DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
UNDERGROUND COAL MINE
FATAL FALL OF ROOF ACCIDENT
March 14, 2001
at
Basic Mining Corp.
No. 2 (I.D. 44-05032)
Nora, Dickenson County, Virginia
Accident Investigator
Arnold D. Carico
Mining Engineer
Originating Office - Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 5
P.O. Box 560, Wise County Plaza, Norton, Virginia 24273
Ray McKinney, District Manager
RELEASE DATE: May 8, 2001
OVERVIEW
On Wednesday, March 14, 2001, at approximately 6:10 a.m., a 53 year old section foreman was fatally injured from a fall of roof. The accident occurred in the crosscut between the No. 2 and 3 Rooms driven right off the East Mains. The roof bolting machine operator had informed the victim that he was unable to position his machine properly because of fallen rock in the crosscut. The victim began operating the scoop to push rock to clear the crosscut. As the victim was making his second push of fallen roof material, he positioned himself inby the last row of roof bolts. A roof fall then occurred, trapping the victim in the operator's compartment of the scoop. He was recovered at approximately 7:30 a.m.
The accident occurred because the victim exposed himself to unsupported roof in an area where adverse roof conditions had been previously encountered. At the time of the accident, the victim was as much as 6 feet 9 inches inby the last row of permanent roof supports. Evidence and testimony indicate that he had traveled inby permanent roof supports at least twice previously.
GENERAL INFORMATION
Basic Mining Corp.'s mine No.2 is located in Neece Creek, approximately one mile off State Route 651 at Nora, Dickenson County, Virginia. The company employed thirteen persons underground and one on the surface. The No. 2 mine used a single mining unit which was operated one shift per day, five days per week to produce an average of 550 tons per day. Shifts were normally 6:45 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. The mine was opened into the Lower Banner coalbed by means of three drifts in June 1978, and was developed by the room and pillar method. Seven different owner/operators intermittently operated the mine since that time and at some point, a fourth drift opening was developed. As reflected by a Legal Identity Form, Basic Mining Corp. assumed control July 12, 1999. The mine entered an active producing status on August 10, 1999. Records show that Paul Lowe is the corporation's president and only officer. The person in charge at the mine at the time of the accident was Johnny Adkins, Foreman and victim.
The most recent of the operators who preceded Basic Mining Corp. developed and retreated the first panel left off the East Mains. This was the only retreat mining performed prior to the present operator. Basic Mining Corp. continued to develop the mine by the room and pillar method and developed and retreated two additional panels left off the East Mains. Coal was produced using a continuous mining machine to extract coal from the coalbed. Coal was hauled by shuttle cars from the face areas to the belt conveyor and then transported to the surface via the belt conveyor. Trucks were employed to haul the raw product from the mine to a nearby preparation plant. The Roof Control Plan required minimum length 48-inch long fully grouted No. 5 rebar roof bolts be installed on a four foot by four foot pattern to within 4 feet of the face. The Plan also required that at least six 72-inch long No.6 rebar torque tension roof bolts be installed in any proposed intersection prior to any development to begin a crosscut.
The mine was ventilated by an exhausting five-foot Ingersol-Rand mine fan installed in the No. 1 Drift (left side) opening to produce approximately 56,000 cubic feet of air. The latest methane liberation was 9,331 cubic feet per day. Panels to the left were developed sequencing toward the exhausting mine fan. This caused new panels to be located on the return side of previously pillared areas. Since return air cannot be used to ventilate active working sections, each pillared area had to be sealed prior to beginning development of the next panel. The seals just inby the accident area had been completed on Saturday, March 10, 2001. While these seals were being constructed, three rooms were being driven right off the intake escapeway just outby the seal construction site and on the opposite side of the East Mains from the next projected panel left. The last regular Safety and Health Inspection (AAA) was completed on January 24, 2001. The latest NFDL (non-fatal days lost) national injury frequency rate for underground mines was 7.35. The latest (CY 2000) NFDL frequency rate for this mine was 18.44 and resulted from three injuries.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
On March 13, 2001, the day prior to the accident, normal production continued in the three rooms which were driven right off the East Mains. During that time, Willard Hurley, Continuous Mining Machine Operator, operated the continuous mining machine. However, he had to leave the mine at 2:00 p.m. Prior to leaving, Hurley started the third cut from the right crosscut off the No. 3 Room. He cut the right side lift approximately 15 feet in depth and then moved the machine to the left side in preparation for that lift. In preparation to leave, Hurley turned the operation of the machine over to Adkins and informed Adkins that he didn't trust the roof in this place because the roof was "dribbling". Hurley and Andrew (Andy) Rife, Shuttle Car Operator, then left the working section.
Adkins began operating the continuous mining machine and completed the cut by advancing the left lift to just short of penetrating No. 2 Room, then advancing the right side lift again until it penetrated the No. 2 Room, a total distance of 26 feet. As he finished the cut, roof rock in excess of one foot in thickness fell from the unsupported area, some of which lodged on the front of the mining machine. After backing the mining machine out of the place, Adkins instructed Shane Branham, Roof Bolting Machine Operator, to move his machine from the No. 2 Room right crosscut where he was installing roof bolts into the No. 3 right crosscut and install a row of roof bolts there. Branham then moved his machine into the crosscut and installed one partial and one full row of roof bolts just before the end of the shift.
On March 14, 2001, Adkins arrived at the mine at approximately 4:40 a.m. Approximately five minutes later, Keith Lane, Beltman, and Tim Tweed, General Inside Laborer, arrived. Adkins had telephoned the two miners the evening before and instructed them to report to work an hour early so they could begin building stoppings which were needed for the planned move to the next projected panel. When they arrived, the fan was not running and Adkins was in the mine office. Lane started the fan at approximately 5:00 a.m. Five minutes later, the three of them proceeded underground via a three-wheeled battery powered mantrip. Adkins stopped at a location about four crosscuts underground and spray painted his initials, the date and time on the mine rib. The three continued to the working section and arrived there at approximately 5:15 a.m. The three men rode by the openings to the three rooms, stopped at each of the seals and then traveled down the return side of the East Mains to the scoop battery charging station. Reportedly, Adkins never got off the mantrip, made any air quality checks, certified any examinations by dates, times and initials, or took any air readings during this time. Adkins retrieved the scoop from the charging station, showed Lane and Tweed where to build the stoppings needed for the projected working section, and began removing unnecessary stoppings with the scoop. He then transported the materials from those stoppings to Lane and Tweed for their use.
At approximately 5:40 a.m., Chris Viers, Electrician, Richard Nowlin, Mechanic, and Branham arrived at the mine and found no one on the surface. Normally, Paul Witt, Continuous Mining Machine Helper, arrived early and served as the outside man until shift start time, but was not working due to a death in his family. Chris Keen, Outside Man, arrived while the three were on surface. At approximately 5:45 a.m., they proceeded underground and arrived on the working section some fifteen minutes later. Chris Viers and Nowlin began changing a drive gear on the belt feeder. Adkins instructed Branham install another row of roof bolts in the No. 3 Room right crosscut. Branham proceeded into the crosscut and saw that additional rock had fallen from the unsupported area of roof and, because of the rock, he would not be able to maneuver his machine to install the roof bolts. He then informed Adkins that the rock would have to be moved. Adkins brought the scoop into the place, got off his scoop, and looked at the area. Adkins then reentered the scoop and began cleaning the area. Branham observed Adkins pushing rock along the inby ribline of the crosscut before he left the place to begin hanging the roof bolting machine cable.
A very short time later while in the Mains between the Nos. 2 and 3 Rooms, Branham heard a roof fall and the scoop shut off simultaneously. He rushed into the No. 2 Room but was unable to see anything but the fallen rock. He yelled for Adkins but got no response. Branham went to get help and located Nowlin and Chris Viers at the belt feeder where they were installing the feeder drive gear. The three of them and Lane then went into the No. 3 Room where they observed that most of the scoop, including the scoop operator's compartment, was covered and that Adkins was still in the operator's compartment. Nowlin called outside at 6:19 a.m. and notified Keen of the accident. Nowlin transported Tweed, a newly employed inexperienced miner, to the surface. Once on the surface, Nowlin began gathering materials to be used in the recovery.
About this time, Hurley, Albert Cook, Scoop Operator, and Terry Vandyke, Shuttle Car Operator, arrived on the surface. Keen called 911 and Paul Lowe, the mine operator. Lowe then notified the Virginia Department of Mines, Minerals, and Energy (VDMM&E) and Larry Dickey, Safety Director for Rapoca Energy Company, the lessor to Basic Mining Corp., who notified the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Nowlin and Vandyke loaded materials to be used in the recovery onto a three wheeled mantrip and went underground. Cook gathered additional support materials including two hydraulic jacks into a scoop which was located on the surface, and also proceeded underground. Hurley chose not to go underground since Adkins was his cousin. Chris Viers, Branham, Nowlin, Lane, Cook and Vandyke began setting supports and moving rock until they reached Adkins. Elliott Viers, General Inside Laborer, who was trained in Advance First Aid, came underground. After the site was secured, he checked Adkins for a pulse and found none. Adkins was removed from the scoop at approximately 7:30 a.m. and the crew arrived on the surface approximately fifteen minutes later with the victim. Sandy Ridge Rescue Squad was standing by on the surface and checked Adkins for signs of life and found none. Deputy Scott Stanley of the Dickenson County Sheriff's Department was at the mine and notified Kurtz Alderman, the county coroner, of the circumstances. Alderman instructed the rescue squad to transport Adkins to Mullins Funeral Home in Clintwood, Virginia where he conducted his examination. The time of death listed on the coroner's report was 6:15 a.m.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
Ray McKinney, District Manager, was notified of the accident on March 14 at 6:25 a.m. by Larry Dickey, Safety Director for Rapoca Energy Company, lessor to Basic Mining Corp. Gary Jessee, Coal Mine Safety and Health Specialist (Roof Control) and Roy Davidson, Electrical Engineer, were dispatched to the mine and arrived at 8:00 a.m. Two representatives from VDMM&E were already present at the mine. Wayland Jessee, Assistant District Manager, Inspection Division, and John Godsey, Acting Supervisor - Roof Control, arrived a short time later. A 103(k) Order was issued to insure the health and safety of persons in the underground areas of the mine until the investigation could be completed. Preliminary information concerning the fatality was gathered and a preliminary investigation of the accident scene was conducted. Officials from the company, MSHA and VDMM&E met and arranged for the investigation to continue at the mine at 9:00 a.m. the next day.
The accident investigation team members were designated and the investigation continued at the mine on the morning of March 15. The accident scene was inspected and a scaled drawing, photographs, and a video were made. A spot inspection (CAA) was conducted concurrently with the investigation to address any enforcement issues not related to the fatality. Interviews of Paul Lowe and thirteen employees were conducted on March 16 at VDMM&E's Keen Mountain, VA office.
DISCUSSION
1. The mine has been developed by the room and pillar method using continuous mining machines and shuttle cars. Successive panels were developed on the return side of the previous panel, thus requiring sealing of the previous panel prior to development of the next, since the air coming from the pillared areas would be return air. At the time of the accident, seals had just been completed in preparation for development of the next (4 Left) panel. Coal was being produced from three rooms being developed to the right of the East Mains intake airway and just outby the seals to allow for some coal production while the seals were being constructed.
2. The area of the East Mains adjacent to the rooms was developed in February 1998. The three rooms were developed into an area of faulted roof as evidenced by conditions in the No. 5 Entry of the East Mains. The immediate roof consisted of six to ten feet of shale and contained numerous potholes and horsebacks. The first two to three feet of the roof was composed of thinly laminated shales that tended to break along prominent horizontal bedding and angled joints which were often slickensided (highly polished). Systematically oriented structure was observed in east-west trending joints two to ten feet apart and extending into the roof from a few inches to approximately two feet. Additionally, there were numerous random curvilinear joints in the accident area which contributed to the pothole at the accident site. Slickensided slips are sometimes tight jointed and thus hard to detect and can create "horsebacks" which fall with little or no warning. The overburden at the accident scene was approximately 425 feet. No visible signs of stress were present on the coal pillars.
3. The area of the mine from which the rooms were driven was developed by a previous operator and was supported by four foot resin grouted no. 5 rebar installed on a four foot by four foot pattern lengthwise and crosswise to yield four bolts per row. The maximum width for entries and crosscuts to be developed was 20 feet. The presently approved Roof Control Plan dated July 20, 1999, contains the same basic requirements but was revised on June 27, 2000 to require six 72-inch no. 6 rebar torque tension roof bolts be installed in a proposed intersection prior to starting the crosscut development. These bolts had been installed in the intersections at the mouths of the three rooms and in the rooms where crosscuts had been turned. The crosscut width at the accident scene was 17.6 feet.
4. Separations in the mine roof at 68.5, 36 and 17 inches were detected in a test hole located 15 feet from the face of the No. 3 Room and just outby the accident location. Due to these separations and the faulted roof conditions, the operator determined that recovering the scoop was not feasible.
5. On the afternoon of March 13, Willard Hurley, Continuous Mining Machine Operator, left the section at approximately 2:00 p.m. Hurley stated that he had developed a cut from the No. 3 Room right crosscut to approximately fifteen feet in depth prior to leaving. He also stated that he informed Johnny Adkins, Foreman, that the roof was bad and that there was some "dribbling" as he cut the place. Adkins then began operating the mining machine and connected the No.3 Room right crosscut into the No. 2 Room. (The distance from the last row of roof bolts at the time the connection was made to the left ribline of the No. 2 Room was 26 feet. The distance from the front (foot) control of the machine to the front of the ripper head bits is 20.5 feet. The machine is not equipped with remote control, thus is operated by onboard controls only. These facts taken together show that the victim was at least 5.5 feet inby permanent supports while making the connection.) Sometime near the completion of the connection, some roof rock greater than 12 inches in thickness fell onto the mining machine near the machine's ripper head. Some of that rock was still on top of the machine at the time of the investigation.
6. On the afternoon of March 13 and after the connection was made between the Nos. 2 and 3 Rooms, Adkins instructed Shane Branham, Roof Bolting Machine Operator, to install a row of roof bolts in the No. 3 Room right crosscut. Branham installed a partial row of three roof bolts and a complete row of four roof bolts just prior to the end of the shift. He then installed a reflective device on the last row of roof bolts. (A green reflective device was present on the last row of roof bolts at the time of the investigation.) Adkins was heard to say that "he had seen all he needed to see over there". He further indicated that production activity in the rooms was completed and the unsupported area was to be timbered off.
7. The only effort toward a preshift examination for March 14 which could be verified was a single set of dates, times and initials just inby the drift opening. Two other miners (Lane and Tweed) accompanied Adkins underground while he was to have performed this preshift examination. No further evidence of an examination was present and statements indicated that no other effort was made toward the examination prior to work commencing. No record was made prior to work commencing, or prior to three additional miners (Branham, Nowlin, and Chris Viers) entering the mine.
8. On the morning of March 14, activities began to move the section to the 4 Left Panel projections an hour before normal shift start time. These activities included Adkins using the scoop to remove unnecessary stoppings and Lane and Tweed beginning construction of stoppings which would be needed for the projected move. When Branham arrived on the section at approximately 5:55 a.m., Adkins instructed him to install another row of roof bolts in the No. 3 Room right crosscut. After observing that additional roof rock had fallen in the unsupported area of the crosscut, Branham informed Adkins that the rock would have to be moved before he could maneuver his machine to install the roof bolts.
9. Adkins trammed the scoop tractor into the No. 3 Room, got off the scoop and observed the place where the rock was down, then proceeded to push the rock along the left (inby) ribline. Branham left the place and was in the process of hanging the roof bolting machine cable when the roof fall occurred at 6:10 a.m. There were no eye witnesses.
10. Statements were made during the interview indicating that Adkins had been under apparent stress for some time due to family health problems.
11. The machine-cut mining heights on the working section ranged from 42.5 to 49 inches. The mining heights along the intake escapeway haul road ranged down to 39 inches. The scoops were used to deliver materials from the surface to the working section along this haul road. Therefore the scoops were not required to have canopies and none were installed.
12. At the time of the investigation, the distance from the last row of roof bolts to the scoop control farthest into the unsupported roof area was measured to be 6 feet 9 inches. The tram control lever and the light control switch were found in " reverse" positions, indicating that the victim was leaving the unsupported area at the time of the fall. The foot operated speed control pedal was found in the "up" position and, when checked for freedom of movement, appeared to be free of mechanical problems.
CONCLUSION
The accident occurred because the victim trammed the scoop he was operating into an area of unsupported roof while attempting to clean fallen roof material from the area. The area of roof was known to be adverse and the unsupported roof was posted with a readily visible warning device.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
1. Section 103(k) Order No. 2963382 issued March 14, 2001: The mine has experienced a fatal roof fall accident on the 001-0 active section in the rooms right off East Mains. This order is issued to insure the safety of any person in the coal mine until an examination or investigation is made to determine that the 001-0 active section area is safe. Only those persons selected from company officials, state officials, the miner's representative and other people deemed by MSHA to have information relevant to the investigation may enter or remain in the affected area.
2. Section 104(d)(1) Citation No. 7306091, a violation of 30 CFR 75.202(b) issued March 19, 2001: On March 14, 2001, Johnny Adkins, Foreman and Preshift Examiner, was fatally injured when he trammed an S & S Model 482 scoop tractor (serial number not available) into an area of unsupported roof located in the No. 3 Room (numbered R to L) right crosscut of the 001-0 MMU. Adkins was in the process of removing roof rock that had fallen to the mine floor in the unsupported area of the crosscut. Just prior to the accident at 6:10 a.m. on March 14, Adkins had pushed one scoop width of rock along the inby ribline and was in the process of pushing rock along the outby ribline at the time of the roof fall. The most inby lever of the operator's controls was located 6 feet 9 inches inby the last row of permanent supports when the roof fall occurred, fatally injuring Mr. Adkins. This condition was observed during a fatal roof fall accident investigation which began on March 14, 2001. Additionally, evidence indicates that on the afternoon of the previous shift (March 13, 2001), while operating a Joy 14CM5 Continuous Mining Machine with the onboard controls, Serial Number JM3670, the victim positioned himself 5.5 feet inby the last row of permanent supports when connecting the No. 3 Room right crosscut (accident scene) into the No. 2 Room.
3. Section 104(d)(1) Order No. 7306093, a violation of 30 CFR 75.360(a)(1) issued March 19, 2001: An inadequate and incomplete preshift examination was conducted at this mine by Johnny Adkins, Foreman and Preshift Examiner, for the day shift of March 14, 2001. This contributed to fatal injuries to Mr. Adkins this date since no examination, record or corrective action was undertaken in the working places of the working section. This was an area of known inferior roof conditions. An adequate examination of the roof in the unsupported area of No. 3 Room right crosscut (accident scene) would have revealed the adverse roof conditions which led to the fatality. Testimony indicated that adverse roof conditions existed prior to the continuous mining machine cut being completed on March 13, 2001, the shift prior to the accident. The preshift examination was also deficient in the following respects: 1) Mr. Adkins had two uncertified miners accompany him during his preshift examination and the three began working prior to an examination being completed, 2) The working places of the working section, (including the No. 3 Room driven right off the East Mains, the accident scene), and seals on the intake side of the anticipated new working section where equipment was to be moved that shift, were not examined prior to commencing work, 3) No dates, times or initials were present in the areas required to be examined except for a single location just inby the intake drift opening, and 4) No record of the examination results was made prior to persons entering the mine and beginning work. An adequate preshift examination would have revealed the loose broken roof along the intake travelway which was in need of scaling, the areas along the intake travelway in need of resupporting, as well as the adverse roof in the accident area. The preceding facts were ascertained through testimony given and physical evidence observed during a fatal roof fall accident investigation which began March 14, 2001, the day of the accident.
Sketch of Accident Site
Sketch of East Mains
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB01C03
APPENDIX A
List of persons providing information and/or present during the investigation:
BASIC MINING CORP. - MANAGEMENT
Paul Lowe ............... PresidentBASIC MINING CORP. - LABOR
Shane Branham ............... Roof Bolting Machine OperatorRAPOCA ENERGY COMPANY
Albert Cook ............... Scoop Operator
Willard Hurley ............... Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Chris Keen ............... Outside Man
Keith Lane ............... Beltman
Richard Nowlin ............... Mechanic
Andrew Rife ............... Shuttle Car Operator
Tim Tweed ............... General Inside Laborer
Richard Urbanowski ............... Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Terry Vandyke ............... Shuttle Car Operator
Chris Viers ............... Electrician
Elliott Viers ............... General Inside Laborer
Paul Witt ............... Continuous Mining Machine Helper
Larry Dickey ............... Safety DirectorVIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF MINES, MINERALS, AND ENERGY
Frank Linkous ............... ChiefMINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
Sammy Fleming ............... Mine Inspector
Carroll Green ............... Mine Inspector Supervisor
Danny Mann ............... Mine Inspector
Daniel Perkins ............... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
Dwight Miller ............... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
Robert Garrett ............... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
Doyle Roberts ............... Roof Control Technical Specialist
Philmore Skorupa ............... Mine Inspector
Ray McKinney ............... District Manager, District 5MSHA - PITTSBURGH SAFETY AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGY CENTER
Wayland M. Jessee ............... Assistant District Manager, Inspection Division
James W. Poynter ............... Conference Litigation Representative
James Hackworth ............... Education Field Services Specialist
Gary W. Jessee ............... Coal Mine Safety and Health Specialist (Roof Control)
Roy D. Davidson ............... Electrical Engineer
Russell A. Dresch ............... Electrical Engineer
David N. Woodward ............... Mining Engineer
Arnold D. Carico ............... Mining Engineer
Paul L. Tyrna ............... Mining EngineerLIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED
William J. Gray ............... Mining Engineer
Paul Lowe ............... President, Basic Mining Corp.
Shane Branham ............... Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Albert Cook ............... Scoop Operator
Willard Hurley ............... Continuous Mining Machine Operator
Chris Keen ............... Outside Man
Keith Lane ............... Beltman
Richard Nowlin ............... Mechanic
Andrew Rife ............... Shuttle Car Operator
Tim Tweed ............... General Inside Laborer
Richard Urbanowski ............... Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Terry Vandyke ............... Shuttle Car Operator
Chris Viers ............... Electrician
Elliott Viers ............... General Inside Laborer
Paul Witt ............... Continuous Mining Machine Helper