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MSHA - Fatal Investigation Report

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Limestone)

Fatal Powered Haulage Accident
October 14, 1999

Corydon Stone and Asphalt, Incorporated
Corydon, Harrison County, Indiana
I.D. 12-00017

Accident Investigators

Gerald D. Holeman
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Karonica V. Glover
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Ronald Medina
Mechanical Engineer

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
North Central District
515 West First Street, Room 333
Duluth, MN 55802-1302
Felix A. Quintana, District Manager


OVERVIEW


On October 14, 1999, Kenneth Paul Schmitt, lube-man/mechanic, age 58, was fatally injured when he was run over by an off-road haul truck which he had finished servicing at the quarry bench.

The accident occurred because no effective means were used to warn persons that the truck was going to move.

Schmitt had a total of 5 years mining experience as a lube-man/mechanic at this mine. He had not received training in accordance with 30 CFR Part 48.

GENERAL INFORMATION


Corydon Stone and Asphalt, Inc., owned and operated by Corydon Stone and Asphalt, Inc., was a surface, crushed stone operation located in Corydon, Harrison County, Indiana. Bernard P. Bachman, vice president, was the principal operating official. The mine was normally operated one, 10-hour shift a day, five days a week. Total employment was 23 persons.

Limestone was drilled, blasted, loaded onto haul trucks, and transported to the plant where the material was crushed, screened, and stockpiled. The finished product was used by the company at their adjacent facility to produce asphalt or sold as construction aggregate.

The last regular inspection of this operation was completed on March 12, 1999. Another regular inspection was conducted following this investigation.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT


On the day of the accident, Kenneth Schmitt (victim) arrived at the mine site at 6:30 a.m., one hour before his normal starting time. At about 7:30 a.m., he began lubricating and servicing quarry equipment. At about 9:00 a.m., William Kintner, truck driver, parked his haul truck near Schmitt=s lube truck for servicing, and exited the operator's cab. Kintner reported he was outside of his truck while he watched Schmitt work on his vehicle. After an undetermined period of time, Schmitt came out from underneath Kintner's haul truck, with pliers in his hand, and waved at Kintner as an indication that he was through with his truck.

Kintner returned to the operator's cab, started his truck, and looked in his mirrors. He did not see Schmitt. Due to the narrow bench, Kintner turned to the right, in front of the lube truck, before he made a loop turn to the left. When he completed his loop turn, he saw Schmitt lying on the ground. Schmitt had been run over by the haul truck. Kintner immediately stopped his truck and went to Schmitt. Sam Cole, loader operator, summoned emergency medical personnel and assisted Kintner who was attending to Schmitt. Emergency personnel arrived shortly and the victim was pronounced dead at the scene. Death was attributed to crushing injuries.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


At about 9:45 a.m. on October 14, 1999, Steven M. Richetta, supervisory mine safety and health inspector, was notified of the accident by a telephone call from Sandy Mattingly, office manager for the mining company. An investigation began the same day. An order under the provisions of 103(k) of the Mine Act was issued to ensure the safety of the miners until the affected area of the mine could be returned to normal operations. MSHA conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine personnel. The miners did not request, nor have, representation during the investigation.

DISCUSSION


1) The accident occurred in the quarry on the southeastern end of the lower bench approximately 58 feet from the southwest wall (see Appendix C).

2) The accident occurred at approximately 9:00 a.m. on a level, dry area of ground. The weather was reportedly clear and dry.

3) Tire tracks were no longer present in the immediate area of the accident because of emergency personnel entering the area.

4) The truck involved was a 1986 Wabco Haulpak, Model 35D, with a maximum rated payload of 35 tons. The haul truck weighed approximately 61,100 pounds, and was empty at the time of the accident.

5) The backup alarm and the horn on the haul truck were in good operating condition.

6) The side view mirrors on the driver's side were clean. The lower mirror on the passenger side contained some dried mud which created a 2-square foot blind zone along the passenger side of the haul truck between the front and rear tires. The windshield and door windows were clean and unobstructed. The mirrors on both sides of the haul truck were adjusted such that the driver could see objects close to the side of the haul truck, but not farther out. A pedestrian had to be within 2 feet of the passenger side and 4 feet of the driver's side of the haul truck to be seen in the mirrors by the driver. In direct line of sight, the pedestrian became visible at approximately 9 feet in front of the front bumper when standing toward the passenger side of the haul truck. Any objects closer than 9 feet were in a blind zone (see Appendix D).

7) Inspection of the haul truck indicated that the lube points at the rear and side areas of the haul truck (such as the dump body hinge pins and the hoist cylinder pivots) had been greased. The equipment used to lube the haul truck had been put away. The lube hose was found coiled back up onto the appropriate reel. No tools were found with or near the victim.

8) Based on witness statement and engine oil stains, it was determined that at the time of the accident, the lube truck was parked on the passenger side of the haul truck, parallel to and approximately 7 feet 8 inches away. The haul truck was positioned approximately 11 feet back from the front bumper of the lube truck in a staggered position, and roughly aligned with the front of the air compressor on the lube truck.

9) Two persons were working approximately 120 yards to the northwest, but did not witness the accident.

CONCLUSION


The primary cause of the accident was the failure to use effective means to warn the victim prior to movement of the haul truck. The lack of direct communication between the truck driver and the victim contributed to the accident.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


Order No.7842016 was issued on October 14, 1999, under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Act:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on October 14, 1999, when a lube-man was run over by a Wabco 35D haul truck (SN CF13937CFA21-CE). This order is issued to assure the safety of persons at this operation until the mine or affected areas can be returned to normal operations as determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary. The mine operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all actions to recover person, equipment, and/or returning affected areas of the mine to normal.
This order was terminated on October 16, 1999, after it was determined by MSHA that the affected area of the mine could resume normal operations.

Citation No. 7801263 was issued on November 8, 1999, for a violation of 30 CFR Part 56.14200:
On October 14, 1999, a lube-man was fatally injured at this mine when he was run over by a 35-ton haul truck. A warning sound or other effective means to warn persons was not used prior to moving the truck. The mine operator failed to require equipment operators to sound a warning or use other effective means to warn persons who could be exposed to a hazard from the equipment.
This citation was terminated on November 18, 1999. The mine operator has implemented a policy that requires all mobile equipment operators sound their horn prior to movement. All employees have received training on this new policy.

For more information:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon MSHA's Fatal Alert Bulletin



APPENDIX A

Persons Participating in the Investigation

Corydon Stone and Asphalt, Inc.
Bernard P. Bachman, vice president
Bob Satterfield, maintenance superintendent
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Gerald D. Holeman, supervisory mine safety and health inspector
Karonica V. Glover, mine safety and health inspector
Ronald Medina, mechanical engineer
APPENDIX B

Persons Interviewed
Bernard P. Bachman, vice president
William P. Kintner, truck driver
Patrick V. Walter, truck driver