle car, resulting in fatal injuries.

  4. A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566705, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 75.220. The approved Roof Control Plan Pillar Recovery Supplement, dated June 12, 1996, was not being complied with in the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section, beginning approximately 143 feet inby survey station number 964, in that the left pillar split had been mined 36 feet deep. The approved Plan stipulates that the depths will not exceed 20 feet in depth during retreat mining.

  5. A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566706, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 75.220. The approved Roof Control Plan Pillar Recovery Supplement, dated June 12, 1996, was not being complied with in the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section, beginning approximately 143-feet inby survey station number 964, in that the right pillar split had been mined a minimum of 33 feet deep. The approved Roof Control Plan stipulates that the depths will not exceed 20-feet in depth during retreat mining.

  6. A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566708, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 75.220-d. Statements from six of the employees at the mine, who work on the 003 active pillar section, revealed that the employees had not received any training on the approved Roof Control Plan Supplement (Pillar Plan), dated June 12, 1996, prior to implementation.

  7. A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566709, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 75.202-b. Evidence indicated that timber-men traveled inby permanent roof support in the left pillar split of the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section. Nine out of ten timbers were installed out from under permanent roof supports, six of the timbers were too short and were not installed on adequate footing.

  8. A 104-d-1 Order, No. 4566710, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 75.203-a. The method of mining that occurred in the No. 4 entry on the 003 active pillar section beginning 143 feet inby survey station number 964, exposed workmen to the following hazardous conditions:
    1. Excessive widths in the No. 4 entry on the right and left pillar splits. The left and right sides measured 30 feet in depth.
    2. Pillar block dimension located on the inby left pillar split, was measured at 4 1/2 ft. in width.




Respectfully submitted by:

Charles Upchurch
CMS&H Inspector

Gary Roberts
CMS&H Inspector

Mattie R. Beaty
CMS&H Inspector


Approved:

Ray McKinney
District Manager


Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB96C39