Skip to content
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 7

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(Surface Area of Underground Coal Mine)

Fatal Explosives Accident

Ash Trucking Company, Inc.
C-3 Mine
I.D. No. 15-13103
Louellen, Harlan County, Kentucky

January 29, 1997

by

Peggy Langley
Daniel Johnson
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector


Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
HC 66, Box 1762, Barbourville, KY 40906
Joseph W. Pavlovich, District Manager
Release Date: April 21, 1998



OVERVIEW

ABSTRACT OF EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENT
On January 29, 1997, Terry Roddy, a 26 year old surface laborer with six years of total mining experience was fatally injured when an explosion occurred in the rear cargo space of a 1991 Toyota pick-up truck which he had been operating.

Evidence obtained by MSHA Investigators and the results of laboratory tests indicated that dynamite, not of a type allowed for use in underground coal mining, was present in the bed of the pick-up truck.

It is the consensus of the accident investigation team that the accident and resultant fatality was a direct result of the dynamite being detonated by an unknown initiation source. Further, as a result of multiple violative conditions and practices found involving diverse and widespread improper storage, transportation and handling of explosives, it was determined that a hazardous practice existed at this mine.

The cumulative and practical effect of mine management's failure to insure compliance with safety precautions and safeguards associated with explosives and blasting endangered the lives of miners.1

1The Kentucky State Police has an on-going investigation of this event.

GENERAL INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND

The C-3 Mine of Ash Trucking Company, Inc., a Kentucky Corporation, is located near Louellen in Harlan County Kentucky. The mine was opened in 1981 in the Creech coal seam and is developed from four drift openings.

The mine employs a total of eleven miners, eight of whom work underground and three on the surface. The mine produces approximately 250 tons of raw coal per day on one working section (001) and one production shift. A continuous miner, served by mobile bridge carriers, was used for production. The mined coal is transported to the surface by a series of belt conveyors. Trucks are utilized to transport the coal to Harlan Cumberland Coal Company's preparation plant near Cumberland, Kentucky for processing. The final product is then shipped by rail or by truck to various customers.

An on-going Winter Alert Special Emphasis Inspection (CDB) had begun on January 10, 1997 and was on-going at the time of the accident. The last regular MSHA inspection (AAA) was completed on November 19, 1996.

MINE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL



According to the Legal Identity Report on file since June 15, 1993, with MSHA's District 7 Office located in Barbourville, Kentucky, at the time of the accident the subject mine was being operated by:

Terry G. Loving, President (sole listed officer)
227 Village Mall
Harlan, Kentucky 40831


Statements obtained during the course of the investigation indicated that Darrell Middleton who was acting in the capacity of mine superintendent at the time of the accident, had leased the mine from the operator of record and had subsequently subleased the mine to Charles Lambert, serving as mine foreman at the time of the accident. No documents to substantiate these claims were ever produced during the course of the investigation.2

Subsequent to the accident, a change in the Legal Identity Report was received by MSHA's District 7 Office on February 13, 1997, with the effective date of change shown as February 11, 1997.2 This document reflected a change in ownership to L&S Mining, a partnership. Partners listed were:

Charles Lambert, President,
and Donna Lambert, Secretary


The address was shown as:
P.O. Box 168
Grays Knob, Kentucky 40829


Though Lambert's name does appear in this document, no document has been subsequently received by MSHA in this regard either specifically listing or identifying Middleton in any official corporate or partnership capacity.

The surface land and mineral ownership and estates for the area of the accident are divided. The surface land estate is owned by Nally and Hamilton with the mineral estate being owned by the Cornett-Lewis Estate. The mineral estate was leased by Harlan Cumberland Coal Company and subleased to the mine operator of record.

2Title 30 C.F.R., § 41.12 requires that “within 30 days after the occurrence of any change in the information required by § 41.11, the operator of a coal or other mine shall, in writing, notify the appropriate district manager of the Mine Safety and Health Administration in the district in which the mine is located of such change. ”

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT



On Wednesday, January 29, 1997, the day shift began normally at 7:00 a.m. Terry Roddy, surface laborer and victim, began his normal work duties which included the pick-up and delivery of parts to the mine from various suppliers, servicing surface equipment and performing belt maintenance on the surface of the mine.

According to statements obtained during interviews, the shift proceeded without incident until approximately 2:35 p.m. when the explosion occurred.

Roddy, along with Randy McMillian, repairman, had been working in the shop repairing a battery scoop. A pipe wrench was needed to complete repairs, which was reportedly located in the bed of a 1991 Toyota pick-up truck, parked in the coal storage area located approximately three hundred feet from the shop. Roddy walked from the shop to the pick-up truck, started the vehicle and then drove the truck back up to the shop. According to McMillian, Roddy exited the truck and closed the door. Seconds later the explosion occurred, filling the shop with smoke and debris and propelling the victim approximately forty feet over an embankment.

Hearing the explosion, McMillian immediately began a search for the victim. Roddy was found over the embankment behind a small storage building. McMillian checked for vital signs and found none. He then called for Darrell Middleton, mine superintendent (and father-in-law of Roddy), who was located on the surface at the time.

Middleton attempted to telephone a local ambulance service from the shop but the telephone had been damaged by the explosion. Middleton next called underground to withdraw the miners informing them that there had been an accident. He then left the mine site and drove approximately two miles to a nearby store where he telephoned Evarts Funeral Home, which provided local ambulance service to the community.

The Evarts Funeral Home contacted Philip Bianchi, Harlan County Coroner, who in turn contacted Kenneth Fee, a Supervisory CMS&H Inspector of MSHA's Harlan, Kentucky Field Office.

Bianchi then traveled to the site where he pronounced Roddy dead at 3:15 p.m.

THE INVESTIGATION



After being notified of the accident at 2:50 p.m., Fee, accompanied by Daniel Johnson, Federal Coal Mine Inspector/Accident Investigator, immediately traveled to the mine site to begin the investigation. Since the cause(s) of the accident could not be readily determined, representatives of MSHA's Approval & Certification Center were called in to assist in the investigation.

The investigation team was comprised of representatives of the following departments or agencies: Kentucky Department of Mines and Minerals (Inspection Division and Division of Explosives and Blasting), the Kentucky State Police, U.S. Department of Treasury (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The FBI laboratory performed analysis of samples of wreckage and debris from the explosion which were recovered during the course of the investigation.

The ATF assisted in physically recovering explosive materials from the site and also provided technical assistance through their Explosives Incident System located in Washington, D.C.

PHYSICAL FACTORS

  1. The 1991 Toyota pick-up truck was owned by Darrell Middleton and had been loaned to Terry Roddy, victim, to be used as a company supply truck. The truck was destroyed in the explosion.

  2. As evidenced by the destruction rendered by the explosion on the truck, explosives were determined to have been located in the cargo bed of the Toyota pick-up truck on the driver's side near the cab.

  3. Based upon its' discovered position, the pick-up truck had been pulled through the left door of the shop so that the cab of the truck was located inside the surface shop.

  4. An underground examination and interviews were conducted to determine a need for explosives. The following was revealed:

    1. Explosives are not used during normal mining activities because the coal is extracted with a continuous mining machine.

    2. The section was retreat-mining in a panel and plans had been made to move the belt and set up a new panel by February 1, 1997.

    3. Before the belt drive could be set up in a new panel, the mine roof would normally have to be blasted due to the low coal seam height of 36 inches.

    4. Due to adverse mining conditions the operator had started moving the mining equipment off of the active panel to the new location on the day of the accident.

  5. Explosives and detonators were found improperly stored in a supply trailer located near the coal stock pile area. The existing magazine at the site was found to contain stores of oil and grease used in the mining operation.

  6. An inventory of explosives had been conducted on January 15, 1997 by representatives of the previous operator and by the victim himself. Explosives and detonators were listed as being located in the storage trailer.

  7. A case of permissible explosives was missing from the trailer since the last inventory conducted on January 15, 1997. According to statements obtained during interviews and mine records, no explosives had been used since the inventory was completed.

  8. The following items were found in the storage trailer during the course of the investigation: eleven cartridges of Austin Red Diamond Coalmex permissible explosive, (16 inch), found in a powder bag lying on a shelf, approximately seventy-five electric blasting caps (Austin and Dupont) were strewn in various locations within the trailer, most of which were not in their original containers.

  9. An examination of records at the mine and interviews conducted indicated that the victim had not been trained in the use or proper handling of explosives, nor was he experienced in the same. Roddy had a total of six years mining experience with one month at this operation.

  10. The 1991 Toyota pick-up truck used to transport explosives did not have a bed-liner and had exposed metal in the cargo space, and was not posted with proper warning signs.

  11. The results of interviews conducted indicate that on the day of the accident the subject pick-up truck had been running badly and the victim had picked up spark plugs and spark plug wires to make repairs, but had not begun repairs at the time of the explosion. An examination of the operating condition of the pick-up truck was not possible due to the truck being destroyed in the accident.

  12. Several possible stray current sources were found at the accident scene. The ground field for the mine power system was located under the shop building and beneath the area where the truck was parked. There were several energized power systems in the shop building, and a set of scoop batteries were on the ground beside the pick-up truck.

  13. According to MSHA Inspector Daniel Johnson, the victim's feet were wet. The victim wore athletic (tennis) shoes covered by leaky rubber galoshes (non-safety type). The earth where the pick-up truck had been parked was also found to be wet. MSHA District 7 Electrical Supervisor and Inspector, James W. Oakley and Charles R. Enix, examined the area on January 30, 1997 and found no stray current or voltage from these which could have contributed to the accident.

  14. A cellular telephone and a CB Radio were found located inside the cab of the pick-up truck. Neither were in use at the time of the accident. MSHA representative Charles H. Grace questioned whether the initiation of the explosion could have resulted from an incoming call on the cellular telephone. According to ATF's Explosives Incidents System there are no known explosives accidents involving cellular telephones.

  15. According to Steven Burmeister, of the FBI Laboratory's Chemical Unit, the preliminary results of an instrumental examination of residues removed from various fragments of metal were consistent with the presence of ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN) and Nitroglycerine (NG) high explosives which are not characteristic of permissible explosives. Also, present were sodium nitrate, chloride, and sulfate ions. These materials are, however, consistent with those formed upon the initiation of some dynamite compositions.

  16. A section of wire, identified as a component "leg-wire" of an electric blasting cap was found lying on the ground near the pick-up truck.

  17. There were no reported electrical storms or lightning in the area at the time of the accident.

  18. According to Inspector Johnson, the victim was wearing a lined work jacket, which was shredded during the explosion. Nylon and other synthetic fabrics have been found to be involved in the production of static electricity.

  19. The results of an autopsy conducted on January 30, 1997, by the Kentucky Office of the Associate Chief Medical Examiner at Lexington, Kentucky indicated, in part, that both hands were amputated in the explosion. Also, of note, was the presence of "firm plastic material" which had penetrated the body. The plastic material is believed to have originated from a utility "bit-box" which had been located in the truck bed and recovered subsequent to the accident. It is likely that the dynamite had been contained within, or in close proximity to the "bit-box".

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION



As previously stated, instrumental examination of evidence taken from the accident site show that residues removed from various fragments of metal were consistent with the presence of ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN) and nitroglycerine (NG) high explosive. The instrumental examination also showed the presence of sodium nitrate, chloride, and sulfate ions. These materials are consistent with those formed upon the initiation of some dynamite compositions.

From the physical damage created, it was apparent that explosives had detonated in the bed of the Toyota pickup truck. The bed and side of the truck had severe damage, the windows were blown out and the gas tank had holes in it from shrapnel resulting from the explosion. The bed of the truck was blown toward the ground and had actually been separated around a portion of its perimeter. The results of the instrumental examination of the evidence indicate that dynamite was present and had exploded in the bed of the Toyota pickup truck. It has not been determined what initiated the dynamite.

Calculations made using technical formula and data indicate that possibly several pounds of explosives were detonated in the bed of the truck. The calculations were made on the basis that the miner who was in the shop at the time of the explosion and about 15 feet away from the bed of the truck had received no hearing damage.

The explosives found in the storage trailer near the accident site were an emulsion type of MSHA approved permissible explosive. This particular emulsion type of permissible explosive does not contain EGDN or NG.

It is the consensus of the accident investigation team that the accident was a direct result of the dynamite being detonated by an unknown ignition source. Further, as a result of multiple violative conditions and practices found, involving diverse and widespread improper storage, transportation and handling of explosives, it was determined that a hazardous practice existed at this mine.

The cumulative and practical effect of mine management's failure to insure compliance with safety precautions and safeguards associated with explosives and blasting endangered the lives of miners.1

1Ibid.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

  1. A 103-K Order No. 4582576, was issued to assure the health and safety of the miners until an investigation and examination deemed the area safe to work.

  2. A 104-A Citation No. 7450026, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1301(a). Failure to store detonators and explosives properly.

  3. A 104-A Citation No. 7450027, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1302(a). The 1991 Toyota pick-up truck being used to transport explosives was found to have exposed metal in the cargo area which contained explosives.

  4. A 104-A Citation No. 7450028, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1302(b). The 1991 Toyota pick-up truck containing explosives was not being maintained in good condition.

  5. A 104-A Citation No. 7450029, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1302(c). No warning signs were posted on the 1991 Toyota pick-up truck containing explosives.

  6. A 104-A Citation No. 7450030, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1302(d). Other materials were placed in the cargo space of the 1991 Toyota pick-up truck transporting explosives.

  7. A 104-A Citation No. 7450031, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1302(e). Explosives and detonators were not being transported in separate vehicles or separated as required.

  8. A 104-A Citation No. 7450032, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1302(k). The Toyota pick-up truck was found parked with the cab extending inside the door of the surface shop area.

  9. A 104-A Citation No. 7450033, was issued for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1303(a). The miner using or handling explosives was not experienced and did not understand the hazards involved in performing this task.




Respectfully submitted by:

Peggy Langley
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector/Accident Investigator

Daniel Johnson
Supervisory Coal Mine Inspector/Accident Investigator


Approved by:

John M. Pyles
Assistant District Manager
Inspection Division

Joseph W. Pavlovich
District Manager
District Manager


Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB97C01