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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

District 4

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(UNDERGROUND COAL MINE)

FATAL POWERED-HAULAGE ACCIDENT

DAKOTA MINING, INC. (ID NO. 46-08589)
NO. 2 MINE
CAZY, BOONE COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA

August 14, 2000

By

Curtiss Vance, Jr.
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Ronald Medina
Mechanical Engineer, Mine Equipment Branch
Approval and Certification Center

Chad D. Huntley
Electrical Engineer, Electrical Equipment Branch
Approval and Certification Center

Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
100 Bluestone Road, Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Edwin P. Brady, District Manager

Release Date: October 26, 2000


OVERVIEW

On Monday, August 14, 2000, at approximately 5:45 a.m., a fatal powered-haulage accident occurred in the 1st Right Mains 004-0 MMU section of the Dakota Mining, Inc., No. 2 Mine, ID No. 46-08589. The accident resulted in fatal injuries to George B. Niday, a thirty-six year old equipment operator working on the midnight-shift move crew, while he and another miner were in the process of moving the shuttle car and cable anchor to a new location.

The victim had a total of 17 years mining experience, which included 1 year and 11� months at the No. 2 Mine. The accident occurred while the victim and another equipment operator were moving the off-standard shuttle car to a location in the No. 5 belt entry at the section dumping point, where they intended to anchor the shuttle car trailing cable. The victim was walking in front of the shuttle car on the cable reel side watching the trailing cable. As the shuttle car was being trammed down the entry toward the section dump, a raised area in the mine floor caused the canopy to contact the mine roof, stopping the shuttle car. The victim advised the equipment operator to try to move the shuttle car closer to the coal rib on the cable reel side in order to free it.

The operator stated during interviews that he lost visual contact with the victim while he was trying to free the shuttle car. The operator was switching the tram controls in both directions trying to free the shuttle car when it suddenly broke free from the mine roof with the wheels of the shuttle car turned toward the coal rib, pinning the victim between the cable reel guide and coal rib.

GENERAL INFORMATION

The Dakota Mining, Inc., No. 2 Mine is located at Cazy, near Bim, Boone County, West Virginia. The mine began production in late December 1997. The mine was developed into the Powellton coal seam through a box cut with a belt haulage slope and elevator shaft installed at a later stage of mining. Mine ventilation is provided by an eight-foot diameter Jeffrey fan, which produces 360,000 cubic feet of air per minute (cfm) at four inches water gauge, in a blowing configuration. Methane is liberated at a rate of approximately 750,000 cfm per day. The mining height of the coal seam ranges from four-to-eight feet, with an average height of six feet. Mining equipment includes the following: Joy 14CM15 continuous-mining machines, Joy 10SC shuttle cars, Fletcher DDO-13 and Roof Ranger II roof-bolting machines, Fairchild and S&S scoops, Fletcher mobile-roof supports, Stamler coal feeders, rail equipment, and various other support equipment.

Currently there are three operating sections. One is a retreat pillaring section with one continuous-mining machine, a second is a retreat pillaring section with two continuous-mining machines (walk-between arrangement), and the third is on development. Both blowing and exhausting face ventilation are employed on the sections, depending upon the section configuration. The immediate roof consists primarily of sandy shale, while the main roof is massive sandstone. The floor is comprised mainly of shale material. Five-foot, fully-grouted resin rods are used to provide roof support in normal conditions. Longer bolts and other types of supplemental roof supports are utilized when adverse conditions are encountered. The mine produces approximately 1.5 million tons of coal per year and reported 235,000 man-hours worked last year. The present employment is 95 miners.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT

On Sunday, August 13, 2000, at 11:00 p.m., the 1st right crew started their regular shift. They entered the mine via the elevator and then traveled by rail-mounted battery equipment to the 1st Right 004-0 MMU section. All work proceeded normally up until approximately 5:30 a.m. At that time the section foreman, Calvert Sears Miller, told two of the move crew personnel to move the No. 1 off-standard 10SC22 shuttle car to the belt entry at the coal feeder location and anchor the trailing cable.

Two miners, George B. Niday III, the victim, and Russell W. Nelson, went to the shuttle car and hand pulled the shuttle car trailing cable to the section power center. Nelson went back to the shuttle car while Niday stayed to hang the trailing cable across the No. 6 entry at the power center. As Niday was hanging the trailing cable, the foreman, Miller, arrived and directed Niday to go and help Nelson move the shuttle car. Niday was positioned in the No. 5 belt entry to watch the slack cable being dragged along side the shuttle car as Nelson trammed the shuttle car out of the crosscut and into the belt entry toward Niday's position.

As Nelson trammed the shuttle car into the No. 5 entry, the canopy became hung against the mine roof. When the shuttle car stopped, Niday was standing along the right coal rib approximately 10 feet inby the discharge end of the shuttle car and on the opposite side of the shuttle car from Nelson's position. Nelson stated in interviews that he wanted to back the shuttle car into the intersection and have the electricians lower the canopy in order to get it through the low top; however, Niday told Nelson to move the shuttle car toward the right rib a couple feet so that it would come through the low top. Nelson started the shuttle car and attempted to tram back and forth, trying to free the shuttle car canopy from a roof bolt in the mine roof.

Nelson further stated in the interviews that at that point he had lost site of Niday, but could hear him. As Nelson was attempting to tram the shuttle car with the wheels turned toward the right coal rib, he stated that the shuttle car came loose all at once, striking against the right coal rib and he heard Niday scream. Nelson stated that he then applied his foot brake and the emergency stop-switch panic bar, but it was too late. Nelson got out of the operator's deck and ran around in front of the shuttle car on the discharge end. He saw Niday pinned between the shuttle car and the coal rib, facing the rib.

Miller, who was still in the No. 6 entry hanging cable, heard Niday scream. He ran over to the shuttle car location and saw Niday pinned against the coal rib by the shuttle car. Miller stated that he ran back toward the section power center to get the scoop, when he saw two other crew members, Teddy Pridemore and Tony Bias, at the power center. Miller told them that a man was badly injured and directed them to get the scoop and first-aid equipment and bring them to the belt entry. Bias brought a scoop to the discharge end of the shuttle car and Miller told him to put the scoop blade against the corner of the shuttle car deck side and try to lift the shuttle car off of Niday. Bias attempted to lift and push the shuttle car sideways away from Niday. The scoop could not move the shuttle car. Miller told Pridemore to get the other scoop and bring it to the inby side of the shuttle car location.

At this same time, electricians, Mark DeLung and Chuck Scott, who were working on another shuttle car in the No. 4 entry also heard the scream. They immediately ran to the location of the accident. When DeLung arrived at the shuttle car location, he found Nelson standing at the deck of the shuttle car and Niday pinned against the coal rib. DeLung told Scott to go to the section phone and call for an ambulance. Miller went to get a chain to pull the shuttle car away from the coal rib while DeLung, an EMT, assessed Niday's injuries. He found them to be very serious and told Bias to stay with Niday while he ran to the phone to have surface personnel call for HealthNet. Once DeLung and Miller got back to the accident site, Bias asked DeLung if the power on the shuttle car was still on. Bias said he could move the shuttle car backwards and get Niday out without hurting him further. Miller told him to try it and Bias trammed the shuttle car back just enough to remove Niday. DeLung stated that they moved Niday about five feet from the shuttle car, placed him onto a stretcher and covered him with a blanket. DeLung told Miller to call the mine foreman, Donnie Roberts, and tell him to get other EMT's and head their way because Niday had serious injuries and they would need assistance. Niday was carried to the Mack 8 battery-powered mantrip and taken to the end of the section track. He was then placed onto the track-mounted battery-powered mantrip. Roberts met the section mantrip, which was transporting Niday, at the first track switch off the 1st Right section. Niday had stopped breathing and had no pulse. Roberts got on the mantrip to assist Miller and DeLung administer CPR on Niday while they were transporting him to the surface location.

Niday was then transported by the Boone County Ambulance Service to the Boone Memorial Hospital, Boone County, West Virginia. Niday was later pronounced dead from injuries sustained in the accident. The body was sent to the Medical Examiner's office in Charleston, West Virginia for autopsy.

INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENT

The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) was notified at 7:00 a.m., on August 14, 2000, that a fatal powered-haulage accident had occurred. MSHA personnel arrived at the site at 9:30 a.m., on August 14, 2000. A 103(k) Order was issued to ensure the safety of the miners. MSHA and the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training jointly conducted the investigation with the assistance of mine management and the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) representatives of the miners of Dakota Mining, Inc. A list of those who were present and/or participated in the investigation is included in the Appendix.

On August 14-15, 2000, representatives from all parties were briefed by mine management personnel as to the circumstances surrounding the accident. The on-site portion of the investigation was conducted. Photographs were taken and relevant measurements and sketches were made of the accident site.

Interviews of individuals known to have knowledge of the facts before and after the accident were conducted at the Dakota Mining, Inc., mine office conference room at Cazy, Boone County, West Virginia, on August 15, 2000. The physical portion of the investigation was completed on August 15, 2000, and the 103(k) Order was terminated.

DISCUSSION

Training

The victim's training records were examined and indicated that all appropriate training was provided in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.

Examination

The pre-shift and on shift examination record book indicated that the examinations had been conducted in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 75.

The weekly electrical examination records for underground electrical equipment indicated that the underground equipment was being examined regularly and that no hazardous conditions were reported in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 75.

Physical Factors

The shuttle car involved in the accident was a Joy Model 10SC22-48AKKE-1, off-standard car. The operator's seat was perpendicular to the center line of the car and was located ahead of the wheels toward the discharge end of the car. Facing the machine from the discharge end, the operator's compartment was on the left side. The cable reel was located ahead of the wheels toward the discharge end on the opposite side of the machine from the operator. The shuttle car was equipped with a panic bar, steering lever, tram pedal, service brake pedal, parking brake controls, and a canopy. After the accident the shuttle car was found to be empty.

BRAKING SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: The shuttle car was equipped with a Joy wet-disc-brake system. The brake-head assembly was a totally enclosed, multi-disc design. It provided both service and emergency-parking brake capability. There were separate pistons inside the brake head for service brake application and emergency-parking brake release. Both systems used hydraulic oil from the main hydraulic tank on the machine. The service brake was applied with pressure from a power-assisted master cylinder which modulated pressure from the hydraulic pump. The emergency-parking brake was spring-applied and hydraulically-released.

A brake head assembly was mounted to the primary reducer housing on each side of the machine. A wear indicator pin was located on each brake head assembly housing. One end of the indicator pin protruded through the housing and the other end rested on the emergency-parking brake pressure plate. A spring pushed the pin in as the friction material became worn. According to the Joy Technical Publication TJS01053-1189, when the pin retracts flush with the housing while the emergency-parking brake is applied, the worn disc pack should be replaced.

BRAKING SYSTEM TESTS AND EVALUATION: The service and emergency-parking brake systems were evaluated. The emergency-parking brake engaged automatically when the shuttle car was de-energized by any means. When the panic bar was actuated, the emergency-parking brake actuated quickly. The wear pin indicators on both brake assemblies indicated the brake friction material thickness was in the acceptable range specified by Joy. The shuttle car had a manual hand pump in the operator's compartment that could be used to release the brake while the shuttle car was de-energized. To maintain the release pressure developed by the hand pump, a spring-return button in the operator's compartment had to be continuously held down by the operator. If the button was released, the emergency-parking brake would reapply. This feature functioned as designed. No emergency-parking brake defects were found.

Dynamic service brake and emergency-parking brake tests were conducted. These tests were done with the shuttle car in the empty condition, as it was found following the accident. Both the service brake and the emergency-parking brake stopped and held the shuttle car at the accident site and on the maximum grade where it operated. However, when the service brake pedal was kept applied with normal foot pressure, it continued to move downward to full stroke, and after 16 seconds, service brake capability was lost and the shuttle car coasted several feet down a bump on the roadway. This defect was later corrected by replacing both brake head assemblies. With the new brake heads installed, the brake pedal remained stationary, and the service brake held. The defect was not considered to be a factor in the accident because the loss of service braking only occurred after the brake pedal was held in the applied position for more than 16 seconds. However, based on the reported description of the accident by the shuttle car operator, the brake was not applied for a lengthy period of time during the process of freeing the shuttle car. In addition, brake tests conducted during the investigation showed the service brakes were capable of decelerating and stopping the shuttle car during normal stops.

TRAMMING SYSTEM: The shuttle car was provided with a single tram pedal and a pump/tram switch. The pump/tram switch had five positions: off, pump start, slow tram, medium tram, and fast tram. The tram pedal was connected by mechanical linkage to a tram switch. Pushing the tram pedal caused rotational movement of a shaft protruding from the tram switch enclosure. The return action for the tram switch was provided by a torsion spring surrounding the protruding shaft. When the tram pedal was depressed one inch, the first click was heard. When it was depressed further, to nearly the full travel position, a second click was heard. This second switch position allows tram speeds up to the speed selected by the pump/tram selector switch (e.g., slow, medium, or fast). Pressing the pedal past the first switch and up to the second switch only allows tramming at slow speed. The tram system was tested by depressing the tram pedal and initiating movement 20 times in each of the three tram speed positions, in both the forward and reverse directions of travel. In each of the tests, the shuttle car moved in the appropriate direction. No binding of the tram pedal linkage was found and the tram pedal returned to the neutral position upon release.

The tram selector switch enclosure was disassembled and a skinned wire was found. The skinned wire was fastened to terminal 5 of the tram electrical switch. Terminal 5 and this wire are on the output side of the switch and are activated when the pedal is depressed.

Based on visual observation, the wire appeared to have been pinched against the flange during insertion of the electrical switch into the explosion proof enclosure. The insulation showed no signs of wear as a result of rubbing against the inside of the enclosure. The conductor was visible, but no signs of arcing on the conductor or inside of the enclosure wall were visually observed.

The control voltage for the shuttle car was provided by a 120-volt transformer in which both output leads were floating/ungrounded. With this floating/ungrounded design feature, two connections of control wiring to frame are necessary for any abnormalities to occur. By design, contact of the single "skinned" control wire at terminal 5 with the frame of the machine would not result in any abnormal operation. If a double fault were to occur, the control circuit would open and clear the fault.

The skinned wire was not considered to be a factor in the accident because no electrical malfunctions were reported during the interviews of operators of this machine, and no electrical malfunctions were noted during the accident investigation. In addition, the shuttle-car operator was reportedly attempting to tram the shuttle car to free it, when the accident occurred. The movement of the shuttle car was therefore expected, except for the suddenness of the movement once the shuttle car broke free. The shuttle car was designed such that the pump motor would not start while the tram pedal was depressed. This feature was tested and functioned as designed.

STEERING: The shuttle car was equipped with a horizontal steering lever. The steering lever operated a steering valve that controlled the flow of oil to the steering cylinders to allow four wheel steering. The steering was tested by operating the steering lever while observing the corresponding tire movement. The tires maintained proper orientation and alignment throughout this test indicating adequate operation. Throughout the testing and operation of the shuttle car, no steering defects were found.

PANIC BAR: The shuttle car was equipped with a panic bar on the right side of the operator's compartment. De-energization of the machine, including the tram motors, occurred with an applied force of 10 pounds and a panic bar movement of 5/8 inch. No defects were found in this system.

VISIBILITY: The visibility, when looking across the machine from the operator's perspective, was limited by the 8-3/4 inch opening between the top of the sideboard and the bottom of the canopy, and also by the canopy support posts. The 8-3/4 inch opening was free of any screen material. The distance from the ground to the top of the canopy was 54 inches. A steel plate guard was located behind the operator's head to provide protection from material falling into the operator's compartment from the ribs.

CONCLUSION

The fatal accident occurred when the victim, located in a position out of the view of the shuttle-car operator, was crushed between the cable reel side of the energized shuttle car and coal rib. The unexpected sudden movement of the shuttle car was not anticipated by the victim who was positioned between the shuttle car and rib, observing the efforts to free the shuttle car.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

A 103(k) Order No.3568484 was issued to ensure the safety of all persons until the investigation was completed and all areas and equipment were deemed safe.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB00C20


APPENDIX A

The following persons were interviewed, provided information, and/or were present during the investigation.

DAKOTA MINING, INC., OFFICIALS
Douglas K. Williams, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mine Superintendent
Tim Beckner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mine Foreman
Randal Riddle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maintenance Foreman
Burgel Speilman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Manager Mine Safety
Sears Miller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Section Foreman
David Hardy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attorney-At-Law
Julia Shreve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Attorney-At-Law
Connie DeMuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Court Reporter
United Mine Workers of America
C. A. Phillips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International Representative
Sherman Crum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UMWA Local President
Phillip Martin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Safety Committeeman
Joe Reynolds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Safety Committeeman
Russell W. Nelson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Equipment Operator
Tony A. Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Equipment Operator
Teddy Pridemore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Equipment Operator
Mark DeLung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Electrician
West Virginia Office of Miner's Health, Safety Administrator
Terry Farley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Health and Safety Administrator
Wayne Ashby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . District Inspector
Ernie L. Pyles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . District Inspector
Joe Atha . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electrical Inspector
Mike Rutledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Training Specialist
Dennie Ballard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Assistant Inspector at Large
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Richard J. Kline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Assistant District Manager
Don Ellis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supervisory Mine Safety and Health
Basile Summers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Mike Shumate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Preston White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Education and Training
Curtiss Vance, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Approval and Certification Center
Ronald Medina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mechanical Engineer
Chad Donald Huntley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Electrical Engineer

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