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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Limestone)

Fatal Powered Haulage Accident
November 8, 2000

Precision Aggregates II LLC
Precision Aggregates II LLC
Portage, Wood County, Ohio
I.D. No. 33-04315

Accident Investigators

Gerald D. Holeman
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Stephen W. Field
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

F. Terry Marshall
Mechanical Engineer

James A. Young
Mine Safety and Health Specialist

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
North Central District
515 West First Street, Room 333
Duluth, MN 55802-1302
Felix A. Quintana, District Manager

OVERVIEW


On November 8, 2000, Christopher Lee Robinett, truck driver, age 27, was fatally injured when his haul truck rolled backwards down a 14 percent grade, traveled through the berm, and fell approximately 25 feet to the quarry floor.

The cause of the accident was the failure to maintain the truck's braking system in safe operating condition.

Robinett had a total of 11 weeks and three days mining experience, all at this mine. He had received training in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 46.

GENERAL INFORMATION


On the day of the accident, Christopher L. Robinett (victim) reported to work at 6:00 a.m., an hour past his normal starting time.

Robinett was instructed by Robert Short, quarry foreman, to take over the operation of Euclid haul truck 201 from Floyd T. Edington, haul truck driver, who had been operating the truck since 5:15 a.m. hauling shot rock from the quarry to the primary crusher.

At approximately 9:00 a.m., Robinett commented on the C.B. radio that his truck wasn't running well hauling four buckets of rock. Robinett told Carl D. Anderson, loader operator, he heard rods knocking and requested that his truck be loaded light with only three buckets. As the loaded truck ascended the ramp out of the quarry, Anderson observed it stop near the top, roll backward down the ramp, and travel over the elevated edge of the highwall.

Anderson went to the accident site and radioed for 911 assistance. Tracy L. Doremus, scale clerk, heard Anderson's call for help and contacted 911. Emergency personnel arrived and pronounced Robinett dead at the scene. Death was attributed to multiple blunt trauma.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


MSHA was notified of the accident at 10:35 a.m. on November 8, 2000, by a telephone call from Robert Short, quarry foreman, Precision Aggregates II, LLC, to Felix A. Quintana, district manager. An investigation was started the same day and an order was issued pursuant to Section 103(k) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of miners.

MSHA's accident investigation team conducted a physical inspection of the accident site, interviewed a number of persons, and reviewed training records and work procedures being performed at the time of the accident. The investigation was conducted with the assistance of mine management and mine employees. The miners did not have, nor request, representation during the investigation.

DISCUSSION


     The accident occurred on the roadway ramp from the quarry floor to the crusher. Evidence indicated the loaded truck stopped as it neared the crest of the ramp, rolled backward for about 320 feet and overtraveled the berm, landing on the quarry floor 25 feet below. The grade on the ramp was 14 percent for the top 200 feet, changing to 9 percent for an additional 80 feet, and 6 percent for 40 feet in the area the truck overtraveled. The roadway was about 20 feet wide and provided with a berm along its entire length.

  • The berm where the truck overtraveled was 4 feet high and 10 feet thick at the base. It was constructed of limestone product varying in size from fines to coarse shot rock material. This berm was higher than the 36 inch mid-axle height of the truck.


  • At the time of the accident, most of the quarry floor was covered with standing water, requiring that the haul trucks drive through water as they entered and exited the loading area. Water levels in the quarry measured approximately 18-20 inches the day after the accident. The drum friction contact surfaces of this Euclid R-50 with 21.00-35 tires was measured to be about 27-� inches from the ground for the front axle brakes and 24-� inches from the ground for the rear axle brakes.


  •      The investigation showed that on several occasions in the past, the truck stalled for varying reasons and had rolled backwards due to the lack of effective braking. It could not be determined during this investigation why the truck stopped prior to rolling backwards down the ramp.

  • The truck involved was a 1975 Euclid R-50 end dump, Serial Number 301LD65909. The Net Vehicle Weight (NVW) was 77,075 pounds and it was rated for a payload of 100,000 pounds. The truck's payload at the time of the accident was estimated at 25 tons.


  • This truck was powered by a Series 16V-71 Detroit Diesel with a rating of 608 horsepower and was provided with hydraulic steering. Power was transferred to the drive wheels using an Allison CLBT-6061 transmission which provided six forward speeds and one reverse speed.


  • This haul truck was equipped with service brakes, emergency brakes, and a parking brake. The service brakes consisted of four air activated, hydraulic applied, duplex wedge drum brakes, with 20- � inch X 7 inch brakes on each of the front wheels and 26 inch X 10 inch brakes on each of the rear wheels. The emergency brake utilized the rear service brakes and was activated by a flip switch on the dash panel. This system used two emergency air tanks that were separated from the main air system for the rear service brake emergency application. The parking brake was an internally expanding 12 inch X 5 inch shoe drum brake on the rear of the transmission that acted on the drive shaft and was spring applied, air released. It was activated by a push-pull control knob on the dash panel.


  •      The service brakes wedge assemblies for both the front and rear service brakes were found to be defective. Various degrees of rust were present on all of the internal wedge assembly components within the wheel cylinders and the plunger housings indicating moisture was introduced to that area. The braking force generated by the right front, right rear, and left rear service brakes was compromised by the inoperative and defective wedge assemblies. Other defects of internal wedge assembly components included leaking wheel cylinder hydraulic piston seals, and frozen wedge rollers.

         The adjustment of both rear brakes exceeded the manufacturer's recommended shoe lining to drum clearance of 0.060 inches.

         Tests, measurements, and observations indicated the truck's parking brake and service brakes were defective at the time of the accident.

         Off-road, lap-type seat belts were provided in the truck. The investigation revealed that seat belts were not in use during the accident.

         Functional testing could not be conducted on the main hydraulic steering system due to the inability to run the engine, however, a visual inspection of the steering system was performed. All of the hydraulic plumbing was intact, no visible leaks or broken hoses were observed, and all of the steering system's mechanical linkages were intact.

  • Fuel levels were adequate for the location of the fuel pick up within the tank and the maximum grade that the truck was being operated on. A fuel filter was present between the fuel pump and the fuel rails within the engine heads. All of the external fuel lines were removed and examined and no blockages within these lines were detected.


  • All of the front and rear drive shaft components were intact. The engine's flywheel cover area sustained damage from the accident allowing partial inspection of the flywheel area. The flywheel, the drive coupling, and all related hardware were determined to be intact.


  •       Weather at the time of the accident was cool and overcast, with no precipitation.

  • Toxicology: The victim's toxicology report confirmed cannabinoids at 214 nanogram/millimeter in his urine. There was no conclusive evidence to prove the victim was impaired.


  • CONCLUSION


    The root cause of the accident was the failure to establish procedures requiring systematic examination and maintenance of the truck's brake systems. As a result, neither the service brakes nor the parking brakes were maintained to allow the driver to control the truck. Failure to remove the water covering the quarry haul road created a corrosive environment to the truck's braking components and affected the truck's ability to stop effectively. The use of seat belts may have reduced the severity of the injuries.

    ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


    Order No. 7833334 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act:
    A fatal accident occurred at this operation on November 8, 2000, when a haul truck driver suffered fatal injuries in the cab of the Euclid end dump haul truck. The truck went over a 25 foot high wall. This order is issued to assure the safety of all persons at this operation until the mine or affected areas can be returned to normal mining operations as determined by an authorized representative of the secretary. The mine operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all actions to recover persons, equipment, and/or restore operations in the affected area.
    This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after it was determined that conditions contributing to the accident had been eliminated and normal mining operations could resume.

    Order No. 7801270 was issued on November 22, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14101(a)(1):
    A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The truck's service brakes were not capable of stopping and holding the truck on the grade that it traveled. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to be operated in this condition. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
    This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator permanently removed the truck from service.

    Order No. 7801271 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.9313:
    A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The truck traveled through water measuring on average 18 to 20 inches prior to climbing the ramp. Water penetrated braking components and caused corrosion and seizing of its parts and resulting in inefficiency. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to operate in this condition. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
    This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator installed an auxiliary pumping system, raised the north quarry road above the surrounding area, and began construction of a different quarry pumping system.

    Order No. 7801272 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14101(a)(2):
    A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The parking brake was not capable of effectively holding the unit on the typical grades that it traveled. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to be operated in this condition. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
    This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator permanently removed the truck from service.

    Order No. 7801273 was issued on November 8, 2000, under the provisions of Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14131(a):
    A fatal accident occurred at this mine on November 8, 2000, when a loaded haul truck was ascending a ramp, lost power, rolled backwards, and traveled over a berm to the quarry floor. The seat belt was not worn by the driver. Management engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence by allowing the haul truck to be operated without seat belt usage. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
    This order was terminated on November 22, 2000, after the mine operator established a posted policy requiring seat belt usage.

    Sketch of Accident Scene

    Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
    Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB2000M45


    APPENDIX A


    Persons Participating in the Investigation

    Precision Aggregates II LLC
    Randolph G. Schmeltz .......... managing member
    Robert R. Short .......... quarry foreman
    Attorney-At-Law
    Grant W. Wilkinson .......... attorney
    State of Ohio, Dept. Of Natural Resources, Division of Mineral Resource Management
    Greg Plumly .......... mine safety inspector
    Jerry Stewart .......... mine safety inspector
    Mine Safety and Health Administration
    Gerald D. Holeman .......... supervisory mine safety and health inspector
    Stephen W. Field .......... mine safety and health inspector
    F. Terry Marshall .......... mechanical engineer
    James A. Young .......... mine safety and health specialist
    James E. Wood .......... mine safety and health inspector
    APPENDIX B


    Persons Interviewed

    Precision Aggregates II LLC
    Carl D. Anderson .......... loader operator
    David G. Baney .......... truck driver
    Kenney E. Donaldson .......... mechanic
    Tracy L. Doremus .......... scale clerk
    Norman J. Eaken .......... driller
    Floyd T. Edington .......... haul truck driver
    Ted E. Heckerman .......... haul truck driver
    Charles E. Hopple, Jr. .......... crusher operator
    Timothy R. Keeton .......... crusher operator
    Gerald A. Lauffer, Jr. .......... skid steer operator
    Marc A. Robinett .......... skid steer operator
    Rodney E. Sheeks .......... loader operator
    Randolph G. Schmeltz .......... managing member
    Robert R. Short .......... quarry manager
    Michael H. Trumbull .......... truck driver
    Formerly of Precision Aggregates II LLC
    Edward Bear, Jr.
    Derek Souvenier


    Persons Interviewed

    Glacier Northwest
    Scott Nicholson .......... mine superintendent
    Paul Frederick .......... safety manager
    Mark Snyder .......... excavation foreman
    Andrew Neuser .......... shop foreman
    Terry Gallion .......... equipment operator
    Michael Oatman .......... electrician
    David Day .......... equipment operator
    David Ertler .......... swing shift foreman
    John Barich .......... mechanic/electrician
    George Gunstone .......... equipment operator
    Marshal Hensick .......... equipment operator