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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION


Southeastern District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

Accident Investigation Report
Surface Nonmetal Mine

Fatal Machinery Accident

Sunshine Rock
Sunshine Rock, Incorporated
Miami, Dade County, Florida
Mine I.D. 08-01045

April 26, 1997

By

Merle E. Slaton
Supervisory Mine Inspector

And


Ezra L. Killian
Mine Safety and Health Inspector


Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212
Birmingham, Alabama 35209

Martin Rosta
District Manager



GENERAL INFORMATION



Santico Salazar, dragline operator, age 45, and Julio Hernandez, oiler, age 55, drowned at approximately 4:30 a.m., on April 26, 1997, when the dragline they were operating fell into 71 feet of water, carrying the victims with it.



Salazar had a total of four years mining experience, with three years at this mine as a dragline operator. Hernandez had been employed at this company for one year as an oiler. His total mining experience was unknown.



Neither of the men had received training in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.



The Director, Florida state mine safety and health program, notified the MSHA Bartow Field Office of the accident on April 28, 1997, after seeing coverage of the accident on television. The operator was contacted by telephone, the accident was confirmed, and on April 28, 1997, an investigation was started.



Sunshine Rock, a crushed limestone operation, owned and operated by Sunshine Rock, Incorporated, was located at 20100 N.W. 129 Avenue, Miami, Dade County, Florida. The principal operating official was Frank Licea, plant manager. The pit was normally operated two, 10 hours shifts, 5 days a week. Twenty-five persons were employed.



The area to be mined was normally below the water table once the overburden was removed. The mining site was leveled and compacted to form a working pad that was slightly elevated above the water table. This working pad supported the dragline, and other equipment.



The limestone deposit was broken by drilling and blasting. Broken material was excavated from below the water by draglines and stockpiled adjacent to the pit for drying. The material was then loaded by front-end loaders into portable crushers. The material was crushed, sized, screened and stockpiled.



The last regular inspection of this operation was completed on January 16, 1997.

PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED



The pit area was 71 feet deep, filled with water and was approximately � mile long and � mile wide. The accident occurred at the northwest corner of the pit where the ground was close to level and slightly above water level.



The dragline involved in the accident was a Lima 2400B, serial number 712B191, weighed about 555,000 pounds and was powered by a D379B, 500 H.P. Caterpillar engine. It was equipped with a 130 foot boom and an 8 cubic yard bucket. The dragline was equipped with a number of floodlights on the boom and cab for nighttime operation.



The slide pinion lever was used to select either swing, boom or tram functions and the control lever operated the dragline in the function selected. The drum control lever was used to cast and retrieve the bucket, which could be done in any of the functions associated with the slide pinion lever.



The dragline was equipped with travel locks or "digging dogs", ratchet-type mechanisms which secured the tracks against movement. The travel locks could be set manually with electrical control switches, and were set automatically when the dragline was in the swing or boom functions.



The dragline was usually located perpendicular to the pit when mining material from it. Material was mined no closer than 3 feet from a buffer line located 16 feet from the edge of the pit. The buffer line was marked with rocks which were painted orange.



The accident occurred on the second shift. No supervisors were on mine property at the time the accident occurred.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT



On April 25, 1997, Santico Salazar, and Julio Hernandez, victims, reported to work at 4:30 p.m., their normal starting time. They were assigned to use the dragline to excavate material from the southwest corner of the pit. At 10:00 p.m., Osbeck Delatorie, dragline operator, was working on the other side of the pit and saw Salazar's dragline move toward the northwest corner of the pit. Delatorie continued to work until about 3:00 a.m., then shut down his dragline and left the property.



While Salazar and Hernandez were moving the dragline, the drive/travel chain broke and fell off the left track about 175 feet before they reached the northwest corner of the pit. This caused the loss of brake and steering on the left track. Tracks indicated that the dragline continued forward at a slight right angle and stopped parallel to the edge of the pit. The dragline would normally be operated while parked perpendicular to the pit. Due to the drive/travel chain no longer being on the left track it was impossible to steer the dragline to position it in such a manner.



By the size of the pile of material that was dug and stockpiled, it was estimated that they had worked until about 4:30 a.m., April 26, 1997, when the bank collapsed, causing the dragline to sink into about 71 feet of water.



Alfredo Benites, day shift dragline oiler, arrived at 5:00 a.m. to start his shift. When he could not find the dragline or the men, he returned to the office area and noticed Salazar's car still parked there. Benites returned to the work site, where he noticed the dragline boom protruding from the water. At 6:15 a.m., Frank Licea, manager, was contacted by phone and he then called 911.



The Dade County rescue squad arrived on the site at 7:00 a.m. and contacted Dade County Divers who arrived at approximately 8:30 a.m. Salazar's body was recovered at 1:30 p.m. directly in front of the dragline windshield outside of the cab.



Hernandez could not be found and the search for him continued until 6:50 a.m., April 29, 1997, when his body floated to the surface just north of the dragline.



The victims were pronounced dead by the Metro Dade Medical Examiner. The deaths were attributed to asphyxiation.

CONCLUSION



The causes of the accident were operating the dragline without the drive/travel chain which resulted in the inability to control the brake and steering on the left track of the dragline; positioning the dragline parallel to the pit rather than perpendicular to it during extraction operations; and excavating material in a manner which created unstable ground conditions.

VIOLATIONS



Order No. 3875645
Issued on April 28, 1997, under the provisions of 103(K) of the Mine Act:

On April 26, 1997, at 0430 an accident occurred at this mine resulting in two employees drowning. A Lima 2400B dragline, Company Number 1, fell into the water filled pit while operating in the northwest pit area. Both the dragline operator and the oiler were apparently drowned. This order prohibits any further activity at this dragline and the northwest pit area except that necessary for recovery operations. No other work or repairs may be done to the Number 1 dragline or the northwest pit area until this order is modified, vacated or terminated by an authorized representative of the Secretary of the Department of Labor. Recovery operations may proceed as necessary. This order is issued to insure the safety of other persons at the mine.



Citation No. 4549584
Issued on April 30, 1997, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of Standard 56.14100(c):

On April 26, 1997, an accident occurred at this mine resulting in two employees drowning. The drive/travel chain on the left side of the Lima 2400B dragline broke, causing the failure of the brake and steering control on the left side of the dragline. The equipment had continued to be operated in this condition and was a contributing factor in the accident.



Citation No. 4549585
Issued on April 30, 1997, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of Standard 56.3130:

On April 26, 1997, an accident occurred at this mine resulting in two employees drowning. The fatal occurred when the dragline was positioned to close to the edge of the bank with the tracks parallel to the edge of the bank and the ground gave away, submerging the Lima 2400B dragline in approximately 70 feet of water.

This citation was terminated on May 1, 1997, when Frank Licea, manager, had advised all the dragline operators of the accident and this type of operating of the dragline will no longer be used.



Citation No. 4549586
Issued on April 30, 1997, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of Subpart 50.10:

On April 26, 1997, an accident occurred at this mine resulting in two employees drowning. The company failed to immediately notify the MSHA District office or field office having jurisdiction over the mine, as implemented by 30 CFR, Part 50.10.

This citation was terminated on May 1, 1997, when Part 50.10 was discussed with the mine manager and he stated he understood his responsibilities.



Citation No. 4549587
Issued on April 30, 1997, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of Standard 56.18009:

On April 26, 1997, an accident occurred at this mine resulting in two employees drowning. Persons worked at this mine through most of the second shift, beginning at 4:30 p.m. on April 25, 1997, without anyone designated by the operator to be in attendance and take charge in case of an emergency.

This citation was terminated on May 1, 1997, when as of April 30, 1997, the company has designated someone to be in charge of the second shift in case of an emergency.



/s/ Merle E. Slaton
Supervisory Mine Inspector


/s/ Ezra L. Killian
Mine Safety and Health Inspector



Approved by: Martin Rosta, District Manager

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon [FAB97M27]