DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Limestone)
Fatal Powered Haulage Accident
November 8, 2000
Precision Aggregates II LLC
Precision Aggregates II LLC
Portage, Wood County, Ohio
I.D. No. 33-04315
Accident Investigators
Gerald D. Holeman
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Stephen W. Field
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
F. Terry Marshall
Mechanical Engineer
James A. Young
Mine Safety and Health Specialist
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
North Central District
515 West First Street, Room 333
Duluth, MN 55802-1302
Felix A. Quintana, District Manager
OVERVIEW
On November 8, 2000, Christopher Lee Robinett, truck driver, age 27, was fatally injured when his haul truck rolled backwards down a 14 percent grade, traveled through the berm, and fell approximately 25 feet to the quarry floor.
The cause of the accident was the failure to maintain the truck's braking system in safe operating condition.
Robinett had a total of 11 weeks and three days mining experience, all at this mine. He had received training in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 46.
GENERAL INFORMATION
On the day of the accident, Christopher L. Robinett (victim) reported to work at 6:00 a.m., an hour past his normal starting time.
Robinett was instructed by Robert Short, quarry foreman, to take over the operation of Euclid haul truck 201 from Floyd T. Edington, haul truck driver, who had been operating the truck since 5:15 a.m. hauling shot rock from the quarry to the primary crusher.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Robinett commented on the C.B. radio that his truck wasn't running well hauling four buckets of rock. Robinett told Carl D. Anderson, loader operator, he heard rods knocking and requested that his truck be loaded light with only three buckets. As the loaded truck ascended the ramp out of the quarry, Anderson observed it stop near the top, roll backward down the ramp, and travel over the elevated edge of the highwall.
Anderson went to the accident site and radioed for 911 assistance. Tracy L. Doremus, scale clerk, heard Anderson's call for help and contacted 911. Emergency personnel arrived and pronounced Robinett dead at the scene. Death was attributed to multiple blunt trauma.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
MSHA was notified of the accident at 10:35 a.m. on November 8, 2000, by a telephone call from Robert Short, quarry foreman, Precision Aggregates II, LLC, to Felix A. Quintana, district manager. An investigation was started the same day and an order was issued pursuant to Section 103(k) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of miners.
MSHA's accident investigation team conducted a physical inspection of the accident site, interviewed a number of persons, and reviewed training records and work procedures being performed at the time of the accident. The investigation was conducted with the assistance of mine management and mine employees. The miners did not have, nor request, representation during the investigation.
DISCUSSION
The accident occurred on the roadway ramp from the quarry floor to the crusher. Evidence indicated the loaded truck stopped as it neared the crest of the ramp, rolled backward for about 320 feet and overtraveled the berm, landing on the quarry floor 25 feet below. The grade on the ramp was 14 percent for the top 200 feet, changing to 9 percent for an additional 80 feet, and 6 percent for 40 feet in the area the truck overtraveled. The roadway was about 20 feet wide and provided with a berm along its entire length.
The investigation showed that on several occasions in the past, the truck stalled for varying reasons and had rolled backwards due to the lack of effective braking. It could not be determined during this investigation why the truck stopped prior to rolling backwards down the ramp.
The service brakes wedge assemblies for both the front and rear service brakes were found to be defective. Various degrees of rust were present on all of the internal wedge assembly components within the wheel cylinders and the plunger housings indicating moisture was introduced to that area. The braking force generated by the right front, right rear, and left rear service brakes was compromised by the inoperative and defective wedge assemblies. Other defects of internal wedge assembly components included leaking wheel cylinder hydraulic piston seals, and frozen wedge rollers.
The adjustment of both rear brakes exceeded the manufacturer's recommended shoe lining to drum clearance of 0.060 inches.
Tests, measurements, and observations indicated the truck's parking brake and service brakes were defective at the time of the accident.
Off-road, lap-type seat belts were provided in the truck. The investigation revealed that seat belts were not in use during the accident.
Functional testing could not be conducted on the main hydraulic steering system due to the inability to run the engine, however, a visual inspection of the steering system was performed. All of the hydraulic plumbing was intact, no visible leaks or broken hoses were observed, and all of the steering system's mechanical linkages were intact.
Weather at the time of the accident was cool and overcast, with no precipitation.
CONCLUSION
The root cause of the accident was the failure to establish procedures requiring systematic examination and maintenance of the truck's brake systems. As a result, neither the service brakes nor the parking brakes were maintained to allow the driver to control the truck. Failure to remove the water covering the quarry haul road created a corrosive environment to the truck's braking components and affected the truck's ability to stop effectively. The use of seat belts may have reduced the severity of the injuries.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Order No. 7833334 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on November 8, 2000, when a haul truck driver suffered fatal injuries in the cab of the Euclid end dump haul truck. The truck went over a 25 foot high wall. This order is issued to assure the safety of all persons at this operation until the mine or affected areas can be returned to normal mining operations as determined by an authorized representative of the secretary. The mine operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all actions to recover persons, equipment, and/or restore operations in the affected area.This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after it was determined that conditions contributing to the accident had been eliminated and normal mining operations could resume.
Order No. 7801270 was issued on November 22, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14101(a)(1):
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The truck's service brakes were not capable of stopping and holding the truck on the grade that it traveled. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to be operated in this condition. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator permanently removed the truck from service.
Order No. 7801271 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.9313:
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The truck traveled through water measuring on average 18 to 20 inches prior to climbing the ramp. Water penetrated braking components and caused corrosion and seizing of its parts and resulting in inefficiency. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to operate in this condition. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator installed an auxiliary pumping system, raised the north quarry road above the surrounding area, and began construction of a different quarry pumping system.
Order No. 7801272 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14101(a)(2):
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The parking brake was not capable of effectively holding the unit on the typical grades that it traveled. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to be operated in this condition. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator permanently removed the truck from service.
Order No. 7801273 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14131(a):
A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The seat belt was not worn by the driver. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to be operated without seat belt usage. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator established a posted policy requiring seat belt usage.
Sketch of Accident Scene
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB2000M45
APPENDIX A
Persons Participating in the Investigation
Precision Aggregates II LLC
Randolph G. Schmeltz .......... managing memberAttorney-At-Law
Robert R. Short .......... quarry foreman
Grant W. Wilkinson .......... attorneyState of Ohio, Dept. Of Natural Resources, Division of Mineral Resource Management
Greg Plumly .......... mine safety inspectorMine Safety and Health Administration
Jerry Stewart .......... mine safety inspector
Gerald D. Holeman .......... supervisory mine safety and health inspector
Stephen W. Field .......... mine safety and health inspector
F. Terry Marshall .......... mechanical engineer
James A. Young .......... mine safety and health specialist
James E. Wood .......... mine safety and health inspector
APPENDIX B
Persons Interviewed
Precision Aggregates II LLC
Carl D. Anderson .......... loader operatorFormerly of Precision Aggregates II LLC
David G. Baney .......... truck driver
Kenney E. Donaldson .......... mechanic
Tracy L. Doremus .......... scale clerk
Norman J. Eaken .......... driller
Floyd T. Edington .......... haul truck driver
Ted E. Heckerman .......... haul truck driver
Charles E. Hopple, Jr. .......... crusher operator
Timothy R. Keeton .......... crusher operator
Gerald A. Lauffer, Jr. .......... skid steer operator
Marc A. Robinett .......... skid steer operator
Rodney E. Sheeks .......... loader operator
Randolph G. Schmeltz .......... managing member
Robert R. Short .......... quarry manager
Michael H. Trumbull .......... truck driver
Edward Bear, Jr.
Derek Souvenier
Persons Interviewed
Glacier Northwest
Scott Nicholson .......... mine superintendent
Paul Frederick .......... safety manager
Mark Snyder .......... excavation foreman
Andrew Neuser .......... shop foreman
Terry Gallion .......... equipment operator
Michael Oatman .......... electrician
David Day .......... equipment operator
David Ertler .......... swing shift foreman
John Barich .......... mechanic/electrician
George Gunstone .......... equipment operator
Marshal Hensick .......... equipment operator