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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health

Report of Investigation

Surface Non-Metal Mine
(Sand and Gravel)

Fatal Powered Haulage Accident
February 9, 2001

Portable #1
Tommer Construction Co., Inc.
Ephrata, Grant County, Washington
ID No. 45-03161

Accident Investigators

John D. Pereza
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Randy Horn
Mine Safety and Health Inspector

Wayne M. Colley
Mechanical Engineer

Emmett Sullivan
Mine Safety and Health Specialist

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Western District
2060 Peabody Road, Suite 610
Vacaville, CA 95687
Lee D. Ratliff, District Manager



OVERVIEW


On February 9, 2001, Dustin L. Hollibaugh, plant oiler, age 21, was fatally injured when he became entangled in a conveyor belt while underneath the frame of the screening unit. The accident was caused by the failure to de-energize the conveyor unit and block it against hazardous motion prior to entering this area. Hollibaugh had eight months of mining experience, all at this mine. Although he had not received all training in accordance with the company's 30 CFR Part 46 training plan, he had been instructed regarding appropriate safety procedures when working near moving machinery.

GENERAL INFORMATION


Portable #1, a surface sand and gravel mine, owned and operated by Tommer Construction Co., Inc., was located in Ephrata, Grant County, Washington. Principal operating officials were Nick Tommer, president; Larry Tommer, Sr., vice-president; and Scott Hollibaugh, superintendent. The mine operated alternating crews, one 12-hour shift, four to five days a week. This portable plant changed locations regularly and, in that regard, had been in its present location for four days. Total employment was ten persons.

The last regular inspection of the mine was conducted on October 12, 2000. Another inspection was conducted following the accident investigation.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT


On the day of the accident, Dustin Hollibaugh (victim) began his regular work shift at 7:00 a.m. The crushing and screening plant ran for about one hour when several large rocks were observed in the processed material. Hollibaugh and Brian Lieser, plant operator, shut the plant off and checked the screen unit for holes in the sizing screens. Holes were not found and the two men began the process of restarting the plant. Lieser went to the operator's station and started the conveyor belts in the plant while Hollibaugh visually checked to ensure that everything was running properly. Hollibaugh found no problems and Lieser restarted the feed belts to the plant.

About 9:30 a.m., Hollibaugh came into the operator's station, talked briefly with Lieser, then left. About ten minutes later, Lieser saw rock spilling off the top of the screening unit. He pushed the plant's emergency stop button and went to the screen to see what the problem was. He discovered Hollibaugh caught between the rear transfer conveyor belt and an idler (roller). Lieser immediately notified Scott Hollibaugh, plant superintendent, that the victim was caught in the screen conveyor belt, then ran to get a knife so he could cut the belt and free the victim. In the meantime, Scott Hollibaugh arrived at the accident site where he was joined by Kelly Ryan, loader operator. Lieser arrived with the knife, the belt was cut, and the victim was freed. Cardio-pulmonary-resuscitation efforts were begun and an ambulance arrived a few minutes later. The victim was taken to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Death was attributed to asphyxia due to mechanical compression.

INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT


MSHA was notified of the accident on February 9, 2001, at 10:27 p.m., by a telephone call from Susan Dahl, office manager, to Stephen Cain, supervisory mine safety and health inspector. An investigation was started on the same day. An order was issued pursuant to Section 103(k) of the Mine Act to ensure the safety of the miners. MSHA's accident investigation team traveled to the mine, conducted an inspection of the accident site, interviewed miners, and reviewed appropriate training and other records. The miners did not request, nor have, representation during the investigation.

DISCUSSION


� The crushing and screening plant consisted of several trailer-mounted crushers and sizing screens with associated conveyor belts and support trailers. The plant operator's station was located in a separate trailer. A diesel motor and generator provided electrical power for the plant and operator's station.

   The operator's station was in a trailer approximately 50 feet away from the screening unit. The trailer had windows on the northeast end. The plant operator could not see the accident site under the screening unit when looking out the windows from his seat in the trailer.

   The accident occurred underneath the frame of the Spomac SCT8701 screening and conveyor unit. This unit consisted of two hoppers and screens mounted above two transfer conveyor belts supported by a steel frame attached to a portable, wheel-mounted, trailer. The unit was 42 feet long, nine feet wide, and approximately 14 feet high. Material was fed into the unit's rear hopper by a conveyor belt.

� The unit's rear transfer conveyor belt was horizontally mounted underneath the screen hopper. The belt was about 48 inches wide, approximately 17 feet in length, and 48 inches above ground level. It traveled at 3.4 feet per second and was driven by a 10-horsepower induction motor connected with drive belts to a 14-inch diameter drive pulley. The tail pulley for the rear transfer conveyor belt extended past the end of the unit and was adequately guarded. Access to the remainder of the belt assembly was limited by the trailer's frame, the unit's tires, and structural steel supports composing the upper deck of the screening unit.

� An opening measuring 46 inches high and 33 inches wide was located underneath the south end of the screening unit. A structural steel brace, located diagonally on the upper right corner of the opening, restricted access to this area which would not normally be guarded. Inside the opening, approximately 4� feet north of the rear transfer conveyor belt tail pulley, was a 6-inch high, horizontal, steel I-beam spanning the width of the screening unit. Directly in front of the I-beam was a 4-inch diameter idler (roller) which redirected the belt over the top of the I-beam on its return trip to the tail pulley. The idler (roller) was concealed from view when entering the restricted space under the screen. A small gap between the idler (roller) and a trailer support beam allowed rock build up which prevented the idler (roller) from rotating. There was an approximate one-inch wide by 24-inch long hole in the idler (roller) caused by the conveyor belt traveling over the non-rotating idler (roller).

� The victim became caught between the screening unit's rear transfer conveyor belt idler (roller) and the conveyor belt. Since there were no eyewitnesses to the accident, it could not be determined why he was underneath the unit. However, it is believed that he was attempting to clean mud buildup from between the moving conveyor belt and the motionless idler (roller) so the belt would not be damaged.

� The victim's hard hat had a deep scratch which appeared fresh. Plastic pieces matching the color of the hat were found on the east, inner side of an I-beam under the screening unit. He was wearing a mid-weight jacket with attached hood. Two shovels were located a short distance from the unit. An orange utility knife was found approximately two feet under the spilled material, directly beneath the rear transfer conveyor tail pulley.

   The temperature at the time of the accident was about 28 degrees Fahrenheit and winds were at out of the north at approximately 13 miles per hour. There was light snow falling and skies were overcast. The screened material on the rear transfer conveyor belt was damp and sticky.

   The victim had not received all training in accordance with the company's 30 CFR Part 46 training plan but he had been instructed regarding appropriate safety procedures when working near moving machinery.

CONCLUSION


The accident was caused by the failure to de-energize the power to the conveyor and block it against motion before going underneath the frame of the screening unit. Failure to repair the defective conveyor idler (roller) prior to placing the screening unit in operation was a contributing factor.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS


Tommer Construction Co., Inc.

Order No. 7996080 was issued on February 9, 2001, under the provisions of Section 103(k) of the Mine Act:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on February 9, 2001, when the plant oiler was caught in a return idler (roller) on the rear transfer conveyor belt for the Spomac screening unit. This order is issued to assure the safety of persons at this operation and prohibits any work in the affected area until MSHA determines that it is safe to resume normal operations as determined by an authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor. The mine operator shall obtain approval from an authorized representative for all actions prior to restoring operations in the affected area.
Order No. 7996080 was terminated on February 14, 2001, after it was determined that the mine could resume normal operation.

Citation No. 7996081 was issued on March 14, 2001, under the provisions of Section 104(a) of the Mine Act for a violation of 30 CFR 56.14105:
A fatal accident occurred at this operation on February 9, 2001, when the plant oiler was caught in a return idler (roller) on the rear transfer conveyor belt for the screen deck. The power had not been shut off, nor had the conveyor been blocked against hazardous motion. The plant was in production and the belt was not undergoing testing or adjustments at the time of the accident.
The citation was terminated on March 29, 2001, when the operator re-instructed all employees in the written policy regarding de-energizing equipment prior to work being done near the machinery. Additionally, the defective idler (roller) was removed from under the rear transfer conveyor belt.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB00M02


APPENDIX A


Persons Participating in the Investigation

Tommer Construction Co., Inc.
Nick Tommer .......... president
Mine Safety and Health Administration
John D. Pereza .......... mine safety and health inspector
Randy Horn .......... mine safety and health inspector
Wayne M. Colley .......... mechanical engineer
Emmett Sullivan .......... mine safety and health specialist
APPENDIX B


Persons interviewed during the investigation

Tommer Construction Co., Inc.
Nick Tommer .......... president
Scott Hollibaugh .......... superintendent
Warren Smethers .......... foreman (second crew)
Brian Lieser .......... miner
Kelly Ryan .......... miner
Robert McKelvy .......... miner
Allen Predeohl .......... miner (second crew)
Kelly Schlittenhart .......... miner (second crew)
Grant County Sheriff's Office
Courtney Conklin .......... sergeant
Brent Mullings .......... deputy
Grant County Coroner's Office
Jerry Jasman .......... coroner
Ephrata Fire Department
Craig Huston .......... emergency medical services coordinator