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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Underground Coal Mine

Fatal Powered Haulage Accident
April 10, 2000

Skyline Mine No. 3
Canyon Fuel Company, LLC
Helper, Carbon County, Utah
ID No. 42-01566

Accident Investigators

Jerry O. D. Lemon
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Frank Markosek
Inspector Trainee

Arlie B. Massey
Electrical Engineer

Ronald Medina
Mechanical Engineer

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 9
P.O. Box 25367
Denver, Colorado 80225-0367
John A. Kuzar, District Manager



OVERVIEW


On Monday, April 10, 2000, at about 3:10 p.m., Christopher A. Newman, age 35, Shuttle Car Operator, was fatally injured in a powered haulage accident on the 7th Left three-entry development section in the No. 1 belt entry at crosscut No. 17. Newman, operating the No. 16 opposite standard shuttle car, had taken a load of coal to the section feeder breaker to dump. When he did not return to the continuous mining machine, another crew member went to look for him. Newman was found standing in an upright position, crushed between the cab of the shuttle car and the coal rib.

Newman had unloaded about 90 percent of his load when the electrical power to the shuttle car interrupted for unknown reasons. Newman attempted to exit the shuttle car, but the clearance between the cab and the coal rib was tight, only about eight to nine inches. While Newman was exiting the shuttle car, the No. 17 standard shuttle car arrived to side-dump at the feeder breaker. This shuttle car, while dumping, struck the rear conveyor of Newman's shuttle car, causing it to move toward the coal rib, crushing Newman. Newman had ten years of mining experience with two years and one month as a shuttle car operator.

The direct cause of the accident was the impact of the No. 17 standard shuttle car on the No. 16 opposite standard shuttle car and the tight clearance between the operator's cab and the coal rib. A contributing factor was the location of the feeder breaker close to the rib line requiring the No. 16 shuttle car and the operator's compartment to be close to the rib. The use of the opposite standard shuttle car on the straight and the standard shuttle car on the side-dump restricted both shuttle car operator's visibility of each other while at the feeder breaker. Had the shuttle cars switched routes, the operators would have been able to see each other while at the feeder breaker.

GENERAL INFORMATION


The Skyline Mine No. 3 is an underground coal mine located about six miles southwest of Scofield, Carbon County, Utah. It is operated by Canyon Fuel Company, LLC, with LLC members Arch Western Resources, LLC and Itochu Coal International, Inc.

The mine was opened in the fall of 1981 by the Utah Fuel Company, a subsidiary of Coastal States Energy Company. It was purchased by Canyon Fuel Company, LLC with LLC members ARCO Uinta Coal Company and Itochu Coal International, Inc. on December 20, 1996. Arch Western Resources replaced ARCO Uinta Coal as a LLC member on June 1, 1998.

The underground workings are accessed by drift openings rather than shafts. Coal is transported out of the mine by belt conveyors. The first longwall mining was conducted in September of 1986. The mine has one producing longwall and two continuous mining machine sections. In 1999, the mine produced 3.7 million tons of coal.

The 7th Left section, where the fatal accident occurred, is a three entry section, that began development on February 29, 2000. A 60-inch section belt is in the No. 1 entry. The No. 2 entry is the section's intake entry. The section return is in the No. 3 entry. These entries are on 50-foot centers with crosscuts on 120-foot centers.

The average daily production at the mine is 18,000 tons. The mine employs approximately 247 persons with 216 underground and 31 on the surface. The mine works three 8-hour and 40 minute shifts per day. One shift is a maintenance/down-shift, and two are production shifts. This schedule is normal for five days per week, with major maintenance and rehabilitation work done on the weekends.

The last Mine Safety and Health Administration Safety and Health Inspection was completed on March 29, 2000. The NFDL incidence rate for this mine for 1999 was 1.44 compared to the National underground NFDL rate of 8.14.

The principal officers at the mine at the time of the accident were:
Dan Meadors        General Manager
Ray Bridge             Safety Supervisor (Dugout Mine)
Rick Parkins           Production Superintendent
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT


On Monday, April 10, 2000, the 7th Left section crew, supervised by Larry Christensen, entered the underground mine at 7:00 a.m., and arrived on the section at about 7:30 a.m. Christensen made his on-shift examination, found the section safe to work, and gave work assignments to the crew. Mining started at approximately 7:45 a.m. in the face of the No. 1 entry and continued without incident in the three entry development until 3:00 p.m.

At 3:00 p.m. the Joy 12CM-12 continuous mining machine was located in the No. 1 face. The No. 17 Joy shuttle car, Model 10SC32-56BX-5, was loaded and trammed to the Stamler feeder breaker, located in the No. 1 entry, and side dumped onto the feeder from crosscut No. 17. The No. 17 car was the standard shuttle car with the operator's cab on the right side, looking toward the faces. After unloading at the feeder breaker, the No. 17 shuttle car operator returned to the continuous mining machine for another load, taking 3 to 5 minutes to load per car.

The No. 16 shuttle car, operated by Christopher Newman, victim, after being loaded, was trammed straight back in the No. 1 entry to dump on the end of the feeder breaker. Newman dumped approximately 90% of his load when electrical power to the shuttle car interrupted for an unknown reason. Newman attempted to exit the shuttle car, but the clearance between the cab and the coal rib was tight, only about eight to nine inches. While Newman was exiting, the No. 17 shuttle car returned to side-dump at the feeder breaker. This shuttle car entered the No. 17 crosscut, raised its conveyor boom, trammed onto the feeder breaker, and struck the rear conveyor of the No. 16 shuttle car. This collision was enough to shift the top of the No. 16 shuttle car and close the space where Newman was to about 4 inches. This 4 inch distance is an estimate based on a simulated reconstruction of the accident during the investigation. Newman was caught between the cab of the shuttle car and the coal rib, crushing his upper chest and head.

Dan Guyman, operator of the No. 17 shuttle car, stated that he knew he had hit the other car and he yelled to see if there was a problem. Getting no response and not seeing any lights, he pulled off the feeder breaker and traveled back to the continuous mining machine for another load of coal.

Earl Petersen, a co-worker, went to look for Newman to see why he had not returned to the continuous mining machine, as the No. 17 car had taken three loads to his one. Petersen found Newman crushed between the rib and the No. 16 shuttle car at the feeder breaker. The entire crew and foreman were summoned to the accident scene. The No. 17 shuttle car was chained to the No. 16 shuttle car to pull it back so Newman could be removed from the pinch point. Newman was given CPR by the EMT's on the section and was transported to the CastleView Hospital in Price, Utah where he was pronounce dead.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


On Tuesday, April 11, 2000, the accident investigation team consisting of Jerry O. D. Lemon, Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector and Team Leader from Price, Utah; Frank Markosek, Inspector Trainee from Price, Utah; Arlie B. Massey, Electrical Engineer, and Ronald Medina, Mechanical Engineer, both from Technical Support, was assigned to investigate the accident.

On April 11, 2000, Lemon and Markosek traveled to the mine to survey the accident scene. The three faces on the 7th Left section were observed on this survey. All the equipment on the section was given a brief visual inspection. The roof and rib conditions were observed. All date, time, and initials were checked and found to be in compliance. Danger signs were posted at the accident scene and Lemon checked to see that the No. 16 shuttle car and the Stamler feeder breaker were electrically locked and tagged out. The pre-shift, on-shift, and electrical weekly examination books were checked for the section and no problems were observed.

A pre-investigation conference was held with the following company officials: Bruce Calvert, Section Foreman; David Arnolds, Lawyer; Rick Parkins, Production Superintendent; Jack Hatch, Acting Safety Supervisor; and Ray Bridge, Safety Supervisor at Dugout Mine. These officials were notified that the investigation would start on April 12, 2000. Lemon and Markosek accompanied engineers Carl Winters and Rod Anderson to the accident scene to survey the site.

On Wednesday, April 12, 2000, the MSHA accident investigation team arrived on mine property at 9:00 a.m, held a brief meeting with company officials, and then traveled to the accident site. The accident scene was observed, measurements made, and photographs taken. The investigation team returned to the surface and interviewed witnesses.

On Thursday, April 13, 2000, the investigation team traveled underground to complete the accident investigation. The accident scene was reconstructed and simulated by having the No. 17 shuttle car come into the feeder breaker and simulate dumping coal. Arlie Massey and company electrical personnel inspected the electrical equipment involved in the accident. Ronald Medina and company personnel examined the braking, steering, and tram systems on the Nos. 16 and 17 shuttle cars.

The Carbon County Sheriff's Department participated in a portion of the accident investigation. Sheriff James Cordova and Chief Deputy Guy Adams visited the accident scene on April 12, 2000, and were satisfied with the investigation that MSHA was conducting.

The field investigation work was completed on April 13, 2000.

DISCUSSION


1. The 7th Left development section was a three-entry section, which was started on February 29, 2000. The section had advanced to about 19 crosscuts. From left to right, the No. 1 entry was the belt entry, the No. 2 entry was the intake entry, and the No. 3 entry was the return entry. The faces were ventilated by exhaust, auxiliary fans with tubing. The average production on the section was approximately 2,000 tons per shift.

2. Coal was mined with a Joy 12CM-12 continuous mining machine and transported to the belt by two Joy 10SC32B shuttle cars. A Fletcher DDR-13-B-O double-boom walk-through roof bolting machine is used on the section.

3. The shuttle cars involved in the accident were a Joy Model 10SC32-56BXX-5 opposite standard shuttle car, Serial No. ET16071A, Approval No. 2G-3761A-00, Company Assigned No. 16; and a Joy Model 10SC32-56BX-5 standard shuttle car, Serial No. ET16774, Approval No. 2G-3935A-0, Company Assigned No. 17.

4. The No. 16 shuttle car was the opposite standard car with the operator's cab on the left rib side. This created a tight clearance of eight to nine inches for the shuttle car operator when he got out of the shuttle car at the feeder breaker.

5. The No. 16 shuttle car was originally shipped on August 9, 1993, and was rebuilt on May 25, 1999. In this model, the operator's seat was perpendicular to the center line of the car. The operator's compartment was located ahead of the wheels toward the discharge end of the car. Facing the machine from the discharge end, the operator's compartment was on the left side. The cable reel was located ahead of the wheels toward the discharge on the opposite side of the machine from the operator. The shuttle car was equipped with a panic bar, horizontal steering lever, tram pedal, service brake pedal, parking brake controls, and a canopy. A hinged door allowed access to the compartment. As found after the accident, the shuttle car was nearly empty with approximately 1/4 ton of coal remaining in the discharge conveyor.

6. The No. 17 shuttle car was originally shipped on August 9, 1993, and was rebuilt on March 10, 1999. This shuttle car was similar to the No. 16 shuttle car, except the operator's compartment was located in the standard position. The No. 17 shuttle car was reported to be fully loaded at the time of the accident.

7. Both shuttle cars were equipped with Joy wet disc brake systems. The brake head assembly was a totally enclosed, multi-disc design. It provided both service and emergency-parking brake capability. There were separate pistons inside the brake head for service brake application and emergency-parking brake release. Both systems used hydraulic oil from the main hydraulic tank on the machine. The service brake was applied with pressure from a power assisted master cylinder which modulated pressure from the hydraulic pump. The emergency-parking brake was spring-applied and hydraulically-released.

8. The brake head assembly was mounted to the primary reducer housing. A wear indicator pin was located on each brake assembly housing. One end of the indicator pin protruded through the housing and other end rested on the emergency-parking brake pressure plate. A spring pushed the pin in as the friction material became worn. According to the Joy Technical Publication TJS01053-1189, when the pin retracts flush with the housing, while the emergency-parking brake is applied, the worn disc pack should be replaced.

9. The service and emergency-parking brake systems on the No. 17 shuttle car were evaluated and no deficiencies were found. Both the service brake and the emergency-parking brake had the capability to quickly stop and hold the fully loaded shuttle car at the location where the accident occurred, as well as on the maximum grade where it operated. The wear pin indicators on both brake assemblies indicated the brake friction material thickness was in the acceptable range specified by Joy. The panic bar functioned, and when activated caused immediate application of the emergency-parking brake.

10. Based on the evaluation of the accident scene and tests and inspections of the emergency braking system, the No. 16 shuttle car did not coast due to a released emergency-parking brake at the time of the accident. The emergency-parking brake system operated properly and engaged automatically when the shuttle car was de-energized by any means. When the panic bar was actuated, the emergency-parking brake applied quickly. The spring applied emergency-parking brake had the capability to hold the shuttle car stationary at the location where the accident occurred. The wear pin indicators on both brake assemblies indicated the brake friction material thickness was in the acceptable range specified by Joy. The shuttle car also had a manual hand pump in the operators' compartment that could be used to release the brake while the shuttle car was de-energized. To maintain the release pressure developed by the hand pump, a spring-return button in the operator's compartment had to be continuously held down by the operator. If the button was released, the emergency-parking brake would reapply. This feature functioned as designed and thereby eliminated any possibility that the operator could have left the compartment with a released emergency-parking brake.

11. Dynamic service brake and emergency-parking brake tests were also conducted on the No. 16 shuttle car. Both the service brake and emergency-parking brake could quickly stop and hold the shuttle car on the maximum grade where it operated. These tests were done with approximately 1/4 ton of coal in the shuttle car, as it was found following the accident.

12. The tram pedal and linkage on each of the two shuttle cars operated normally. No binding was found and the tram pedal on each shuttle car returned to the neutral position upon release.

13. Both shuttle cars were equipped with a horizontal steering lever. The steering lever operated a steering valve that controlled the flow of oil to the steering cylinders to allow four wheel steering. The steering lever on each shuttle car was operated while observing the corresponding tire movement. The tires maintained proper orientation and alignment throughout this test indicating adequate operation. Throughout the testing and operation of both shuttle cars, no steering defects were found.

14. The conveyor directional control of the No. 16 shuttle car was found in the "forward" position. The pump traction switch was found in the "fast tram" position. The tram direction switch and headlight switch were set for travel back to the face. There were 49 loads on the counter.

15. The feeder breaker was a Stamler Model No. 90014, with Serial No. 11333. The right edge of the feeder breaker was tight against the rib.

16. A test was conducted to determine the effect of the No. 17 shuttle car striking the No. 16 shuttle car at the feeder breaker. The No. 16 shuttle car was left, unmanned and de-energized, in the position where it was found following the accident and rescue effort; and the No. 17 shuttle car was slowly trammed toward it. To minimize the impact force, the No. 17 shuttle car approached the feeder at a slower than normal speed. At this reduced speed the No. 16 shuttle car rocked toward the rib approximately 4 to 6 inches when it was struck, and then rebounded back to within an inch of the original position. In this test, the elevated conveyor of the No. 17 shuttle car hit the upper conveyor sheave bracket of the No. 16 shuttle car, thereby duplicating the events at the time of the accident. The conveyor sheave bracket is commonly referred to as an "elephant ear." There was no permanent deformation or other damage at the point of contact.

17. As found after the accident and rescue efforts, the top of the canopy for the No. 16 shuttle car was 9� inches from the rib. During the rescue effort, the No. 16 shuttle car was reportedly pulled laterally, away from the rib, by the No. 17 shuttle car. The rib to canopy clearance at the time of the accident would therefore have been somewhat less than 9� inches.

18. The visibility from the perspective of the No. 17 shuttle car operator was evaluated. It was determined that under the conditions at the time of the accident, the No. 17 shuttle car operator could not see the No. 16 shuttle car. This visibility evaluation was done with the No. 17 shuttle car conveyor raised to the normal approach height in preparation to side dump into the feeder. It was also carrying a full load of coal. The bottom of the conveyor was 4 feet above the ground at this approach height. When the conveyor boom was lowered to the point where the bottom of the conveyor was 28 inches above the ground, the No. 16 shuttle car started to become visible. The No. 17 shuttle car operator had to look across his shuttle car to see the No. 16 shuttle car at the feeder. Even with the conveyor boom on the No. 17 shuttle car completely lowered, only a small portion of the No. 16 shuttle car was visible to the No. 17 operator, making it difficult to see. The headlights on both ends of both shuttle cars were operational, provided the shuttle cars were energized. However, the tripped breaker caused the No. 16 shuttle car to lose power, including lights.

19. The No. 16 shuttle cars' main electrical power controller, cable reel, the breaker at the power center for this car, and all other necessary electrical components were inspected. No defective electrical devices were found. The reason for the shuttle car power interrupting could not be determined. The position of the circuit breaker switch handle indicated that power to the No. 16 shuttle car did interrupt while it was dumping at the feeder breaker.

CONCLUSION


The direct cause of the accident was the impact of the No. 17 standard shuttle car on the No. 16 opposite standard shuttle car and the tight clearance between the operator's cab and the coal rib. A contributing factor was the location of the feeder breaker close to the rib line requiring the No. 16 shuttle car and the operator's compartment to be close to the rib. The use of the opposite standard shuttle car on the straight and the standard shuttle car on the side-dump restricted both shuttle car operator's visibility of each other while at the feeder breaker. Had the shuttle cars switched routes, the operators would have been able to see each other while at the feeder breaker.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


1. A Section 103(k) Order (No. 7611703) dated April 10, 2000, was issued to the operator to ensure the safety of all persons until an ivestigation could be completed and the mine deemed safe.

2. A Section 314(b) Notice to Provide Safeguard (No. 7614906) was issued to the operator to ensure that feeder breakers will be located such that adequate clearance is provided for shuttle car operators to safely exit the shuttle car when dumping at the feeder breaker.


Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
 FAB00C09




APPENDIX A

List of persons participating in the investigation:

CANYON FUEL COMPANY, LLC. COMPANY OFFICIALS
Dan Meadors ............... General Manager
Ray Bridge ............... Safety Supervisor (Dugout Mine)
James Poulson ............... Maintenance
Bruce Calvert ............... Section Foreman
Wendell Christensen ............... Electrical Coordinator
Jack Hatch ............... Acting Safety Supervisor
Rick Parkins ............... Production Superintendent
Jeff Carver ............... "C" Shift Coordinator
Karl Kelly ............... Human Resource Supervisor
Stan Christensen ............... Maintenance Superintendent
Doug Johnson ............... Technical Support Manager
Carl Winters ............... Senior Engineer
Rod Anderson ............... Surveyor
JACKSON & KELLY PLLC, ATTORNEYS AT LAW
David Arnolds ............... Lawyer
CANYON FUEL COMPANY, LLC. EMPLOYEES
Earl Peterson ............... Miner Operator
Charles Russell ............... Electrician
Larry Christensen ............... Fireboss
Dee Howard ............... Roof Bolter
Brett McFarlane ............... Roof bolter
Allen Rowe ............... Miner Operator
Dan Guyman ............... Shuttle Car Operator
Cody Jensen ............... Mechanic
STATE OF UTAH
Ron Parkin ............... State Mine Inspector
CARBON COUNTY SHERIFFS' DEPTARTMENT
James Cordova ............... Sheriff
Guy Adams ............... Chief Deputy
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Arlie B. Massey ............... Electrical Engineer Technical Support
Ronald Medina ............... Mechanical Engineer Technical Support
Frank Markosek ............... Inspector Trainee
Jerry O. D. Lemon ............... Coal Mine Inspector


APPENDIX B

List of persons interviewed in the investigation:

CANYON FUEL COMPANY, LLC. EMPLOYEES
Earl Peterson ............... Miner Operator
Charles Russell ............... Electrician
Larry Christensen ............... Fireboss
Dee Howard ............... Roof Bolter
Brett McFarlane ............... Roof bolter
Allen Rowe ............... Miner Operator
Dan Guyman ............... Shuttle Car Operator
Cody Jensen ............... Mechanic