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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION


Southeastern District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

Accident Investigation Report
Surface Nonmetal Mine

Fatal Powered Haulage Accident

Camak Quarry
Martin Marietta Aggregates
Camak, Warren County, Georgia
Mine I.D. 09-00075

October 20, 1997

By

Merle E. Slaton
Supervisory Mine Inspector

And

Danny W. Wriston
Mine Safety and Health Inspector


Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
135 Gemini Circle, Suite 212
Birmingham, Alabama 35209

Martin Rosta
District Manager


GENERAL INFORMATION



Jut L. Anderson, loadout lead man, age 50, was seriously injured at about 10:00 a.m. on October 20, 1997, when he was run over by a locomotive while cleaning the railroad scale. He died as a result of his injuries at about 3:00 a.m. the following day. Anderson had a total of 24 years mining experience at this mine, the last 10 years as a loadout lead man. He had received training in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.



MSHA was notified by a telephone call from the area production manager for the mining company at 11:00 a.m. on the day of the accident. An investigation was started the following day.



The Camak Quarry, a crushed stone operation, owned and operated by Martin Marietta Aggregates, was located at Camak, Warren County, Georgia. The principal operating official was Phillip White, plant manager. The mine was normally operated one, 10-hour shift, five days a week. Total employment was 39 persons.



Stone was quarried by drilling and blasting multiple benches. Broken material was crushed, sized, and stockpiled for sale as construction aggregate. Approximately 80% of the finished product was shipped by rail.



The last regular inspection at this operation was completed June 19, 1997. Another inspection was conducted in conjunction with this investigation.

PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED



The accident occurred at the railroad scale in the plant yard. The scale consisted of a shallow pit containing 12, 8-by-12 steel I-beams that were perpendicular to the railroad tracks. The I-beams were spaced evenly at twelve-inch intervals for the length of the scale, which was twelve feet. Metal cover plates, placed between the I-beams to prevent debris from falling into the scale, had been removed so the area beneath them could be cleaned.



The loadout area was 1000 feet from the scale. Of this distance, 850 feet sloped at a .02% decline and then leveled off for about 200 feet at the scale.



The locomotive involved in the accident was a 125-ton, ALCO, RS-11, company number 7589, powered by an 8400-cubic-inch diesel engine. An air compressor mounted at the rear of the locomotive crank shaft provided 760 cfm of air. On the day of the accident, the locomotive was parked three feet from the scale. The brakes had not been set, and the locomotive was not blocked against motion. One brake shoe had been removed from the right side of the front truck.



The victim was using a fiber re-enforced rubber hose, about 54 feet long, to blow debris from the scale, I-beams and rail assembly. This hose was attached to the air compressor circuit on the locomotive.



Rail cars were loaded from bins in the plant, one at a time, then turned loose or pushed with a front-end loader so they would roll toward the locomotive in front of the scale. Fourteen railcars had been loaded on the day of the accident, each with about 110 tons of crushed stone. The brakes had not been set on any of the cars. The loadout crew was unaware that the scale was being cleaned when they were releasing the cars.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT



On the day of the accident, Jut Anderson (victim) reported for work at 6:30 a.m., his usual starting time. He worked at various tasks related to his job as loadout lead man which included cleaning railcars in preparation for loading and overseeing loadout procedures.



By 8:00 a.m., Billy Moss, a coworker, had parked the locomotive approximately three feet from the scale, with the rear of the engine toward the scale to enable Anderson to use the locomotive's air supply. By 8:30 a.m., ten railcars had been loaded and dropped to the front of the locomotive.



At about 10:00 a.m., Anderson was seated at the end of the scale on a cross beam between the rails with his back to the locomotive, blowing debris from the scale. Jason Jones was using the backhoe to clean material beside the pit.



At the same time, four more railcars were loaded and released. The cars rolled from the bins a short distance and stopped, blocking an access road. The four cars were about 200 feet from the ten previously loaded railcars.



Robert Hobbs, loader operator, saw that the road was blocked by the cars and pushed them with his loader so they would roll on down the track. The four cars hit the other 10 and pushed the locomotive over Anderson.



Jones ran to the mine office to summon help. Joe Clemmens, quality control inspector and emergency medical technician, returned with Jones. Anderson was pinned under the locomotive. The locomotive was moved and the brake linkage cut away with a torch so Anderson could be removed.



The local rescue squad took Anderson to a hospital in Augusta, Georgia, where he died the following day.

CONCLUSION



The accident was caused by failure to communicate to the load-out crew to discontinue coupling cars while work was being performed in front of the locomotive. Failure to set the brakes and block the locomotive against movement contributed to the severity of the accident.

VIOLATIONS



Citation No. 4551641
Issued on October 22, 1997, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of Standard 56.14217:

An accident occurred at this mine on October 20, 1997, severely injuring an employee. He died of these injuries the following day. The victim was seated approximately three feet from a 125 ton ALCO RS-11 locomotive cleaning the rail scales with compressed air being supplied by the locomotive. The locomotive and the ten railcars attached to it were not blocked against movement. Four loaded railcars were pushed into the locomotive and attached cars causing the locomotive to run over and pin the victim beneath the locomotive. Mine management was aware the scales were to be cleaned but failed to assure that the train was blocked against movement. The conduct of the operator was aggravated and constituted more than ordinary negligence. This is an unwarrantable failure.

This citation was terminated on November 4, 1997. The train is now being blocked against movement when parked.



Order No. 4551642
Issued on October 22, 1997, under the provisions of 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for the violation of Standard 56.14207:

An accident occurred at this mine on October 20, 1997, severely injuring the employee. He died of these injuries the following day. The victim was seated approximately three feet from a 125 ton ALCO RS-11 locomotive cleaning the rail scale with compressed air being supplied by the locomotive. The locomotive and the ten railcars attached to it were left unattended and the parking brakes on the locomotive or railcars were not set. Four loaded railcars were pushed into the locomotive and attached cars causing the locomotive to run over and pin the victim beneath the locomotive. Mine management was aware the scales were to be cleaned but failed to assure the parking brakes were set. The conduct of the operator was aggravated and constituted more than ordinary negligence. This is an unwarrantable failure.

This order was terminated on November 4, 1997. The brakes on the locomotive and railcars are now being set when the equipment is left unattended.



Citation No. 4551643
Issued on October 20, 1997, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of Section 56.14102:

An accident occurred at this mine on October 20, 1997, severely injuring the employee. He died of these injuries the following day. The brakes on the 125 ton RS-11 locomotive were not in functional condition in that a brake shoe had been removed from the front side of the front truck.

This citation was terminated on November 4, 1997. The locomotive has been permanently removed from service and is being dismantled.



/s/ Merle E. Slaton
Supervisory Mine Inspector


/s/ Danny W. Wriston
Mine Safety and Health Inspector



Approved by: Martin Rosta, District Manager


Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon [FAB97M56]