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January 28, 2002


Island Creek Coal Company
VP 8 (I.D. 44-03795)
Mavisdale, Buchanan County, Virginia

Accident Investigator

Arnold D. Carico
Mining Engineer

Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 5
P.O. Box 560, Wise County Plaza, Norton, Virginia 24273
Ray McKinney, District Manager

RELEASE DATE: June 20, 2002


On Monday, January 28, 2002, the clean coal filter drain pump exploded due to pressure buildup within the pump. The explosion inflicted fatal injuries to Fred R. Hess, a 54-year-old Fine Coal Operator at the Deskins Preparation Plant, a part of the VP 8 underground coal mine. The victim was standing approximately eight (8) feet away at the on/off switch when the pump access cover plate struck him. The pump became overheated when the water content in the pumped medium decreased. This decrease in water content caused a consequent rise in the specific gravity of the pumped medium and decreased pump performance. The discharge line subsequently became clogged with coal fines causing the pump to become a closed pressure vessel.

The accident occurred when pressure within the pump body eventually developed to the extent that the pump exploded. The pressure developed because the pump continued to be operated for up to 35 minutes after the discharge line to the pump became clogged. The coal slurry within the pump body was consequently agitated and heated, resulting in the pressure buildup. The presence of welds at the pump access cover attachment points materially contributed to the mode and potentially the timing of the pump failure.


Island Creek Coal Company's VP 8 mine is located three miles south of Oakwood on State Route 624 in Buchanan County, Virginia. Island Creek Coal Company was purchased by Consolidation Coal Company in 1993 and is presently a subsidiary of Consolidation Coal Company. The VP 8 mine was formed in 1994 by the interconnection of the Garden Creek Pocahontas Company's (a subsidiary of Island Creek Coal Company) Virginia Pocahontas 6 Mine (ID No. 44-04517) and Island Creek Coal Company's Virginia Pocahontas 5 Mine (ID 44-03795), each of which had its own preparation plant. The VP 8 mine retained ID No. 44-03795 and both preparation plants were kept operational. The mine is opened into the Pocahontas No. 3 coalbed that averages 70 inches in thickness. Ventilation is provided by four fans exhausting 2,370,000 cubic feet of air per minute at .27 percent methane (9,102,000 cubic feet of methane per day).

Employment is provided for 229 underground and 63 surface employees. The mine operates three shifts per day, seven days per week, producing an average of 9,798 raw tons of coal per day from two mechanized mining units and a longwall mining unit. Both trolley and diesel powered track haulage are used to transport personnel and materials to and from the underground areas of the mine. Coal is transported to the bottom of two production shafts via belt conveyors. It is then transported to the surface by hoist driven skip cars where it is cleaned at two preparation facilities. The Deskins Preparation Plant employs 24 persons on three production shifts per day, five or six days per week. Communications within the plants are by hand held two-way radios and these communications can be monitored by anyone with a radio. The Deskins Plant was originally attached to the Virginia Pocahontas 5 Mine and was the site of the fatal accident.

Consol Energy, located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, is the parent company of Consolidation Coal Company. The principal management officials in charge at the time of the accident were:
Mine Superintendent .......... Stephen D. Williams
Principal Officer of Health and Safety .......... Stephen D. Williams
General Plant Foreman (Deskins) .......... Steven Carter
Shift Foreman .......... Michael Aldridge
The mine address is Drawer L, Oakwood, VA 24631. The corporate address is 1800 Washington Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15241.

The last regular Safety and Health Inspection (AAA) was completed on December 31, 2001; however, due to the size of the mine, a regular safety inspection is continuously ongoing.

The latest NFDL (non-fatal days lost) national injury frequency rate for underground mines (which also includes both the underground areas and the surface work areas of underground mines) was 6.61 and the rate for this mine was 8.00.


On January 28, 2002, the afternoon shift (3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) for Deskins Preparation Plant began their shift performing maintenance work under the supervision of Michael Aldridge, Evening Shift Foreman. The plant had been idled since Saturday evening, January 26, and production was not scheduled until approximately mid-shift, since the Garden Preparation Plant was also available for coal preparation. Coal spillage at the bottom of A Shaft (skip shaft) was also delaying skipping coal to the Deskins Plant. Fred Reedy, Preparation Plant Operator and Fred Hess, Fine Coal Operator and victim, were assigned to replace a section of grating along the No. 18 Belt walkway. This assignment entailed cutting away the old grating and welding new into place. They finished this job and took their lunch break at approximately 7:00 P.M. Tommy O'Quinn, Tipple Utility, was instructed to clean the No. 18 Belt tube enclosure just above the location where Reedy and Hess were to be working. After completing this task, O'Quinn was assigned to assist Kenneth Hess, AC Electrician and Hoisting Engineer, and Christopher Lester, Preparation Plant Mechanic, in repairing and replacing a belt guard around the No.7 Belt counter weight. Kenneth Hess was later assigned to manually operate the skip hoist while work was being done at the shaft bottom to free the hoist ropes from spilled coal. Dana Gilbert, Construction Foreman and Emergency Medical Technician/First Responder, was one of those persons working in the area of the skip shaft (A Shaft) bottom.

At approximately 7:30 P.M., Mr. Aldridge made the decision to begin production at the plant. Initially, the plant would use coal stored in the raw coal silo, and later use coal skipped through A Shaft. The crew began to assume their normal production stations and duties. Since the fine coal system must be started first, Fred Hess started the clean coal filter drain pump at approximately 7:45 P.M. from a switch located immediately adjacent to the pump. Starting the pump also entailed turning on the "packing water" which is forced around the pump drive shaft entrance gland to maintain a seal and to cool the shaft. This pump lifts the coal slurry from the first floor clean coal filter drain tank back to the two clean coal filter tanks located on the third floor. The filter tanks must be drained during each plant shut-down and then refilled at each start-up. The pump will normally empty the drain tank back to the third floor filter tanks in fifteen to twenty minutes.

Fred Hess proceeded to the second floor where he shut off the drain valves to the filter tanks, then on to the third floor where he began making adjustments to the fluid levels in the filter tanks. Most of the fluids for the initial filling of the filter tanks come from pumping of the first floor drain tank. The fluids from the drain tank can be observed flowing from the manifolds into the filter tanks. When the drain tank is empty as indicated by the stoppage of flow, the clean coal filter drain pump can be shut off from a switch on the third floor near the filter tanks. Final adjustments in the levels in the filter tanks are made from other sources such as the froth cells and the black water circuit. Maintaining the proper level of fluids in the filter tanks is critical to proper operation of the fine coal circuit, since the coal fines are removed by air vacuum within the submerged filters. Adequate vacuum is maintained solely by maintaining the proper level of fluids in the filter tanks.

Reedy began his normal duties at the plant operator's station, which is located between the 6th and 7th floors (6� floor). Since the rest of the plant cannot begin production until the fine coal circuit is operational, Reedy was awaiting word from Fred Hess to begin normal coal feed to the plant. Upon receiving word from Fred Hess that the fine coal circuit was ready, he began starting the remainder of the plant. When the vacuum was turned on for the filters, Reedy noted that the vacuum was low indicating that the filters were not adequately sealed and notified Hess of this fact. Hess began making adjustment to bring the fluids levels up so that the filters would seal and thus allow the vacuum to come up to a proper level.

Aldridge, following his normal routine, began the production start-up by walking through the plant beginning at the top floor and proceeding to the bottom floor. O'Quinn began by walking through the plant from the bottom floor to the top to assess what areas were in need of cleaning. O'Quinn ended up in the operator's control room on the 6� floor along with Lester and Reedy, the plant operator. As Aldridge was completing his walk through on the first floor of the plant, he noticed the clean coal filter drain pump was apparently hot as evidenced by steam coming from the area of the pump drive shaft.

Aldridge radioed Fred Hess of the problem and Hess promptly came to the first floor. Hess walked toward the pump switch located eight feet away from the pump and directly in line with the pump volute's bolted-on access cover plate. Aldridge turned to leave the plant and was on the other side of the drain tank when, at approximately 8:35 P.M., he heard an explosion. He hurried back to where he had left Hess and saw him lying near a wall some 20 feet away from the switch. Aldridge immediately went to Hess and saw that he was injured. He radioed the plant operator that Hess was injured, to send help and to shut the plant down. Aldridge then had to move Hess approximately 10 feet away from the wall since black water was cascading down onto Hess.

Just prior to the accident, Reedy noted that the No. 18 Belt had shut off. When he checked as to the reason, he also noted that the black water pump was off, which could cause the No. 18 Belt to shut off, since they are interlocked. He restarted the black water pump and was then also able to restart the No. 18 Belt. This sequence is consistent with indications that Fred Hess mistakenly shut off the black water pump prior to shutting off the clean coal filter drain pump. Almost simultaneously with the restarting, the three men in the room heard a "pop" and assumed that the thermal dryer may have blown open. They then received the message from Aldridge concerning the accident. Reedy began an emergency shut down while Lester and O'Quinn went to the first floor to help.

When Lester and O'Quinn arrived at the accident scene, Aldridge was kneeling beside Hess and supporting his head. Aldridge instructed Lester to get a stretcher from the lunch/waiting room area, which he proceeded to do. Lester met Kenneth Hess in the lunch/waiting room. Kenneth Hess retrieved a long back board while Lester called the dispatcher and instructed him to call an ambulance and to summon an Emergency Medical Technician. Aldridge and O'Quinn removed the victim's belt and O'Quinn went to the lunch/waiting room to get something to put under the victim's head. After doing this, O'Quinn took a vehicle to "B" Shaft (elevator shaft) to pick up Dana Gilbert, First Responder, who had been contacted and was on his way to the surface. Kenneth Hess took the long back board to Aldridge, where he, Aldridge, and two other employees (who had just arrived on the scene from the loadout area) prepared to load the victim onto the back board. As they were doing this, Lester noted that the victim's left leg was not in a normal position and warned the others that his leg may be broken. Lester stated that up to this time he had thought the victim was only knocked unconscious. As they loaded the victim onto the back board, the victim's shirt fell open and Lester noted the circular imprint of the pump access cover plate on his lower left abdomen, at which time he knew the victim was seriously injured. They completed loading the victim onto the back board and carried him to the lunch/waiting room. A short time later, O'Quinn and Gilbert arrived on the scene. Gilbert checked the victim and stated that he had a pulse, was having difficulty breathing, and that no excessive bleeding was evident. Gilbert then administered oxygen and continued monitoring his pulse and respiration. After the accident, the victim was never verbally responsive.

Dismal River Volunteer Rescue Squad, Inc. arrived at approximately 9:00 P.M., briefly checked the victim, loaded him into the ambulance and left at approximately 9:05 P.M. The ambulance arrived at Buchanan General Hospital at approximately 9:30 P.M. where the victim was examined and pronounced dead by Dr. J. Segen, Buchanan County Coroner. The body was transported to the Virginia Medical Examiner's facility in Roanoke, VA for an autopsy.


Mike Canada of the company's safety department notified Charlie Walls, MSHA Coal Mine Inspection Supervisor, of the accident at 9:20 P.M. Canada stated that the severity of the accident was not known at that time. Walls then called Wayland Jessee, Assistant District Manager, Inspection Division and notified him of the accident. At approximately 10:30 P.M., Walls was notified that the accident had resulted in the death of Fred Hess. At 10:40 P.M. Walls notified Jessee of the fatality. Walls and John Griffith, Coal Mine Inspector, were dispatched to the mine. They issued a closure order under Section 103(k) of the Mine Act for the preparation plant to insure the health and safety of persons at the plant until the investigation of the accident could be completed. They observed the accident scene, assured that the accident scene was secured and gathered preliminary information related to the accident. Officials from the company, MSHA and VDMM&E met in the early morning hours and arranged for the investigation to continue at the site that same morning.

The accident investigation team members were designated and the investigation continued the morning of January 29. The accident scene was inspected and a scaled drawing, photographs, and a video made. A spot inspection (CAA) was conducted concurrently with the investigation to address any enforcement issues not related to the fatality. Joint interviews were conducted with the VDMM&E of three supervisory and five hourly employees on January 29 and 30 at the company's training facility. Preliminary findings indicated that there might be other pumps that could operate under similar conditions. The company was therefore required to generate an action plan to address methods for elimination of any such related hazards prior to returning the plant to production.


1. The Deskins Preparation Plant is one of two plants that are part of the VP 8 mine complex. Because of this, the plant is operated on an "as needed" basis rather than continuously.

2. During plant shut-downs, the clean coal filter tanks (located on the third floor of the plant) are drained to a clean coal filter drain tank (located on the first floor). During a plant start-up, the Fine Coal Operator begins the process by starting the clean coal filter drain pump from a switch located on the first floor in order to transport the coal slurry back to the clean coal filter tanks. As a part of the pump starting procedure, water is started flowing into the pump's packing gland ("packing water") where the pump drive shaft enters the pump housing. This water provides for both sealing and cooling of the shaft. The Fine Coal Operator next proceeds to the second floor where he shuts off the drain valves for the clean coal filter tanks, thus allowing them to begin to fill. He then proceeds to the third floor where he begins the process of adjusting the fluid level in the clean coal filter tanks. The discharge from the first floor clean coal filter pump into the third floor filter tanks can be observed from this location. The drain tank can normally be emptied in 15 to 20 minutes. The Fine Coal Operator must visually note that flow from the pump has ceased and then shut the pump off with a second switch located near the clean coal filter tanks. According to witness statements, the clean coal filter pump was started at 7:45 P.M.

3. Statements made during interviews indicated that during normal operations, some of the "packing water" will enter the pump volute and during pump shut-down, a surge of water may enter the pump. During the investigation, it was noted that almost all the "packing water" was flowing into the volute and was exiting through the volute access opening. This water, in addition to any which may have already been present in the pump, was the source of the water for the eventual pressure buildup.

4. Emptying the drain tank of pumpable fluids leaves the tank approximately 1/3 full of coal fines. If additional material is needed to fill the clean coal filter tanks, it is normally obtained from other sources but may be obtained from the clean coal filter drain tank. This is accomplished by introducing fresh water from the 2-inch water line connected to the pump inlet line. Failure to shut the pump off after all fluids are removed from the drain tank or failure to introduce water into the pump intake line (purge water) will result in the pump drawing a higher specific gravity coal fines slurry into the pump. This will result in reduced pump efficiency, eventual pump overheating and possible plugging of the discharge line.

5. In approximately 1990 at this facility, the floor sump pump discharge became plugged, the pump overheated, and exploded. Soon after, several of the pump volutes (outer metal housings), including the floor sump pump were equipped with Resistive Thermal Devices (RTDs). These devices give a variable current output depending upon the temperature sensed. RTDs, in conjunction with Program Logic Controllers (PLCs), were used to monitor the pump volute temperatures. They were programmed to give an alarm at the plant operator's station at a temperature of 120� F and interrupt the circuit at 150� F. (These settings were determined during the investigation.) Although no one interviewed during the investigation was involved in the decision as to which pumps to monitor, it was mine management's decision at that time not to equip this pump with thermal protection. It was conjectured by present mine management that this decision may have been based upon the facts that the clean coal filter drain pump is used only intermittently (during plant start-ups) and then only for only a short time frame.

6. Except for the fine coal start-up procedures, almost all the plant operations, including pump operations, are controlled from the plant operator's station on the 6� floor. Switches on the first and third floors are the only controls for the clean coal filter drain pump. Some pumps, including the black water pump, have dual controls both near the pump and at the plant operator's station. Many of the continuous plant functions are interlocked to automatically disengage upstream functions should any part of the system cease to operate, thus assuring that downstream systems are not overloaded.

7. At approximately 8:30 P.M., Michael Aldridge was completing his "walk through" of the plant as the plant was being started when he observed that the clean coal filter drain pump was hot as evidenced by steam coming from the pump drive shaft area. He radioed Fred Hess of the problem and instructed him to check the pump. Hess showed up at the first floor location a minute or so later and proceeded toward the pump. At approximately 8:35 P.M. Aldridge turned to leave. He had only reached the other side of the drain tank when he heard the pump explode. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident.

8. The first floor switch for the clean coal filter drain pump is located beside a switch for the black water pump on a column approximately 8 feet away from the pump. When observed during the investigation, the pump switch labels had been wiped clean and the clean coal filter drain pump switch was in the "off" position. A statement given during interviews indicated that these conditions were also observed by one of the workers immediately after the accident. Assuming the victim had mistakenly de-energized the black water pump, he would have noted that the clean coal filter drain pump did not stop and then have cleaned the labels. Upon realizing his mistake, he then de-energized the clean coal filter drain pump. This would explain the noted de-energizing of the black water pump and the interlocked No. 18 Belt just prior to the accident.

9. The pump volute has an access cover plate that measured 19 � inches in diameter by 7/8 inch thick and was held in place by eight � inch carriage bolts. Statements given during the interviews indicated that one of the bolts near the bottom of the volute might not have been in place due to a damaged lug. After the accident, it was noted that five of the eight bolt mounting lugs on the volute were broken to varying degrees and three of the eight bolt mounting slots on the pump access cover plate were broken. Subsequent laboratory testing revealed a higher level of corrosion for the fracture surface of the broken lug at the 5 o'clock position.

10. When checked after the accident, the clean coal filter drain pump discharge line was stopped solid with coal fines. It was stated during interviews that it is a common practice to "back flush" lines such as these when they become clogged. This is accomplished by shutting the pump off and allowing the head of fluid above the pump to flow backward through the pump. This "back flushing" could be ascertained by noting the pump shaft revolving backward after the pump was shut off. This may be what the victim was attempting at the time of the accident if he was still in need of material for the clean coal filter tanks.

11. Evidence indicates that the victim was probably standing with his right hand near the pump switch while observing the pump when the pump exploded. Medical records indicate that the victim suffered multiple blunt force injuries to the left lower chest/hip area that resulted in his death. The medical examiner's report stated that a circular impression was present on this area of his body. This impression was consistent with the size and shape of the inner face of the pump access cover plate. The pump access cover plate and the victim came to rest approximately 20 feet from the pump switch and approximately 8 feet apart.

12. The manufacturer of the pump could not be ascertained. The original construction specification for Unit No. 71 (clean coal filter drain pump) was for a Goyne Model #491-61. Goyne is now a division of Gould Pumps of ITT Industries. The pump had foundry markings consistent with having been manufactured at the Thomas Foundry in Birmingham, AL. Thomas Pumps was later bought by Denver Pump Company of Colorado Springs, CO. which was subsequently bought by Metso Mineral's Svedala Pump Division. At some point, Metso reportedly sold this particular line of pumps, including the castings, to Gould/Goyne.

13. According to company representatives, all pump repairs that require welding are contracted. Tracking of units for company record keeping is accomplished by affixing a (permanent) identifying tag to the equipment. No identifying tag was found attached to this pump unit; therefore no record of contracted repairs was available. Statements made during the investigation indicated that this pump unit was last changed out approximately four years ago.

14. Thermodynamic heating calculations were performed which indicated that the pump would not have reached the pump's assumed proof pressure of 225 psi (150% of the 150 psi maximum operating pressure). The parameters used for the calculations were as follows:
1) The pump volute was full and contained 7.44 gallons of slurry mixture,
2) The slurry was a 50% mix by volume of coal fines (density of the coal fines was 1.41 g/cm3) and water resulting in a specific gravity of 1.21 and a specific heat of .59 Btu/(lb*�F),
3) The brake horsepower at a stall condition was 11 HP,
4) Packing gland water was introduced at 100 psi with half flowing into the pump volute as an initial condition,
5) The impeller housing clearance was .215 inches (.183 inches in excess of proper clearance, and
6) The pump ran in the stall condition from 15 to 30 minutes. These calculations indicate an internal pressure of no more than 167 psi would have been reached.
15. The pump access cover plate was designed to be held in place by eight bolts that fit into slots cast into the volute and cover plate. Witness statements indicated that at the time of the accident probably only seven of the bolts were in place. Strength analysis of the metal from similar bolts from the volute was performed. At yield, the metal exhibited characteristics consistent with an SAE Grade 2 bolt. Calculations were made using the following parameters:
1) A bolt pre-load of 75% of the bolt's proof load was used during installation,
2) This attachment configuration created an inelastic joint, and
3) When using a gasket, the total bolt force is approximately equal to the initial tightening load plus the external load. Assuming eight bolts were used for the attachment, the bolts would have yielded at a minimum of 223 psi internal pressure. Assuming seven bolts were used for the attachment, the bolts would have yielded at a minimum of 195 psi internal pressure.
16. After the pump failed, investigators observed five locations on the pump volute and three on the cover plate to be broken (See Item 9). Of the five broken locations on the volute, four involved locations that had been welded. Elemental analysis of the pump metal composition showed it to be a "white cast iron". This metal is considered to be unweldable according to the Metals Handbook, Volume 6-Welding, Brazing, and Soldering", 1993 edition. Visual and microstructural evaluations of the weld locations indicated the welds were involved in the failures of the lugs.


The accident occurred when the clean coal filter drain pump exploded due to heat and pressure buildup within the pump while the victim was standing approximately eight feet away at the on/off switch. The pump's access cover plate struck the victim, inflicting fatal injuries. The accident occurred because the discharge line to the pump became clogged while the pump continued to be operated. The coal slurry within the pump volute was consequently agitated and heated, resulting in a pressure buildup to the point the access cover plate was blown off.

The root cause of the accident was the company's failure to properly assess the hazards associated with overheated pumps and their failure to install thermal circuit interrupt devices on all pumps of similar duty when the first pump failed ten years ago. A secondary root cause was the presence of the welds at the volute cover attachment points that materially contributed to the mode and potentially the timing of the pump failure.


Section 103(k) Order No. 7306786 was issued January 29, 2002 and reads as follows: This mine has experienced a fatal machinery accident, on the first floor of the Deskins Preparation Plant. This order is issued to assure the safety of any person in the preparation plant area until an examination or investigation is made to determine that the preparation plant area is safe. Only those persons selected from company officials, state officials, the miner's representative, and other persons who are deemed by MSHA to have information relevant to the investigation may enter or remain in the affected area.

Section 104(a) Citation number 7322283 was issued June 19,2002 and reads as follows: The clean coal filter drain pump at the Deskins Preparation Plant was not maintained in safe operating condition. On January 28, 2002 this pump exploded due to heating and internal pressure buildup, causing the pump access cover to be blown from the pump body (volute). This cover struck and resulted in fatal injuries to Fred Hess, Fine Coal Operator. This pressure buildup resulted from the pump being operated for approximately 30 minutes after the clean coal filter drain tank was emptied of almost all liquids and the pump discharge line become plugged. The volute cover is normally secured using eight equally spaced bolts installed into slots cast into the volute and cover. Of five volute attachment locations which were found to be broken after the accident, four involved welds. The metal ("white cast iron") of which the pump is made is considered to be unweldable according to the Metals Handbook, Volume 6 "Welding, Brazing and Soldering", 1993 edition. Microstructural and visual examinations of the fracture locations show these failures were associated with the welds. As indicated by thermal heating calculations and calculations of the yield strength of the attachment bolts, the pump failed below its proof test pressure (150% of the maximum operating pressure). These factors significantly contributed to the pump failure, and thus the fatality.

On February 7, 2002, a Resistive Thermal Device and Program Logic Controller were installed on the replacement pump unit for the one involved in the accident. These devices cause a warning to be given at 120 degrees F and cause the circuit to be interrupted at 150 degrees F volute surface temperature. All other pumps which operate under similar conditions were fitted with these or undercurrent devices by 4/10/2002.

Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
Fatal Alert Bulletin Icon FAB02C03


List of persons providing information and/or present during the investigation:

Stephen D. Williams .......... Mine Superintendent
Steven Carter .......... General Plant Foreman
Michael Aldridge .......... Plant Foreman - Afternoon Shift
Dana Gilbert .......... Construction Foreman and Emergency
Medical Technician/First Responder
Elizabeth Chamberlin .......... Corporate Safety Director
Rick Marlowe .......... Corporate Safety Inspector
Bill Tolliver .......... Corporate Safety Inspector
Barry Dangerfield .......... Vice-President Group 2
Bill Fertall .......... Manager Engineering Group 2
Dave Berry .......... Safety Manager Group 2
Christopher Lester .......... Plant Mechanic - Afternoon Shift
Franklin Howard .......... Plant Mechanic - Day Shift
Fred Reedy .......... Plant Operator - Afternoon Shift
Tommy O'Quinn .......... Tipple Utility - Afternoon Shift
Kenneth Hess .......... Electrician - Afternoon Shift
Larry Breeding .......... Plant Operator/Elec. - Day Shift
Lonnie Alsbrook .......... Safety Committeeman
Bill Shelton .......... Safety Committeeman
Ralph Looney .......... Safety Committeeman
Max Kennedy .......... International Representative
Danny Sparks .......... Local President
Frank Linkous .......... Chief, Division of Mines
Opie McKinney .......... Mine Inspection Supervisor
Carroll Green .......... Mine Inspection Supervisor
Joseph Altizer .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Sammy Fleming .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Dwight Miller .......... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
Daniel Perkins .......... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
David Elswick .......... Coal Mine Technical Specialist
Ray McKinney .......... District Manager
Wayland Jessee .......... Assistant District Manager -Inspection Division
Roy D. Davidson .......... Inspection Supervisor
Charlie Walls .......... Inspection Supervisor
James W. Poynter .......... Conference and Litigation Representative
James R. Baker .......... Educational Field Services Specialist
Russell A. Dresch .......... Electrical Engineer
John S. Griffith .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Gary L. Roberts .......... Coal Mine Inspector
Dennis R. Belcher .......... Coal Mine Inspector
David N. Woodward .......... Mining Engineer
Arnold D. Carico .......... Mining Engineer
Terry F. Marshall .......... Mechanical Engineer
Steve Carter .......... General Plant Foreman
Michael Aldridge .......... Plant Foreman - Afternoon Shift
Dana Gilbert .......... Emergency Medical Technician/ First Responder
Fred Reedy .......... Plant Operator - Afternoon Shift
Franklin D. Howard .......... Plant Mechanic - Day Shift
Kenneth Hess .......... Electrician - Afternoon Shift
Christopher Lester .......... Plant Mechanic - Afternoon Shift
Tommy O'Quinn .......... Tipple Utility - Afternoon Shift