DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Surface Area of Underground Coal Mine
Fatal Fall of Person
No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant
Jim Walter Resources, Inc.
Brookwood, Tuscaloosa County, Alabama
Mine I.D. 01-01247
John Church
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Charles Carpenter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
James Boyle
Mining Engineer
Terrence M. Taylor
Senior Civil Engineer
Michael C. Superfesky
Civil Engineer
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 11
Hueytown Field Office
Hueytown, AL.
Release Date: February 6, 2002
OVERVIEW
On August 29, 2001, at approximately 3:40 p.m., Ricky Fields, Ironworker/Welder, age 32, was fatally injured when a ten (10) foot by four (4) foot section of reinforced concrete slab, that served as a stair landing, collapsed causing him to fall approximately 34 feet to the floor below. The accident occurred as a result of the removal of support structure along with the failure of the remaining structure supporting the concrete slab. The landing was being removed as part of the scope of work associated with an upgrade to the Jim Water Resources, Inc No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant. The following were contributing factors:
� The failure to utilize a safety belt and line.
� The failure to conduct an engineering evaluation of the structure to determine the condition of the framing, floor, and walls.
� The reliance of individual knowledge/experience to take the place of a systematic plan of demolition and reconstruction.
� The failure to develop and implement safe work procedures for demolition activities.
Fields had seven years and five months of construction/fabrication experience and had worked 12 days at this particular site. He was employed by Pro Industrial Welding, Inc. (PIW) at the time of the accident.
GENERAL INFORMATION
The No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant (Mine I.D. 01-01247), address 14730 Lock 17 Road, Tuscaloosa County, Alabama, is owned and operated by Jim Walter Resources, Inc. and is captive to the No. 4 underground mine. The plant was constructed in the 1970's by McNally-Pittsburgh and since that time has undergone various upgrades and modifications.
Total employment at the mine site is 91 surface and 296 underground personnel. The plant normally operates three shifts, six days a week, processing approximately 9000 tons of raw coal per day.
At the time of the accident, the plant was undergoing a major modification that included the installation of heavy media cyclones and spirals. The work was being conducted on a contract basis.
SEDGMAN (Contractor I.D. VAD), address 2090 Greentree Road, Pittsburgh, PA., 15220, is the general contractor engaged by Jim Walter Resources to design and construct the Heavy Media Cyclone and Spiral Addition (SEDGMAN Project 1282) at the No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant. SEDGMAN employed a Construction Site Manager as the onsite representative for the day to day oversight of the project. The SEDGMAN Project Manager operates out of the main corporate office.
Pro Industrial Welding, Inc. (PIW) , (Contractor I.D. YXR), address Rt. 3, Box 259, Saltville, VA., 24370; local address 12882 Lock 17 Road, Brookwood, AL. 35444, is the subcontractor employed by SEDGMAN to provide the labor and services required to perform the construction activities associated with the Heavy Media Cyclone and Spiral Addition project. PIW employs 39 persons (ironworkers, welders, pipe fitters, general laborers) for this project. The subcontractor works two ten hour shifts, 25 employees on days and 14 employees on evenings. The principal officials are:
A quarterly inspection was ongoing at the time of the accident.Jim Walter Resources, Inc
George R. Richmond .......... President & Chief Operating Officer
Dale Byrum .......... Manager of Safety and Training
Fred Kozel .......... No. 4 Mine Manager
Ken Russell .......... No. 4 Mine Safety Manager
Mike Yates .......... No. 4 Mine Preparation Plant Area Manager
SEDGMAN
Mark Levin .......... President
Craig Jolley .......... Project Manager
David Gill .......... Construction Site Manager
Pro Industrial Welding, Inc.
Keith Crabtree .......... President
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Wednesday, August 29, 2001, Ricky Fields and Gary McDonald began their shift at the No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant. McDonald is an Ironworker and Fields was an Ironworker/Welder. The men worked the day shift for PIW. They were assigned construction duties on the 5th and 6th floors at the west side of the plant. The construction activities included connecting the steel skeleton that had been erected from the two and one half �decant' floor into the existing 5th and 6th floor structure.
At approximately 9:00 a.m., Fields and McDonald determined that a portion of an overhang that extended from the 5th to the 7th floor would have to be removed in order to make the beam connections to the 5th floor. The portion in question was a reinforced concrete slab landing extending out from the 5th floor. The landing supported a stairway which provided access between the 5th and 6th floor. The two men (Fields and McDonald) informed Treavor Rhine, Lead Man, PIW, of the need to remove the landing. Because the landing was not shown on the onsite drawings, Rhine notified David Gill, Construction Site Manager, SEDGMAN, of the need to remove the landing and that the work was not covered under the original Scope of Work. Rhine and Gill conferred, using the onsite drawings available as reference. Both men agreed that the elevations of the beam connections were such that the landing would have to be removed. Gill authorized Rhine to do the work and Rhine instructed Fields and McDonald to begin removing the concrete landing. At this time, Rhine asked Gill how he (Gill) would proceed with the demolition. Gill suggested that the landing be separated into pieces, cable slings strung through the pieces and the cherry picker (mobile crane) used to �fly' the pieces out.
Fields and McDonald began removing the landing. Working north to south, a concrete saw was used to make two cuts across the width of the landing, isolating two pieces, each approximately 5 feet long. A cutting torch was used to complete the separation. Two holes were drilled into each piece, a cable threaded to form a loop and the cherry picker used to lift pieces away from the site. The first piece was lifted without incident. The second piece hung due to a piece of rebar that had not fully separated. An oxygen-acetylene cutting torch was used to complete the separation. The piece was then lifted without further incident. These and all lifts associated with this work were done �blind', that is, the crane operator could not see the area and the operator had to rely on radio communication with either Fields or McDonald for directions.
After the removal of the second piece of landing, Fields and McDonald were occupied by a variety of tasks that were associated with both the demolition of the landing and the connection of the steel skeleton to the existing floor structure. Fields rigged at least one and possibly two chain hoists that were to be used to support the remaining landing. McDonald rigged the steel girders that were to be lifted in place and readied for the necessary connections. Sometime after 1:00 p.m., James Harbin, crane operator, came up to the work area to observe where he would be lifting the steel girders for connection. While he was in the area, he helped Fields rig a chain hoist that he assumed would be used to support the landing structure. Within the same time frame, Gill came up to the work area as part of his walk around. He did not notice anything out of the ordinary. Rhine had been up to the site at various times and he also did not notice anything out of the ordinary. Throughout this time, neither Fields nor McDonald were observed wearing a safety belt with a line tie off.
At approximately 3:30 p.m., William Gandy, a Jim Walter Resources employee who is a table repairman, was on the 5th floor inspecting the shaking tables. Gandy was standing at the number 18 table when he observed Fields on the outer edge of the remaining landing. Fields appeared to be kicking a piece of metal that looked like a toe plate. Gandy observed Fields leave the landing and return with �cutting torches' (oxygen-acetylene). Gandy then walked from the 5th floor area to the control room. When he got to the control room, he heard that an accident had occurred and that a contractor had fallen from the 5th floor to the floor below.
At approximately 3:40 p.m., McDonald observed Fields kneeling on the remaining portion of the landing. McDonald does not recall exactly what Fields was doing nor does he recall Fields using a �cutting torch'. McDonald walked to the north beam and proceeded to remove a nut from a bolt in preparation to make a beam connection when he heard a crash. He turned and saw that the landing had collapsed. He then proceeded down to the lower plant level.
Fields fell approximately 34 feet down to the two and one-half �decant' floor. Tim Nunnelly, Welder, PIW, was on the second floor when he heard a crash and saw Fields fall. He ran over to the decant floor where he met Rhine. Nunnelly contacted a Jim Walter Resources employee who called for medical assistance, while Rhine attempted to communicate with Fields. Within minutes, Ken Russell, No. 4 Mine Safety Manager, arrived on the site and began to visually examine and attempt to communicate with Fields. Fields was placed on a stretcher and carried out of the plant to a waiting ambulance. Dale Byrum, Jim Walter Resources Manager of Safety and Training, administered emergency medical treatment while Fields was transported to the on site helicopter pad. Fields was transported by Lifesaver helicopter to the Carraway Hospital where he died during emergency surgery.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
Kenneth Ely, Hueytown CMS&H Field Office Supervisor, was notified of the accident at 4:30 p.m. CMS&H accident investigators John Church (Lead) and Charles Carpenter were dispatched to the site to begin the investigation. An order was issued pursuant to section 103(k) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of the miners. A physical examination of the accident scene was begun by the responding investigators on August 29th. On August 31st, MSHA Safety and Health Civil Engineers Terence Taylor and Mike Superfesky along with James Boyle, District Mining Engineer, conducted additional examinations at the scene. The accident scene was photographed, diagramed, and all relevant equipment examined. The examination of the scene was concluded on September 4, 2001.
Interviews with person who had knowledge of the accident were conducted by MSHA. Interviews began on August 29, 2001 with the final interviews concluding on September 10, 2001.
DISCUSSION
1. The Jim Walter Resources No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant was undergoing a major plant expansion that included the installation of heavy media cyclones and spirals. Construction work entailed both anticipated and unanticipated demolition activities.
2. The No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant was owned and operated by Jim Walter Resources, Inc. Jim Walter Resources, Inc. had contracted the renovation design work to SEDGMAN. The design work, as described in the Executive Plan and Schedule, would be the responsibility of SEDGMAN's Engineering Design group and under the direction of a Project Manager. The design engineering would include structural design, modifications and additions. On-site field engineering and construction services would be provided by the assigned Project Manager. The Project Manager was responsible for directing/monitoring contractors and construction progress. SEDGMAN would provide for the selection and direction of subcontractors, compliance with the project engineering drawings, and ensure the quality of construction and compliance with typical industry standards. The Scope of Work states that the contractor (SEDGMAN) would provide all engineering, design, detailing, fabrication, mechanical equipment, structural steel, concrete, plate work, piping, electrical equipment, conduit, wiring, labor, supervision, tools and equipment necessary to complete the project as described in the Scope of Work.
At the time of the accident, Craig Jolley was the assigned Project Manager. Jolley was not on-site when the accident occurred and normally worked out of the Pittsburgh office. SEDGMAN had designated a Construction Site Manager (David Gill) as the on-site representative. Gill had approximately 40 years of construction experience, but no formal engineering training.
3. SEDGMAN entered into a subcontract agreement with Pro Industrial Welding, Inc (PIW) to provide labor, equipment, services, and agreed upon materials to perform all the work for the Jim Walter Resources No. # 4 - SEDGMAN Project No. 1282. This included a purchase order that described the work as construction supervision, cranes, small tools, consumables, materials and labor to erect the Heavy Media Cyclone and Spiral Addition.
At the time of the accident, Keith Crabtree (President, PIW) was the construction supervisor. PIW employed a system of �Lead Men' to direct the day to day construction activities. Treavor Rhine was in this capacity on the day of the accident in addition to other duties. Rhine had approximately 8 years construction experience, but no formal engineering training.
4. Ricky Fields had 7 years and 5 months of construction/fabrication experience. The majority of his work with PIW consisted of fabrication (welding) activities that were conducted at the off-site PIW shop in Brookwood, AL. He had twelve days experience at the No. 4 Mine Coal Preparation Plant project when the accident occurred.
5. Fields was conducting demolition work at the 5th floor level of the plant when the accident occurred. This particular work (removal of the overhang 5th floor landing) had not been recognized as necessary until that day. There were no specific plans, specifications, or procedures for doing the work. The methods of temporary support, cut sequencing, and piece removal were left to the discretion of PIW and ultimately to the individual knowledge/experience of Fields and McDonald.
6. The demolition work consisted of the removal of an overhang on the west side of the plant that extended from the 5th to the 7th floor. The overhang was supported by a system of vertical trusses extending from the west side of the building. The portion of the overhang being removed at the time of the accident was a reinforced concrete landing extending out from the 5th floor (elevation 532'-8"). The slab was originally poured on corrugated decking, and its thickness varied from 2-1/2" to 4". The landing supported a stairway which provided access between the 5th and 6th floor.
7. The landing was originally approximately 19' long and 49" wide. It was supported on the east side by six, short 2-1/2" x 2-1/2" x 1/4" angle seats attached by welds to the web of a W10x21 edge beam that was oriented parallel to the west side of the building, along column No. 1. The west side of the slab was supported by a C8x11.5 channel, that was approximately 19' long. There were four, 8" deep lateral C8x11.5 channels of 4' length that connected between the east side W10x21 slab support and the 19' long west side C8x11.5 slab support. One lateral channel was located at the north end, one at the south end, and two at intermediate points. Specifically, one of the intermediate channels was located where the stairwell met with the 5th floor, approximately four feet from the south end of the slab, and one was located midway between that channel and the north end channel. These six members comprised the main framing for the concrete slab landing.
8. The 5th floor landing received primary support from the three hanger connections on the west side, and the W10x21 on the east side. As the east side W10x21 was part of the main building, it transmitted the floor loads directly into columns designated as B1 and C1. In contrast, the outside 19' channel was part of the overhang, and was supported by vertical trusses (i.e. hangers). The trusses extending from columns B1 and C1 provided support to the outer channel at the north and south ends. An additional set of diagonals, in the plane of the outside wall and suspended from the north and south trusses, provided a hanger support to the mid-span of the landing. The trusses essentially consisted of angle shaped diagonal and vertical members, with channel shaped horizontal members. The diagonals in the trusses were loaded in tension and provided the vertical support for the outer edge of the framing for the landing.
9. Prior to the accident, the north end of the outside 19' long western channel had been burned off and was reportedly supported by a � ton Harrington chain hoist that was suspended from the second stair tread off the 6th floor of the stairway leading from the 5th to the 6th floor. The chain hoist was used to replace the vertical support that was provided by the north end diagonal hanger (vertical truss).
10. Two concrete slab pieces from the northern half of the floor, measuring 57" and 58", had been saw cut and removed from the landing. Following their removal, the intermediate 4' long C8x11.5 lateral channel, that was located 7.5' south of the north end, beneath the slab, was torch cut on both ends. It was found lying on the 4th floor.
11. The mid-span 4"x4"x3/8" angle hanger also had burn markings through most of its cross section, indicating that it had been cut by torches. There were conflicting witness reports as to when the cut had occurred on the day of the accident.
12. The angle hanger connection to the south corner of the landing was thinned from corrosion. One leg of the angle was only 0.09" thick and the other leg was 0.068" thick. This represented a loss of thickness of approximately 80%. The south corner hanger was therefore only able to provide minimal if any support for th south end of the landing. There were no shiny marks found on the thin separation location of the hanger angle after the accident. A shiny mark would have indicated a recent failure. As this was an outside corner of the building, it was unprotected from the rain that occurred after the accident. Therefore, a recent fracture may have developed a light layer of corrosion.
13. With the north end of the 19' outside channel and the mid-span hanger angle cut, the western side of the remaining 10' of concrete landing was being supported by the � ton Harrington chain hoist at one end and the thinned south end hanger on the other. On the east side, the slab was still being supported by the 2-1/2"x2-1/2"x1/4" angle seats welded to the web of the W10x21 beam. In addition, two of the above mentioned lateral, 4' long channels were also supporting the landing. This was the channel at the south end and the intermediate channel located below the stairway. A 6" deep channel (C6x8.2) had been welded to the top flange of the intermediate 8" deep channel in a stacked manner. The bottom of the stairway stringer channels were originally attached to the top flange of the 6" deep channel. The bottom of the stairway stringers were heavily corroded and had been reinforced by smaller short channel pieces. It is believed that the smaller channels were not attached, but were only bearing on the concrete landing surface.
14. A 3/4 ton capacity Lite Mule (Model LMSB) chain hoist had been rigged to the east side stair stringer. Reportedly, the chain hoist was installed after the accident to support the bottom of the stairs, which had previously been supported by the concrete landing.
15. A 1 ton capacity Coffing (Model LHH) chain hoist was found at the 2-1/2 (decant) floor, where debris had fallen. It was equipped with a hook located above the block and grab hook at the end of a 14'-3" length of chain. Neither appeared to have been attached to any objects prior to the landing failure.
16. It appears that the only chain hoist used as a temporary support for the demolition of the 5th floor landing was the � ton Harrington chain hoist. The grab hook at the end of the chain was found hanging straight down, approximately 32" below the 5th floor. There was no sling attached to the hook and there was no evidence of a choker type attachment. The chain may have been looped around the outside 19' long channel and hooked onto the channel flange or a corrosion hole in the web. Another possibility was that the chain did not wrap around the channel, but was hooked directly to a corrosion hole in the web. As the chain was hanging below the floor, the extra length would have made it possible to attach the hook to a corrosion hole on the north side of the mid-span hanger in a diagonal direction. After the landing collapsed, the top flange of the outside 19' long channel was found to be torn/separated from the web on the north side of the mid-span hanger, which suggests that the hook may have been attached to a corrosion hole in the web hanger near the top flange.
17. The 4' long, 8" deep, intermediate channel (C8x11.5), located where the stairwell attached to the landing, had failed through the webbing on the east side, where it connected to the W10x21 beam. The 4' long channel supporting the south edge of the landing had also failed. This channel failed by tearing at the interface between the top flange and web. After the accident, the top flange was found hanging by a weld on its east side to the W10x21 beam. The two channels had measured web thicknesses of approximately 0.078" and 0.065", respectively. This represented a 65% to 70% loss due of thickness due to corrosion.
18. In the debris found on the 2-1/2 (decant) floor, below the location of the overhang, the 19' long channel had a 90 degree rotation of the web, where it tore near the mid-span hanger. There was also a significant separation of the top flange from the web. Both conditions were suggestive of restraint being provided by the attachment of the chain hoist.
19. By rigging the � ton Harrington chain hoist to the 2nd stair tread leading from the 6th to the 5th floors, the contractor was inadvertently imparting an additional downward force back down to the support framing for the 5th floor landing. Deformation of the 2nd stair tread indicates that it was under stress from the chain hoist.
20. The Coffing and Harrington chain hoists were disassembled and independently tested following the accident. Both hoists functioned properly and met the manufacturer's standards for load carrying capacity.
21. The remaining 121" of concrete slabbing fell to the 2-1/2 (decant) floor. At some point the slab had separated into two pieces of 66" and 55" lengths. In the debris found at this floor level, the larger piece was on top of the smaller. The smaller piece was from the southern-most portion of the landing. The two pieces separated at the natural joint created by the embedded 6" deep channel at the bottom of the stair stringer channels.
22. There were no eye witnesses to the failure. Based on the evidence observed at the site and the interviews conducted, it appears that the heavily corroded south hanger failed first. A loss of support to the southwest side of the landing then caused the 4' long intermediate lateral channel at the bottom of the stairway, and the south lateral channel to pull away from the W10x21 beam. In addition, the 2-1/2"x2-1/2"x1/4" angle seats under the east side of the landing would have pried away from the webbing of the W10x21 edge beam. With the south corner falling away, the north end of the outside channel would have twisted due to the restraint from the � ton Harrington chain hoist rigged to the stairway.
23. An alternative failure scenario would have involved the movement of the chain hoist rigging on the 19' long outside channel. Due to stress from the chain hook attachment to the channel and the heavy corrosion, the hook could have caused deformation and slippage along the channel, thereby transferring additional loads to the remaining supports, which could have subsequently overloaded them. The remaining supports would have included: the two, 4' lateral channels; the small angle seats; and the south hanger angle. Once they were overloaded, the remaining portion of the landing would fall. The 90 degree shearing rotation of the outside channel web would be consistent with this type of rigging induced failure.
24. The victim was not using a safety belt and line when the collapse occurred. Although the site was observed/inspected by both the PIW Lead Man and the SEDGMAN Construction Manager, the absence of fall protection was not questioned. The west side wall of the plant had been removed from the vertical supports to accommodate the plant expansion. This action exposed the concrete landing on the 5th floor to 2-1/2 decant floor below.
25. Testimony revealed that a practice existed which included a lax attitude toward the use of fall protection by employees of the Independent Contractor. The operator cited several instances whereby employees of the Independent Contractor were observed not using fall protection where required. Several meetings were held between the operator and both contractors in the months preceding the accident to discuss the unsafe practice.
26. The discussion between the PIW Lead Man and the SEDGMAN Construction Manager associated with this demolition was limited to the authorization of the work and how to remove some of the concrete slab. There was no discussion on how the work could be conducted in a safe manner.
CONCLUSION
The accident occurred as a result of demolition activities where a portion of the concrete landing support structure was intentionally removed along with the failure of the remaining supporting structure. The collapse of the concrete landing caused the victim to fall 34 feet to the floor below inflicting fatal internal injuries. Contributing factors to the accident are:
� The failure of anyone to recognize the need to use a safety belt and line.
� The failure to conduct an engineering evaluation to determine if the structure was maintained in good repair to prevent accidents and injuries to employees.
� The reliance of individual knowledge/experience to take the place of a systematic plan of demolition and reconstruction. The development of and adherence to a plan specific to this work would have ensured that the structure would be maintained to prevent accidents and injuries to employees while demolition activities were taking place.
� The failure to develop and implement safe work procedures for demolition activities.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
1. 103(k) Order No. 7676871 was issued on August 29, 2001:
" The mine has experienced a fatal accident at the preparation plant. This order is issued to assure the safety of any person until an examination is completed."2. 104(a) Citation No. 7676879 was issued on February 4, 2002 to Jim Walter Resources Inc. under 30 CFR 77.200 as follows:
" The Rand/McNally coal processing facility and structure were not being maintained in good repair to prevent injuries to employees. Areas of the coal preparation plant associated with the underground mine are currently under demolition and construction. Steel members and supporting structure beneath and attached to the concrete deck area of the 5th floor level were not substantially maintained to prevent collapse of the structure. Beams and structure associated with the deck support showed signs of deterioration, corrosion, and fatigue which seriously reduced their load carrying capacity. Employees of the Operator were exposed to the area during the course of normal mining conditions."3. 104(d)(1) Citation No. 7676880 was issued on February 4, 2002, to Pro Industrial Welding, Inc., under 30 CFR 77.1710(g) as follows:
" Safety belts and lines were not being worn by employees where there was a danger of fall during demolition and reconstruction activities at the Rand/McNally coal processing facility located near the underground mine. A practice existed which revealed a lax attitude toward the use of fall prevention equipment by employees of the Independent Contractor. A lack of reasonable care for employees resulted in an accident that claimed the life of an employee of the Independent Contractor. During work activities on August 29, 2001 an accident occurred involving one employee who wasn't secured by safety belts and lines. One employee fell thirty-four (34) feet when a steel and concrete landing failed. The fall resulted in fatal injuries. The employee was working on an overhanging concrete deck that was open to the floor 34 feet below."4. 104(d)(1) Citation No. 7676881 was issued on February 4, 2002, to SEDGMAN, under 30 CFR 77.200 as follows:
" The Rand/McNally coal processing facility and structures were not being maintained in good repair to prevent injuries to employees. Areas of the coal preparation plant are currently under demolition and reconstruction by employees of an Independent Contractor who are under advisement by an on-site manager of SEDGMAN. This employee examined the work area and discussed the demolition procedure with the Independent Contractor prior to the accident. Steel members and supporting structure beneath and attached to the concrete deck area of the 5th floor level were not substantially maintained to prevent collapse of the structure. The steel beams and structure associated with the deck support showed signs of deterioration, corrosion, and fatigue which had seriously reduced their load carrying capacity. SEDGMAN had inspected this area of the plant during the design phase of this project. Actions by the Independent Contractor in conjunction with deterioration and lack of precautionary safety measures, resulted in the failure of supports and structure. An employee of SEDGMAN regularly travels on, beneath, and in close proximity to the failed structure during the course of his regular duties."5. 104(d)(1) Order No. 7676882 was issued on February 4, 2002, to Pro Industrial Welding under 30 CFR 77.200 as follows:
" The Rand/McNally coal processing facility and structures were not being maintained in good repair to prevent injuries to employees. Areas of the coal preparation plant are currently under demolition and reconstruction by employees of the Independent Contractor. Steel members and supporting structure beneath and attached to the concrete deck area of the 5th floor level were not substantially maintained to prevent collapse of the structure. The steel beams and structure associated with the deck support showed signs of deterioration, corrosion, and fatigue which seriously reduced their load carrying capacity. An evaluation had not been performed to determine the condition of the framing, floors, and walls so that a systematic plan of removal could be implemented to prevent premature collapse of any portion of the structure. Actions initiated by the Independent contractor in conjunction with the deterioration resulted in the failure of the supports and structure. This failure resulted in the fall of a contractor miner who sustained fatal injuries."6. 104(a) Citation No. 7677631 was issued February 4, 2002, to Jim Walter Resources Inc., under 30 CFR 77.1710(g) as follows:
" Safety belts and lines were not being worn by contract employees where there was a danger of fall during demolition and reconstruction activities at the Rand/McNally coal processing facility located near the underground mine. A practice had existed in which contract employees were observed by the Operator in positions where fall protection would be required. During work activities on August 29, 2001, an accident occurred involving a contract employee who was not secured by a safety belt and line. One employee fell thirty four (34) feet when a steel and concrete landing failed. The resultant fall caused fatal injuries. The Operator has control over the facility and the employees (including Contractors) which are working on the mine property.7. 104(a) Citation No. 7669633 was issued on February 4, 2002, to SEDGMAN under 30 CFR 1710(g) as follows:
" Safety belts and lines were not being worn by contract employees where there was a danger of fall during demolition and reconstruction activities at the Rand/McNally coal processing facility located near the underground mine. During work activities on August 29, 2001, an accident occurred involving a contract employee (Pro Industrial Welding, Inc.) who was not secured by a safety belt and line. One employee fell thirty four (34) feet when a steel and concrete landing failed. The resultant fall caused fatal injuries. The contractor, SEDGMAN, was responsible for direction/monitoring of the construction activities and observed the work area and work activities prior to the accident."
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB01C16
APPENDIX C - Isometric of Structural Frame
APPENDIX D - Plan of Structural Framing
APPENDIX A
List of persons participating in the investigation:
Jim Walter Resources, Inc:
Dale Byrum, Manager of Safety and TrainingPIW, Inc.:
Ken Russell, No. 4 Safety Manager
Michael Yates, No. 4 Mine Preparation Plant Area Manager
Keith Crabtree, PresidentSEDGMAN:
Mark Levin, PresidentUnited Mine Workers of America:
Tom Wilson, District 20 Safety RepresentativeState of Alabama:
David McAteer, Chairman, No. 4 Mine Safety Committee
Glenn Loggins, No. 4 Mine Safety Committee
Jim Brackner, No. 4 Mine Safety Committee
Wes SandlinMine Safety and Health Administration:
John Church, Lead Accident Investigator, District 11
Charles Carpenter, Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, District 11
Michael Woodrome, Assistant District Manager, District 11
Gary Wirth, Coal Mine Safety and Health Supervisor, District 11
James Boyle, Mining Engineer, District 11
Terence M. Taylor, Senior Civil Engineer, Technical Support
Michael Superfesky, Civil Engineer, Technical Support
APPENDIX B
List of persons interviewed:
Jim Walter Resources, Inc:
Ken Russell, No.4 Safety ManagerPIW, Inc.
Michael Yates, No. 4 Mine Preparation Plant Area Manager
Glenn Loggins, No. 4 Mine Safety Committeeman
Jim Brackner, No. 4 Mine Safety Committeeman
Billy Gandy, Repairman
Keith Crabtree, PresidentSEDGMAN
Trevor Rhine, Leadman
Greg McDonald, Welder
Tim Nunnelly, Welder
James Harbin, Crane Operator
Craig Jolley, Project Manager
David Gill, Construction Site Manager