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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

Report of Investigation

Surface Metal Mine
(Gold)
Fatal Fall of Person Accident
September 20, 1999

CDK Contracting Company (L35)
Carlin, Eureka County, Nevada

at

Barrick Goldstrike Mine
Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc.
Carlin, Eureka County, Nevada
I.D. No. 26-01089

Accident Investigators

John R. Widows
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Richard Wilson
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Michael L. Schumaker
Civil Engineer

Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
Western District
2060 Peabody Rd., Suite 610
Vacaville, CA 95687
James M. Salois, District Manager


OVERVIEW


On September 20, 1999, Dale Jim Chee, Jr., ironworker, age 23, was fatally injured when he fell approximately 57 feet while installing steel grating at the top of a tank. A crane, positioned on the ground, was being used to hoist the gratings to the top of the tank. As a section of grating was being lowered into position, it swung and struck Chee who fell to the ground.

The accident was caused by the failure to attach a tag line to the steel grating to steady and guide it into position. Failure of the crane operator to clearly see the work site and failure of the victim to secure his safety lanyard before starting the work task were contributing causes to the accident.

Chee had a total of two years and one month mining experience, with 5 months experience at this mine. He had received training in accordance with 30 CFR Part 48.

GENERAL INFORMATION

The Barrick Goldstrike Mine, an open pit gold mine, owned and operated by Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc., was located 28 miles north of Carlin, Eureka County, Nevada. Principal operating officials were Donald R. Prahl, vice president and general manager and David Sheffield, superintendent, safety and health services. The mine was normally operated two, 12-hour shifts a day, seven days a week. Total employment was 1430 persons.

Gold bearing ore was drilled and blasted from multiple benches in several pits. Broken material was transported from the pits on haulage trucks to either the mill or waste dump. Depending on its grade, the ore was either crushed and milled or hauled to a cyanide leach pad for processing. The milled or leached product was sent to the plant refinery for removal of impurities and pouring into Dore! bars. These bars were transported to refineries off site for final processing prior to sale to customers.

The victim was employed by CDK Contracting Company, located in Carlin, Nevada. Principal operating officials were John Ryder, project manager and Lawrence McIntyre, corporate safety manager. CDK Contracting Company had 200 employees who worked one ten-hour shift, 6 days a week. They were one of several contractors on site whom had been hired to work on Barrick Goldstrike Mine=s roaster construction project. A roaster is a facility which processes gold-bearing sulfide ores, utilizing heat and carbon leaching to extract the gold. CDK Contracting Company had been hired to install the mechanical piping, conveyors, crusher, and place the structural steel on top of the Carbon-In-Leach (CIL) tanks for the project.

A regular inspection was ongoing at the time of the accident and was completed on September 30, 1999.

DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT


On the day of the accident, Dale Jim Chee, Jr., victim, reported to work at 7:00 a.m., his normal starting time. Chee was assigned his normal work activity which was installation of the steel gratings on top of the 5CIL tank. Plans called for the steel gratings to become walkways with handrails and to be used later for access to the top of the tanks. Walkways and handrails had been installed on five of the six tanks in the project.

Work proceeded normally throughout the shift. At about 2:15 p.m., Chee was positioning an individual section of grating, suspended by the crane, into place on top of the tank. He was using a hand-held radio to communicate with the crane operator regarding the grating=s placement because the operator was out of his sight.

While positioning the grating, it swung or twisted and bumped Chee. He pushed the grating away and started to move and bend down. The grating swung back and knocked him off balance which caused him to fall approximately 57 feet to the bottom of the tank. Other employees immediately responded to the accident scene. Emergency personnel were summoned and arrived a short time later. The victim was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Death was attributed to multiple injuries due to blunt force trauma.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


At about 2:40 p.m., September 20, 1999, MSHA was notified by a telephone call from Daniel Stevenson, director, health and safety services (surface) to William Wilson, assistant district manager, Western District. An investigation was started the same day. An Order was issued pursuant to Section 103(k) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of miners. MSHA conducted a physical inspection of the accident site with the assistance of mine management, miners, and representatives from the Nevada's Department of Business and Industry, Mine Safety and Training Section. The miners did not request nor have representation during the investigation.

DISCUSSION


1. The accident occurred at No. 5 CIL tank which was one of six tanks being erected as part of the roaster construction project. Each tank was an open-topped structure, constructed of steel, measured 48 feet in diameter, 53 feet 7 inches in height, and set on a concrete foundation. (See Appendix 1 for tank layout).

2. Each tank was designed to have walkways installed on top for access and travel. Multiple steel I-beams were installed horizontally on top for structural stability and also for support of the walkways and additional equipment mounted on each tank. Walkways with handrails had been installed on tanks No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. The accident occurred while a crew was installing walkways on tank No. 5.

3. A 320-ton, Manitowoc 4100, track-mounted crane, positioned at ground level, was being used to hoist materials to the top of the tank. The crane was equipped with a 220-foot boom and a 40-foot jib. An inspection of the crane after the accident revealed no safety defects.

4. Communications between the crane operator and employees on top of the tank were done by a pair of hand-held radios since the crane operator was out of sight of the crew working at the top of the tank. The victim=s radio was damaged in the accident and could not be tested; the crane operator=s radio was functional when tested after the accident. The crane operator also told investigators that he had clear communications with the victim up until the time of the accident.

5. Handrails had been partially installed around tank No. 5. These handrails were equipped with a 2-inch steel tie-off cable used by crews to tie their safety lines to while working around the perimeter of the tank. Grating was installed from the perimeter-side handrail toward the middle of the tank. After the perimeter gratings were installed, tie-off points were I-beams, mounted equipment, or to gratings.

6. Individual sections of grating varied in length depending on the particular placement on the tank. The section of grating involved in the accident was 20 feet, 1 inch in length and was three feet wide. It was estimated to weigh 640 pounds. Reportedly, it was necessary for the crane operator to shake the bundle of grating because the sections would stick together. The operator had shaken the bundle of gratings the victim was installing. After shaking the bundle, four sections of grating were installed. The fifth section was being installed when the accident occurred.

7. A two-point attachment was used to rig the grating to the crane=s hoist-line hook. The attachment consisted of a 2-inch diameter steel cable. Each leg of the two-point attachment was 20 feet in length. Two clevises were used to connect the attachment to the grating. The attachment was connected 91 inches from one end of the grating and 82 inches from the opposite end. The legs of the attachment were 182 and 15 inches, respectively, from one edge of the grating along its width. There were no tag lines attached to the grating.

8. During the investigation, a high-lift fork lift was used to suspend the grating involved in the accident so its relative orientation while suspended could be observed. When suspended, the grating was inclined at 25 degrees from vertical. The grating swung and twisted freely while suspended.

9. The victim was wearing a safety belt and full body harness. A >Y= lanyard with shock absorber was attached to the safety harness. The lanyard was equipped with one clasp to attach the lanyard to the harness and two clasps for tying off. One clasp was attached to the harness and the other two clasps used for tying off were attached to a d-ring on the safety belt. The safety belt and harness was inspected after the accident and found to be in good condition with all of the clasps on the safety lanyard operational.

10. At 2:00 p.m., on the day of the accident, the temperature was 75 degrees Fahrenheit with the wind from the south at seven miles per hour.

CONCLUSION


The accident was caused by the failure to attach a tag line to the steel grating to steady and guide it into position. Failure of the crane operator to clearly see the work site and failure of the victim to secure his safety lanyard before starting the work task were contributing causes to the accident.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


Order No. 7967841 was issued on September 20, 1999, under provisions of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act.
A fatal accident occurred at the roaster project on September 20, 1999, when a welder fell from the top of the No. 5CIL tank to the ground. This order is issued to assure the safety of persons at this operation until the affected area can return to normal operations as determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary. The mine operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all actions to recover equipment, and/or return affected areas to normal operations.
The order was terminated on September 21, 1999, when it was determined that the conditions which contributed to the accident had been corrected.

CDK Contracting Company Citation No. 7973571 was issued on December 27, 1999, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30CFR 56.16007(a):
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on September 20, 1999, when a contractor ironworker fell approximately 57 feet from the top of the 5CIL tank. The victim was installing steel gratings on top of the tank. A section of grating was suspended by a crane and was being positioned into place. No tag line was attached to the load to steady or guide the load into place while it was suspended. The section of grating swung or twisted, hitting the victim, causing him to fall.
The citation was terminated on December 27, 1999, when all workers were re-instructed to use tag lines while positioning suspended loads which required steadying or hand guidance.

Citation No. 7973572 was issued on December 27, 1999, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for the violation of 30CFR 56.15005:
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on September 20, 1999, when a contractor ironworker fell approximately 57 feet from the top of the 5CIL tank. The victim was installing steel grating on top of the tank. A section of grating was suspended by a crane and was being positioned into place. The section of grating swung or twisted, hitting the victim, causing him to fall. The victim was wearing a body harness fall protection device equipped with dual lanyards, but he was not tied off.
The citation was terminated on December 27, 1999, when all workers were re-instructed to use their safety lanyards when working in an area where there is a danger of falling.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB99M35

Attachments

  • Drawing of Roaster Project
  • Drawing of Tank No. 5CIL
  • APPENDIX A

    Persons participating in the investigation

    Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc.
    Mitchell C. Baclawski, safety and health coordinator, core programs/contractors
    Michael Crum, process division, safety and health services
    CDK Contracting Company
    Lawrence McIntyre, corporate safety manager
    Robert O. Hales, area safety manager
    Charles Casey, corporate loss control manager
    John Ryder, project and mechanical supervisor
    Chet Rinehart, general foreman
    Steven Devitt, job safety director
    Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Mine Safety and Training Section
    James Frie, district inspector
    Cindy Hartman, boiler inspector
    Mine Safety and Health Administration
    John R. Widows, supervisory mine safety and health inspector
    Richard Wilson, mine safety and health inspector
    Michael L. Schumaker, civil engineer
    APPENDIX B

    Persons interviewed

    CDK Contracting Company
    Chet Rinehart, general foreman
    Charles W. Alderson, leadman
    Wilfred Yazzie, ironworker
    Freddie Chee, ironworker
    Lyle D. Raker, crane operator
    Roy C. Billy, millwright helper
    Lynn Freeman, millwright helper