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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

DISTRICT 5

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)

FATAL FALL OF ROOF ACCIDENT

VICC # 3 Mine (I.D. 44-06853)
Coastal Coal Company, LLC
St. Paul, Wise County, Virginia

April 13, 1999

By

Charles E. Upchurch
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
P.O. Box 560, Wise County Plaza, Norton, Virginia 24273
Billy G. Foutch, Acting District Manager

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)

FATAL FALL OF ROOF ACCIDENT

VICC # 3 Mine (I.D. 44-06853)
Coastal Coal Company, LLC
St. Paul, Wise County, Virginia

April 13, 1999


GENERAL INFORMATION


Coastal Coal Company, LLC's VICC # 3 Mine is located four miles west of St. Paul, Virginia, north off State Route 58 along Meade Creek in Wise County, Virginia. The mine was opened by four drifts into the Jawbone coalbed which ranges from 30 to 65 inches in thickness on the South Mains Section, (001-0 MMU). The overall mining height varies from 5 to 9 feet according to the amount of roof rock taken during mining. Ventilation is provided by a blowing fan which produces approximately 84,220 cubic feet of air per minute. The most current laboratory analysis of return air samples collected by Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) revealed a total methane liberation of 24,256 cubic feet per day. The faces are ventilated with a single split ventilation system utilizing exhausting line curtains. The immediate roof consists of approximately 28 feet of sandy grey shale overlain by a main roof of approximately 20 feet of shale.

The mine provides employment for 51 underground and 4 surface personnel. Two mechanized mining units produce approximately 1400 tons of clean coal daily on two ten-hour production shifts and one eight-hour maintenance shift. A room and pillar system of mining is employed using remotely controlled continuous mining machines, shuttle cars, scoops, and dual head roof bolting machines equipped with automated temporary roof support (ATRS). Coal is transported out of the faces with shuttle cars, and out of the mine via belt conveyors. Employees and supplies are transported by diesel and battery powered, rubber tired equipment. At the time of the accident, the South Mains Section had been developed approximately 8900 feet inby the portals.

The Roof Control Plan in effect at the time of the accident was approved on April 22, 1998, by MSHA. The Roof Control Plan requires, as a minimum, the installation of four-foot fully grouted resin rods, point anchor, or combination anchor roof bolts on a four-foot by four-foot pattern. The maximum allowable entry and crosscut widths are 20 feet and the maximum allowable cut depth is 20 feet as measured from the last full row of permanent roof bolts. Entry and crosscut centers from 60 to 100 feet are permitted for normal conditions with extended entry and crosscut centers up to 200 feet permitted in areas of adverse conditions. Roof test holes, drilled 12 inches deeper than the longest roof bolts being installed, are required at a maximum of 20 foot intervals. The Training Plan was approved by the MSHA District Manager on February 22, 1999.

The principal officials for the Coastal Coal Company, LLC at the time of the accident were:
Chief Executive Officer: David Arledge
Chief Executive Officer: James Van Lanen
Chief Executive Officer: Jeffrey Connelly
Mine Superintendent: Carl Hamilton
Miner's Representative: Carl Hamilton
An MSHA Safety and Health Inspection (AAA) was completed on February 9, 1999, and another was started on April 12, 1999. The 1998 incident rate for the mine was 7.35 compared to 7.89 for the mining industry.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT


On Tuesday, April 13, 1999, the evening shift South Mains Section (MMU 001-0) coal production crew, under the supervision of Foreman Gerald Rutherford, began work at 4:30 p.m. At the direction of Superintendent Carl Hamilton, Rutherford gave a safety talk pertaining to the deteriorating roof conditions on the section. He discussed the measures they were taking to address the conditions, such as the narrowing of entry and crosscut widths, the installation of additional roof bolts per row, and the use of larger roof bolt plates (6 inch by 16 inch) to better support the draw rock. The crew entered the mine at 4:35 p.m., and arrived on the section at about 5:05 p.m. The No. 3 Entry and the No. 3 Right Crosscut had been mined during the previous shift and the Eimco 2810-2 remote control continuous mining machine was parked outby the working face in the No. 3 Entry. Rutherford instructed George William Ingle, continuous mining machine operator, to move the machine to No. 2 Entry, which was the next entry to be mined. Rutherford conducted the on-shift examination in the No. 2 Right Crosscut, the No. 2 Entry, and the No. 1 Entry. Ingle moved the machine to the face of the No. 2 Right Crosscut and began mining. Rutherford traveled to Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 Entries to continue the on-shift examination. After the cut was completed, Rutherford returned and conducted another examination at the face of the No. 2 Entry. Ingle moved the mining machine to the No. 2 face and commenced mining. During this operation, Ingle was joined by Joe Harrison, mechanic, who assisted him with the handling of the mining machine's trailing cable. When the No. 2 Entry cut was completed, Ingle backed the mining machine into the area where the No. 2 Left Crosscut would be started. At that location, Ingle and Harrison cleaned the continuous mining machine's dust scrubber system and replaced some of the cutter head bits.

Rutherford returned and examined the area where initial mining of the No. 2 Left Crosscut was to begin. Rutherford observed no hazards, and proceeded to the No. 5 Right Crosscut to check the roof bolting operations. Ingle positioned the mining machine and began to mine the left side of the No. 2 Left Crosscut. After advancing the left side of the crosscut to a depth of approximately 10 feet, Ingle repositioned the mining machine to the right side of the crosscut and Harrison repositioned the trailing cable. At approximately 6:40 p.m., as Ingle began to mine the right side, the roof fell without warning covering the entire mining machine and the inby end of the center-operated Joy 10SC32 shuttle car. Ingle and Harrison, who was kneeling on one knee near Ingle at the time of the roof fall, were also covered by the falling rock. Timothy Woodruff, shuttle car operator, ran to call for help when he met Rutherford returning to the No. 2 Entry. Rutherford traveled into the entry to examine the accident scene and found that loose rocks were continuing to fall from the roof. He summoned the other crew members and directed them to get emergency support material. Hiram Standifur IV, roof bolter operator, told Rutherford that he would call to the surface for help. Standifur contacted Allen Hamilton, outside person, and informed him of the accident.

At the accident scene, Rutherford knew that two persons were unaccounted for, but was unable to determine their condition. When he heard Harrison call for help, he realized Harrison was entrapped and needed help. Rutherford directed the crew to install cribs to support the roof for safe access to Harrison. After several cribs had been installed and a safe route was provided, James Hall, Shuttle Car Operator, and Rutherford climbed across the top of the fallen material and began moving rocks to locate him. When Harrison was located, he was removed from under the fallen rocks, helped to his feet, and assisted across the rock fall by Rutherford and Hall. Attempts to establish communication with Ingle were unsuccessful. Harrison was transported to the surface via personnel vehicle, then transported by Med-Flight helicopter to Bristol Regional Medical Center where he was treated for minor injuries and released on April 14, 1999.

Rutherford and his crew remained at the accident scene and waited for additional help and roof supports. Rutherford and crew were joined by Carl Hamilton, Superintendent, Robert Tilley, Mine Foreman, MSHA Accident Investigators, and Virginia Department of Mines, Minerals, and Energy (VDMME) officials. Ingle was located, but was found to be unresponsive. Additional cribs were installed and work continued to extricate Ingle. Ingle was recovered at 3:20 a.m. on April 14, 1999, and transported to the surface. Ingle was then transported to Norton Community Hospital where he was pronounced dead by Dr. Linwood Briggs, MD.

PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED


1. The Jawbone coal seam ranges in thickness from 30 to 65 inches on the South Mains section. Two to three feet of rock is being cut from the mine roof during mining. The mining height at the accident scene was approximately eight feet.

2. The overburden for the Jawbone coal seam at the accident site is approximately 640 feet. The overburden ranges up to 1300 feet for the mine.

3. The mine roof on the section and at the accident scene was supported by five-foot point anchor roof bolts with eight inch by eight inch bearing plates installed on a maximum of four-foot by four-foot pattern. The bolt type is a number 6, grade 60, bendable, notched rebar with a minimum grout length of two feet. On April 13, 1999, Carl Hamilton, Superintendent, instructed Rutherford to increase the roof bolt density from four or five bolts per row to six bolts per row due to the increase in amount of draw rock present.

4. The No. 2 Entry was mined 18 to 19 feet wide. The entrance to the right crosscut had been mined 28 feet wide for a length of two feet, and the entrance to the left crosscut had been mined 31 feet wide for a distance of four feet. The approved Roof Control Plan permits entry and crosscut widths to be a maximum of 20 feet and permits the entrance to crosscuts to be mined 24 feet wide for a distance of four feet into the crosscut.

5. The intersection was created by mining the left crosscut from the same entry from which the right crosscut was being mined. This method of mining was allowed by the approved Roof Control Plan.

6. The section was mining through a transition zone as evidenced by deteriorating roof conditions inby the row of crosscuts containing Survey Station Numbers 1059 through 1065.

7. The accident occurred in the second row of crosscuts being developed in this transition zone.

8. The roof fall occurred in the intersection of the No. 2 Entry, the No. 2 Left Crosscut, and the No. 2 Right Crosscut at Survey Station No. 1067, as the initial cut of the 2 Left Crosscut was being mined. The left side of the crosscut had been mined to a depth of approximately 10 feet and the right side had been mined to a depth of approximately 4 feet when the fall occurred.

9. The roof fall was approximately 40 feet long by 20 feet wide by 8 to 10 feet thick. The failed roof material consisted of sandy shale. The outby, left, and inby edges of the fall cavity were high angle slips and slickensided surfaces. The right edge was rough and broken.

10. Examination of a roof test hole in the crosscut of No. 2 Entry immediately outby the accident location revealed a crack in the roof at 60 inches.

11. Witness' statements indicated that after penetrating the mine roof for a distance of approximately 2 feet, no cracks were detected during roof bolt installation or during test hole drilling. Test holes were drilled routinely to the required depth of 6 feet, which is one foot deeper than the 5 foot long roof bolt being installed, and occasionally to depths of 7 or 8 feet to evaluate deeper strata.

12. No evidence of horizontal stress was observed on the section.

13. An Eimco, Model No. 2810-2, continuous mining machine was being used to mine coal on the South Mains Section (MMU 001-0). The machine was operated by remote control and was not equipped with an operator's compartment.

14. The section foreman visually examined the area prior to beginning mining operations in the No. 2 Left Crosscut, and did not observe any hazards.

15. No training violations were discovered during the accident investigation.

CONCLUSION


The accident occurred because the mine roof was not adequately supported or otherwise controlled to protect persons from hazards related to falls of roof. The section was mining through a transition zone of subnormal roof conditions consisting of high angle slips, slickensides, and horsebacks. Roof bolts longer than the five-foot bolts routinely installed on the South Mains Section were not utilized in the transition zone of high-angle slips and slickensides. In addition, the method of mining resulted in excessive widths being created in the intersection.

ENFORCEMENT ACTION


The following citations/orders were issued due to the conditions revealed during the investigation:

1. A 103(k) Order (No. 7295971) was issued to ensure the safety of any person in the mine until an investigation was conducted and the area was deemed safe to work.

2. A 104(a) Citation (No. 7292551) was issued citing 30 CFR 75.202(a). The mine roof in the No. 2 Entry on the 001 active working section where a fatal roof fall accident occurred on April 13, 1999, was not adequately supported or otherwise controlled to protect persons from falls of roof. The roof fall measured approximately 20' wide x 8' to 10' high x 40' long and resulted in fatal injuries to the continuous mining machine operator and non-life threatening injuries to the mechanic/miner helper. The fall began at the cutter head of the continuous mining machine and proceeded across the intersection toward the No. 2 Right Crosscut and outby, down the No. 2 Entry. The fall covered the entire continuous mining machine and the front end of a center-driven shuttle car. The section was mining through a transition zone resulting in deteriorating roof conditions across the section starting inby the row of crosscuts containing Survey Station Nos. 1059 through 1065.

3. A 104(a) Citation (No. 7292552) was issued citing 30 CFR 75.203(a). The method of mining utilized in developing the right and left crosscuts from the No. 2 Entry at Survey Station No. 1067 resulted in excessive widths at the entrance to the crosscuts. The No. 2 Right Crosscut was developed a width of 28 feet for a distance of 2 feet into the crosscut, and the No. 2 Left Crosscut was developed a width of 31 feet for a distance of 4 feet into the crosscut. A roof fall measuring approximately 40 feet long by 20 feet wide by 8 to 10 feet high occurred in the first cut being taken in the No. 2 Left Crosscut and continued across the intersection covering the entire continuous mining machine and the front end of the shuttle car and resulted in fatal injuries to the mining machine operator and non-life threatening injuries to the mechanic/miner helper.

Respectfully submitted:

Charles E. Upchurch
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Approved:

Billy G. Foutch
Acting District Manager


Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB99C11

APPENDIX A

The following persons provided information and/or were present during the investigation:

Coastal Coal Company, LLC Officials

Carl Hamilton .......... Superintendent
Robert Tilley .......... Mine Foreman
Hiram Standifur, Jr. .......... Day Shift Section Foreman
Charlie B. Gibson .......... Evening Shift Section Foreman
Paul Campbell .......... Manager, Mining Operations
Candace H. Morgan .......... Manager, Safety and Health
Nick Brewer .......... MCCI, Consultant
William C. Miller, II .......... Attorney
Coastal Coal Company, LLC Employees
Gerald Rutherford .......... Evening Shift Acting Section Foreman
James Hall .......... Evening Shift Shuttle Car Operator
Daniel McCracken .......... Evening Shift Roof Bolter Operator/General Inside
Hiram Standifur, IV .......... Evening Shift Roof Bolter Operator
Timothy Woodruff .......... Evening Shift Scoop Operator/Shuttle Car Operator
Sammy McMahan .......... Evening Shift Beltman
Allen Hamilton .......... Evening Shift Outside Person
Joe Harrison .......... Evening Shift Mechanic/Continuous Mining Machine Helper
Eric Mullins .......... Day Shift Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Leonard Jackson, Jr. .......... Day Shift Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Anthony Blackburn .......... Day Shift Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Virginia Department of Mines, Minerals, and Energy
Frank Linkous .......... Chief, Division of Mines
Carroll Green .......... Mine Inspector Supervisor
John Thomas .......... Mine Inspector Supervisor
Matt Smith .......... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
James Stanley .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Sammy Fleming .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Vernon Johnson .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Danny W. Altizer .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Clarence Ball .......... Coal Mine Inspector
John P. Talbert .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Michael Willis .......... Mine Safety Engineer
Gary Cutting .......... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Wayland Jessee .......... Assistant District Manager, Inspection Division
James Kiser .......... Staff Assistant
James Hackworth .......... Educational Field Services Specialist
Benjamin S. Harding .......... Supervisory Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Harold Musick .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, Roof Control
Russell Dresch .......... Electrical Engineer
David Woodward .......... Mining Engineer
Larry A. Coeburn .......... Conference Litigation Officer
Gary Jessee .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, Roof Control
John Godsey .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, Roof Control
Charles E. Upchurch .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
MSHA Pittsburgh Safety and Health Technology Center
Joseph Cybulski .......... Supervisory Mining Engineer, Roof Control Division
MSHA Office of the Administrator
Larry Johnson .......... Mine Safety and Health Specialist, Safety Division


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