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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION South Central District Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health Accident Investigation Report Surface Nonmetal Mine Fatal Powered Haulage Accident Bailey's Limestone Quarry Bailey's Limestone Quarry(mine) Wewoka, Seminole County, Oklahoma I.D. No. 34-01794 June 29,1996 By Charles H.Sisk Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector and Michael A. Davis Mine Safety and Health Inspector Originating Office Mine Safety & Health Administration 1100 Commerce Street, Room 4C50 Dallas, Texas 75242-0499 Doyle D. Fink District Manager GENERAL INFORMATION Johnnie M. Brown laborer age 44, was fatally injured at approximately 1:30 p.m. on June 29, 1996, when the elevated front-end loader bucket he was working from rolled forward, crushing him between the loader bucket and the framework of the primary crusher. Brown had a total of two weeks mining experience, all as a laborer at this mine. He had not received training in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48. MSHA was notified of this accident on July 9, 1996, during a telephone conversation requesting assistance in filling out an MSHA accident form (7000-1) from Danielle Bailey, Secretary. An investigation was started the following day. The Bailey's Limestone Quarry, an open pit crushed stone operation, owned and operated by Bailey's Limestone Quarry, was located five miles southwest of Wewoka, Seminole County, Oklahoma. Principal operating officials were Daniel Bailey, owner/president, Larry Baker, Vice President, and James Marsh, foreman. This mine was still in the construction phase, and was approximately 75% complete. The mine was scheduled to operate one, 8 to 10 hour shift a day, 6 days a week. A total of 7 persons was employed. Limestone was to be extracted by having a contractor drill and blast a single bench. Material would then be loaded onto trucks with a front end loader and hauled to the crushing plant. The principal products were crushed stone and multiple sizes of graded rock. A regular inspection had not been conducted at this operation. An inspection was conducted in conjunction with this investigation. PHYSICAL FACTORS The accident occurred at the primary crusher while skirting was being installed on the crusher. The Cedar Rapids jaw crusher, serial # 75810, was being modified by adding skirting to the hopper to increase its holding capacity. The additional metal skirting panels were being bolted onto the crusher assembly. The assembly was braced with angle iron. The 1985 Dresser, model 540, front-end loader, serial number 3520101U004076, involved in the accident, was powered by a 205 horsepower, Dresser International Engine. The loader was equipped with 3.75 yard bucket. The used loader was purchased, by the mine operator, in April of 1995. An investigation conducted by MSHA specialists revealed the following abnormal conditions/defects in the loader's air/hydraulic system: Dirt/grit had accumulated in the pneumatic system's bucket control circuit. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT On the day of the accident, Johnnie M. Brown (victim) reported for work at about 7:00 a.m., his normal starting time. He was to scheduled to complete welding on the secondary crushing platform, a task he had started the day before. Two employees, Larry Baker, vice president, and James Marsh, mine foreman, were already at work replacing teeth on the secondary crusher. Daniel Bailey, owner, and Eathan Smith, laborer, arrived at 9:30 a.m. Brown stopped working on the secondary crusher to assist Bailey and Smith on the primary crusher. They were installing braces to support the hopper skirting by bolting them to the bottom of the crusher assembly before pushing the brace in place with the bucket of the front-end loader. The loader was also used to hold the skirting in place while the top bolt was installed by employees standing inside the elevated bucket. At about 12:45 p.m., Bailey, Brown, and Smith continued tightening the bolts of one of the primary crusher braces. Smith then left the area to retrieve some additional nuts and bolts, so Bailey climbed down from the bucket and moved the loader backward a few feet and let the bucket down. Smith returned and gave the additional nuts and bolts, to Brown, who then signaled Bailey to raise the bucket. Brown positioned the bucket in front of the apron feed drive motor assembly. The assembly projected out from the main frame approximately 32 inches. Bailey glanced towards the secondary crusher and when he turned back around, he heard Brown yell "Bailey". He immediately noticed that the bottom of the bucket had dropped and the top lip had rolled forward pinning Brown's abdomen and chest against the framework. Realizing that Brown was seriously injured, Bailey backed the loader away a few feet. Brown fell unconscious from the bucket into Smith's arms, who was standing beside the bucket on the ground. Bailey called for help as he ran to get his truck and Smith began carrying Brown toward the office. Baker and Marsh ran over from the secondary crusher. At about the same time Bailey arrived with the truck. Brown was placed in the cab and they drove to the hospital in nearby Holdenville, Oklahoma. Enroute to the hospital CPR was performed by Marsh and an EMT from a local fire unit. Further attempts to revive him at the hospital were unsuccessful and he was pronounced dead at 2:39 p.m. Death was attributed to cardiac arrest, due to blunt trauma. CONCLUSION The primary cause of the accident was the practice of working from the raised bucket of a front-end loader. The bucket, and lift arms had not been provided with load-locking devices nor were they secured or blocked to prevent accidental movement. VIOLATIONS Order No. 4448694 Issued on 7/11/96, under the provisions of section 103(k) of the Mine Act. Citation No. 4448695 Issued on 7/10/96, under the provisions of section 104(d)(1) for violation of standard 56.14211(b). Citation No. 4448696 Issued on 7/10/96, under the provisions of section 104(a) for violation of 50.10. /s/ Charles H. Sisk Supervisory Mine Safety & Health Inspector /S/ Michael Davis Mine Safety and Health Inspector Approved by: Doyle D. Fink, District Manager Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:  [FAB96M28]
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