MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Northeastern District
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
Accident Investigation Report
Surface Metal Mine
(Titanium, Zircon, and Ilmenite)
Fatal Machinery Accident
RGC (USA) Mineral Sands Incorporated
Old Hickory Mine
Stony Creek, Sussex County, Virginia
I.D. No. 44-06879
February 3, 1999
by
Merle E. Slaton
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector
James C. Enochs
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
James E. Goodale
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Stanley J. Michalek, P.E.
Civil Engineer
J. Jarrod Durig
Civil Engineer
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Northeast District
230 Executive Drive, Suite 2
Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066-6415
James R. Petrie
District Manager
MSHA was notified at 2:15 p.m. on the day of the accident by a telephone call from the processing supervisor for the mining company. An investigation was started the same day.
The Old Hickory Mine, a surface metal mine, owned and operated by RGC (USA) Mineral Sands Incorporated, was located at Stony Creek, Sussex County, Virginia. The principal operating official was Allen R. Sale, operations manager. The mine was normally operated two, 12-hour shifts a day, seven days a week. A total of 77 persons was employed.
Sand containing heavy minerals was mined from a single bench with a backhoe. Excavated material was transported by trucks to a wet mill where mineral concentrate was produced by gravity separation. The concentrate was then trucked to a dry mill for processing into titanium, zircon, and ilmenite. The finished products were stored in bins prior to shipment by rail, and were sold for use in abrasive materials and in the manufacture of titanium metal, paint pigments, and paper products.
The last regular inspection of this operation was completed on December 9, 1998.
PHYSICAL FACTORS INVOLVED
The accident occurred at the transfer chute located in the loadout building at the dry mill. A 24-inch wide inclined belt conveyor fed material into the chute, then onto a 24-inch wide enclosed reversible conveyor belt. A model 1350 Heavy Duty Linear Sampler manufactured by Heath and Sherwood Limited was installed inside the chute.
The sampler was pneumatically operated and was controlled by an electronic timer set to cycle every 5 minutes. When activated, a mechanical arm would travel 35 inches across the chute in about 3 seconds. As the arm passed through the material falling into the chute from the feed belt, it would collect a sample and discharge it into a tray located at the bottom of the chute. The arm would remain against the opposite side of the chute until 5 minutes elapsed, at which time it would return to its starting position. The arm was constructed of 3 inch square steel tubing, 22 inches long. The air pressure at the time of the investigation was approximately 108 psi. At the sampling arm's limit of travel, the distance between the wall of the chute and the arm was approximately 5 inches.
It was necessary to thoroughly clean the transfer chute when switching products to avoid product contamination. The normal procedure for cleaning the chute involved: (1) turning off and locking out the feed belt; (2) turning off the sampler control switch; (3) climbing onto the feed belt; and, (4) cleaning residual material from the chute with a broom and air hose while lying face down on the belt with the upper body extended out over the headpulley. The discharge belt under the chute was left running to carry away material cleaned from the chute. The chute was normally cleaned several times a week without bleeding off the air pressure to the sampling arm or blocking it against motion.
A work platform and a 14- by 14-inch hinged access door were located on one side of the chute. At the time of the accident, an air hose was found on the platform with its nozzle extended into the chute through the access door. A broom with a broken handle was also found on the work platform, and straw bristles from the broom were found on the discharge belt below the chute.
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
On the day of the accident, Kenneth Urquhart (victim) reported for work at 7:00 a.m., his normal starting time. He met with Jeffery Ooten, shipping coordinator, who instructed him to load railcars with ilmenite. Work progressed throughout the morning without incident. After lunch, Ooten told Urquhart to clean the transfer chute and sampling arm preparatory to loading zircon and to call him when finished. Ooten then left the building and went to the main office to do paperwork.
After Ooten's departure, Urquhart shut off the feed belt, climbed over the headpulley and into the transfer chute. While he was inside the chute, the sampling arm automatically activated, pinning him against the side of the chute. When the arm cycled back to its starting position, Urquhart fell to the bottom of the chute and became lodged between the discharge gate and the belt which was running. No one else was in the loadout building at the time of the accident.
At about 2:00 p.m., Ooten returned to the loadout building. He did not see Urquhart, so he walked over to the plant building to see if he was in the break room. Urquhart was not there, so Ooten returned to the loadout building. Ooten was standing in the loadout building's control room when he looked up at the transfer chute and saw an air hose extending into the access door on the side of the chute. Thinking that something did not seem right, Ooten climbed onto the platform along side the chute, looked inside the access door, and saw Urquhart's hand near the bottom of the chute. Ooten called to Urquhart, but received no response. As he climbed down off the work platform, Ooten pulled the emergency stop cords on the feed and discharge belts, and turned off the control switch for the sampling arm. He then called out to Urquhart several more times. Receiving no response, he ran to the plant control room and told Jimmie Brown, processing supervisor, to call the local emergency assistance number.
Ooten, Brown, and several maintenance personnel returned to the loadout building and began removing the guards and shield panels around the discharge conveyor in order to free Urquhart. Emergency medical technicians arrived shortly and assisted. Life saving efforts were unsuccessful and Urquhart was pronounced dead by the local coroner at 3:09 p.m. The cause of death was attributed to mechanical asphyxiation.
CONCLUSION
The primary cause of the accident was the unsafe procedures for cleaning the chute. The power switch for the sampling arm was not shut off and locked out and the arm was not blocked against motion. Further, workers routinely climbed onto the feed belt and leaned over the headpulley to clean the chute without a safety belt and line.
VIOLATIONS
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on February 3, 1999, when a shipping operator was crushed between a mechanical sampling arm and the side of a chute while cleaning material from inside the chute. This order is issued to assure the safety of persons at this operation and prohibits any work in this area until MSHA determines that it is safe to resume normal operations. The mine operator shall obtain approval from an Authorized Representative of the Secretary for all action to recover persons, equipment, and/or restore operations in the affected areas.This order was terminated on February 4, 1999. Conditions that contributed to the accident have been corrected and normal mining operations can resume.
Citation No.7766283 was issued on February 24, 1999, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.11001:
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on February 3, 1999, when a shipping operator was crushed between a mechanical sampling arm and the side of a chute while cleaning material from inside the chute. A safe means of access was not provided to enable workers to remove residual material, in that the employees were climbing onto the feed conveyor and reaching over the head pulley to clean the chute. Failure to provide a safe means of access to clean this chute is a serious lack of reasonable care which constitutes more than ordinary negligence and is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory safety standard.
This citation was terminated on February 26, 1999. A plan was developed for safely cleaning the transfer chute. The chute will only be cleaned from the work platform by using an air lance inserted through the access door on the side of the chute. No one will climb onto the feed belt or into the chute to clean it.
Order No. 7766284 was issued on February 3, 1999, under the provisions of section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14105:
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on February 3, 1999, when a shipping operator was crushed between a mechanical sampler arm and the side of a chute while cleaning material from inside the chute. The pneumatically operated sampling arm had not been deenergized and blocked against motion. Failure to ensure that the sample arm was blocked against hazardous motion is a serious lack of reasonable care which constitutes more than ordinary negligence and is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory safety standard.
This order was terminated on February 26, 1999. The mine operator established procedures requiring the sampling arm to be shut off and blocked against motion before cleaning inside the chute. All personnel have been instructed in these procedures.
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB99M09
APPENDIX A
Persons Participating in the Investigation
RGC (USA) Mineral Sands Incorporated
Allen
R. Sale, operations manager
Sean P. Fleming, safety director
Charles Saunders, environmental officer
Douglas Miller, processing superintendent
Jeff Ooten, shipping coordinator
Jimmie Brown, processing supervisor
Neal Jones, team leader
Hunton and Williams, Law Firm
Edwin F. Farren,
attorney
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Merle Slaton, supervisory mine safety and health inspector
James C. Enochs, mine safety and health inspector
James E. Goodale, mine safety and health inspector
Stanley J. Michalek P.E., civil engineer, Pittsburgh Health and Safety
Technology Center
J. Jarrod Durig, civil engineer, Pittsburgh Health and Safety Technology
Center
APPENDIX B
Diagram of Sampling Arm
APPENDIX
C
Diagram of Transfer Chute
