MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
NORTHEASTERN DISTRICT
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health
Surface Nonmetal Mine
(Limestone)
Fatal Powered Haulage Accident
April 12, 2000
Mellott Enterprises Inc. (RNF)
Warfordsburg, Fulton County, Pennsylvania
at
New Hope Crushed Stone
New Hope, Bucks County, Pennsylvania
ID No. 36-00199
by
Carl A. Onder
Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Donald S. Corp
Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Stanley J. Michalek, P.E.
Civil Engineer
Michael C. Superfesky
Civil Engineer
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Northeastern District
230 Executive Drive, Suite 2
Cranberry Township, PA
James R. Petrie, District Manager
OVERVIEW
William M. Foster, contract laborer, age 38, was fatally injured at about 4:45 p.m. on April 12, 2000, when he became entangled in the bend pulley of the gravity take-up system. The accident occurred because the conveyor had not been de-energized, locked out and tagged prior to performing work on its components.
Foster had a total of 4 years experience with Kinsley Construction, Inc., 21 weeks at this mine. He was performing construction work, therefore, he was not required to be trained in accordance with 30 CFR, Part 48.
GENERAL INFORMATION
New Hope Crushed Stone, a surface limestone mine, owned and operated by New Hope Crushed Stone, was located at New Hope, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. The principal operating official was John A. Mehok, president. The mine was normally operated one, 8-hour shift a day, five days a week. Total employment was 18 persons.
Limestone was extracted from a multiple bench quarry and transported by truck to the plant where it was crushed, screened and stockpiled for sale as construction aggregate.
Mellott Enterprises, Inc., was the primary contractor and manufacturer of a newly erected secondary plant at New Hope Crushed Stone, and was located in Warfordsburg, Fulton County, Pennsylvania. The principal operating official was Forrest R. Mellott, chairman of the board. Mellot Enterprises, Inc. normally worked one, 8-hour shift a day, five days a week. Total employment at the mine site was one person.
The victim was employed by Kinsley Construction, Inc., a sub-contractor for Mellott Enterprises, Inc., who was responsible for general construction and erection of the new plant. They were located in York, York County, Pennsylvania. The principal operating official was Robert A. Kinsley, chairman and chief executive officer. Kinsley Construction, Inc. normally worked one, 8-hour shift a day, five days a week. Total employment at the mine site was four persons.
H. B. Mellot Estate, Inc., was also a sub-contractor for Mellott Enterprises, Inc., and was responsible for final adjustments on the new plant. They were located in Warfordsburg, Fulton County, Pennsylvania. The principal operating official also was Forrest R. Mellott, chairman of the board. The sub-contractor normally worked one, 8-hour shift a day, five days a week. Total employment at the mine site was one person.
The last regular inspection of this operation was completed on February 3, 2000.
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
On the day of the accident, William Foster (victim) reported for work at 7:00 a.m., his normal starting time. James Galentine, foreman, Kinsley Construction, Inc., initially assigned Foster to duties at station No. 7 of the plant, Galentine later assigned him to work with Earl Carroll, service technician, H.B. Mellott Estate, Inc., tracking belts on conveyors. Carroll instructed Foster how to rack the return rollers and adjust the belt. Carroll and Foster completed the tracking of the C13 conveyor without incident.
At about 3:55 p.m., both, Carroll and Foster began work on the C10 conveyor belt. This conveyor was provided with a walkway. Carroll last observed Foster kneeling on the C10 conveyor walkway, reaching around the guarded area of the lower bend pulley. It is believed he was cutting ties to the lubrication lines on the pulley.
At 4:45 p.m., Carroll visually examined the conveyor walkway to make sure it was free of personnel. He then radioed James Minnichbach, vice president, Mellott Enterprises, Inc., who was supervising the testing of the conveyor belts, that belt C10 could be started. Immediately upon starting the belt, the breaker tripped, thereby stopping the conveyor belt after traveling about two to three feet. Two contract (Gettle Electric) electrical employees, working at the 6614 cone crusher (below the C10 conveyor) observed Foster caught between a bend pulley and the framework of the conveyor.
Local authorities and emergency medical personnel were summoned. The guard on the bend pulleys was removed and the belt cut in order to free Foster. He was pronounced dead at a local hospital a short time later. Death was attributed to traumatic asphyxia.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
MSHA was notified at 5:36 p.m., on the day of the accident by a telephone call from Francis Callery, plant superintendent, New Hope Crushed Stone, to Lawrence Macken, industrial hygienist, MSHA, Northeastern District. An investigation was started the same day. MSHA's accident investigation team arrived at the mine on April 13, 2000, and made a physical inspection of the accident site with the assistance of personnel representing the mining company, the contractor, and the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Neither the mine operator's nor the contractors' employees requested representation during the investigation. An order was issued pursuant to section 103(k) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of miners and contractor employees until the affected area could be returned to normal operations.
DISCUSSION
The secondary plant was manufactured and installed by Mellott Enterprises, Inc., the primary contractor. Mellott sub-contracted the erection and assembly of the plant to Kinsley Construction. Foster was employed by Kinsley Construction however, Kinsley furnished labor to Mellott upon request.
The C10 conveyor was new and had not been operated prior to the accident.
The C10 conveyor was 206 feet in length with an overall rise of 43 feet. The 24-inch-wide conveyor belt was supported by a steel truss frame. The truss was 37 inches wide and 42 inches deep at the area where the accident occurred near the conveyor's fourth support. A 24-inch walkway with handrails extended along on the left side of the structure. An emergency stop system was installed along the walkway.
The gravity take-up system for the conveyor belt was located just beyond the fourth conveyor support. The take-up components consisted of: two, 16-inch-diameter, 26-inch-wide bend pulleys located within the conveyor's truss framework; a take-up pulley; and, a concrete counterweight. The take-up area was positioned 32 feet above ground level. The distance from the bottom beam of the truss to the centerline of the bend pulley was 22 inches. A steel mesh guard, 10 feet long and 4 feet high was attached to the truss structure along the walkway at the location of the take-up components.
Grease port extension tubing was provided on each of the bearing housings for the bend pulleys. When the pulleys were installed, the tubing was wrapped around the bend pulleys' axles and held with a 1/4-inch-wide cable tie. The cable ties for the two grease extensions on the down-belt side bend pulleys had been cut and were found laying on the ground directly below the take-up area. The cable ties for the two grease extensions on the up-side bend pulleys were still in place. Due to the placement of the guard, it would not be possible to reach any of the cable ties from the walkway without entering the truss or using special tools.
A JLG Industries, Inc., lift platform was on site and had been used in belt tracking on other conveyor belts within the plant. At the time of the accident, the lift platform was parked and not in use. The lift platform was used during rescue efforts after the accident.
The main power switch for the C10 conveyor was permanently installed in the secondary plant motor control center. The center was a modified tractor-trailer unit and was located adjacent to station No. 4 (mid-point of the plant). There were no windows to view the C10 conveyor area in a southeast direction. Locks and tags were available at a lock-out station inside the motor control center but had not been used by the three contractors involved with this accident prior to or at the time of the accident.
The contractor in charge of the erection work did not have a positive lock-out procedure. When working on the conveyors the contractor would trip the emergency stop device while doing the work and would reset the device when they were ready to start the conveyor up.
At the time of the accident Carroll was not sure if Foster had tripped the emergency stop cord device. Since he did not see Foster on the walkway, he believed it was clear and informed James Minnichbach that he could start the conveyor.
A conveyor start-up horn was located on the exterior of the west-side of the motor control center. The start-up horn was not connected to a power source and was not operational. Hand-held two-way radios were being used for communication between James Minnichbach, vice-president, and Earl Carroll.
Foster was found caught between the up-side bend pulley and the upper framework of the conveyor below the return-side belt.
CONCLUSION
The root cause of the accident was management's failure to implement a lock out and tag out procedure for the C10 conveyor prior to working on its components and their failure to closely supervise the work task assignments. A contributing factor was not having an operational start up alarm which could have warned Foster of the start up.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
Mellott Enterprises, Inc.
Order No. 7719393 was issued on April 13, 2000, under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on 4/12/2000 when a laborer was apparently checking rollers and removing plastic ties which secured extended grease lines to the frame during shipping on the C-10 conveyor belt, and was caught in the bend roller, at the take up pulley. This order is issued to ensure the safety of persons at this operation until the mine or affected areas can be returned to normal operations as determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary. The mine operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all action to recover persons, equipment, and/or return affected areas of the mine to normal.This order was terminated on April 14, 2000. Conditions that contributed to the accident no longer exist and normal mining operations can resume.
Citation No. 7735402 was issued under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.12016.
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on April 12, 2000, when a contract laborer was caught in the bend pulley of the C10 conveyor. This was a new conveyor installation, and the victim had positioned himself behind the pulley guard to remove plastic ties securing the extended grease fittings. The power switch was not locked out, nor were other measures taken to prevent the C10 conveyor from being energized prior to work being done.The citation was terminated on June 2, 2000, after this contractor implemented lock out and tag out procedures, and instructed all employees in the requirement.
Citation No. 7735403 was issued under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.14201(b).
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on April 12, 2000, when a contract laborer was caught in the bend pulley of the C10 conveyor. The entire length of the conveyor was not visible from the starting switch and a visible or audible warning system was not operated before starting the conveyor.The citation was terminated on June 2, 2000, after the audible warning start up system was operational on this conveyor.
Citation No. 7735404 was issued under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for violation of 30 CFR 56.12016.
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on April 12, 2000, when a contract laborer was caught in the bend pulley of the C10 conveyor. This was a new conveyor installation, and the victim had positioned himself behind the pulley guard to remove plastic ties securing the extended grease fittings. The power switch was not locked out, nor were other measures taken to prevent the C10 conveyor from being energized prior to work being done.The citation was terminated on June 2, 2000, after this contractor implemented lock out and tag out procedures, and instructed all employees in the requirement.
Approved by:
James R. Petrie
District Manager
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB2000M12
APPENDICES
A. Persons Participating in the Investigation
B. Persons Interviewed
APPENDIX A
Persons participating in the investigation
Persons participating in the investigation
New Hope Crushed Stone
John A. Mehok, presidentMellott Enterprises, Inc.
George E. Riordan, vice president
Francis H. Callery, plant superintendent
James E. Minnichbach, vice presidentH.B. Mellot Estate, Inc.
Darrel W. Fry, director of safety
Earl D. Carroll, service technicianKinsley Construction, Inc.
James J. Gallentine, foremanGettle Electric
Michael J. Helton, electricianState of Pennsylvania
Darrel W. Helton, electrician
Michael J. Menghini, department of environmental protectionEagle Fire Department - Bucks County, PA
Christian Kuba, department of environmental protection
Craig R. Forbes, assistant fire chiefMine Safety and Health Administration
Carl A. Onder, supervisory mine safety and health inspector
Donald S. Corp, mine safety and health inspector
Robert H. Madenford, mine safety and health inspector
Stanley J. Michalek, civil engineer, P.E.
Michael C. Superfesky, civil engineer
Linda Henry, attorney
APPENDIX B
Persons Interviewed
Persons Interviewed
New Hope Crushed Stone
George E. Riordan, vice presidentMellott Enterprises, Inc.
Francis H. Callery, plant superintendent
James E. Minnichbach, vice presidentH.B. Mellott Estate, Inc.
Earl D. Carroll, service technicianKinsley Construction
James J. Gallentine, foremanGettle Electric
Michael J. Helton, electrician
Darrel W. Helton, electrician