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Please Note: This report has been amended. For a list of changes, please see the PDF Version - (Contains All Graphics) and refer to the end of the table of contents. (03/02/2007)
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
AMENDED
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Underground Coal Mine
Fatal Roof Fall Accident
December 15, 2005
Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A
Arjay Mining, Inc.
Panther, McDowell County, West Virginia
ID No. 46-09106
Accident Investigators
James R Humphrey
Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Sherman L. Slaughter
Coal Mine Safety and Health Specialist
Jon Braenovich
Mining Engineer
Supervisory, Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector, Roof Control
Originating Office
Mine Safety and Health Administration
District 4
100 Bluestone Road
Mount Hope, West Virginia 25880
Robert G. Hardman, District Manager
OVERVIEW
At approximately 12:40 p.m. on Thursday, December 15, 2005, a 35-year old roof bolting machine operator with 11 years mining experience was fatally injured in a roof fall accident. The victim was preparing to install the first row of roof support in the first cut taken from a highwall for a new drift opening when the mine roof collapsed. In an effort to avoid the falling rock, the victim moved inby the machine's automated temporary roof support (ATRS) towards the face, where he was struck by the falling material.
The highwall was not developed in consolidated, competent rock for a height sufficient to insure stability above the mine openings. The ground control plan did not include any methods to be used to control the hazardous highwall conditions or precautions to be taken to keep persons from being exposed to the ground hazards. Hazardous conditions were uncorrected during numerous workplace examinations. The accident resulted from failure to follow proper mining practices, procedures, and the applicable regulations. The lack of effective administrative controls contributed to the accident.
GENERAL INFORMATION
The Arjay Mining, Inc., Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A, is located near Panther, in McDowell County, West Virginia. The mine operates in the Lower War Eagle bituminous coal seam which averages forty-eight inches in height. The mine was being developed with four drift openings, which were driven to a maximum depth of 60 feet in the number two and three entries.
At the time of the accident, the mine employed six persons and operated during the day shift only. Coal was mined with a remotely operated continuous mining machine, which loaded into shuttle cars. Roof bolting was accomplished utilizing a Fletcher DDO-15 roof bolting machine, equipped with a scissors type ATRS. Mining operations began Monday, December 12, 2005.
The mine operator, Arjay Mining, Inc., was contracted by Riverside Energy Company, LLC to mine the Lower War Eagle bituminous coal seam at the Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A. Engineering services, including highwall and mine bench design, site development, and regulatory plan submittals, were provided by Riverside Energy Company, LLC.
The principal officers for Arjay Mining, Inc., at the time of the accident were:
Michael Tolbert .......... Owner/PresidentThe principal officers for Riverside Energy Company, LLC at the time of the accident were:
O. A. Stump, Jr. .......... Superintendent/Lessee of the equipment
J. C. Woodridge .......... Mine Foreman
Sam Hatcher .......... PresidentThe Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) had not conducted an inspection of the Adkins Branch Mine prior to the accident. On Tuesday, December 6, 2005, Arjay Mining, Inc., submitted a letter to MSHA placing the mine in an active non-producing status. On Wednesday, December 14, 2005, one day prior to the accident, Arjay Mining, Inc., submitted a letter to MSHA changing the mine status to active-producing. The letter did not indicate that production had already begun on December 12; rather, it indicated that the mine would begin production on December 14 or 15.
Robbie Ortiz .......... Mining Engineer
DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT
On December 15, 2005, the working shift began at 07:00 a.m. Denny J. East and Johnny Gorsky, roof bolting machine operators, moved the roof bolting machine into the face of the #2 entry and installed four fully grouted resin roof bolts and a metal strap to complete the roof bolting in the entry. Roger Sexton, electrician, and J. C. Woolridge, Mine Foreman, moved the continuous mining machine and began mining the first cut from the highwall for the number one entry. Coal from the number one entry was loaded into the bucket of a front end loader which was being operated by O. A. Stump Jr., lessee of the mining equipment. East and Gorsky moved the roof bolting machine from the number two entry to the number three entry and installed four rows of roof bolts with straps.
The roof bolting machine was then moved in an outby direction in the number three entry and parked immediately inby the edge of the highwall, to keep it out of the rain. Sexton completed mining the number one entry, advancing the working face approximately ten feet. The continuous mining machine was then withdrawn and a pre-constructed canopy was installed. Flat sheet metal was placed on top of the pre-constructed canopy by Ricky Johnson, trainee-general outside laborer. The flat sheet metal was not secured to the top of the canopy. Upon completion of the canopy installation, Sexton, Johnson, and Woolridge went to the mine office trailer to eat lunch while East and Gorsky bolted the unsupported mine roof of the number one entry.
Stump drove the front-end loader back to a nearby mine from where it had previously been borrowed. East moved the roof bolting machine into the number one entry and set the ATRS against the mine roof. However, the roof bolting machine was too far forward, so East lowered the ATRS and backed the machine several feet outby. East and Gorsky retrieved a metal roof strap from the rear of the roof bolting machine and placed it over the protective canopies. Gorsky and East raised the canopies to support the metal strap against the mine roof to better hold the strap in place during installation.
At approximately 12:40 p.m. Gorsky turned his back toward the working face to retrieve a piece of drill steel from the drill station tray, and heard the mine roof collapsing behind him. Gorsky yelled to warn East and ran outby as roof rock continued to fall. Gorsky stopped at the rear of the roof bolting machine. He looked back toward the face and saw East's leg protruding from beneath the fallen roof rock. East was lying on the mine floor between the roof bolting machine's ATRS and the working face. Portions of the mine roof continued to fall as Gorsky ran to the mine office trailer to retrieve help.
Sexton and Gorsky returned to the number one entry as Woolridge traveled from the mine bench, along the mine haulage road to another mine site to get Stump and to call for an ambulance. The only communication system from the mine to the nearest point of medical assistance was a cellular telephone which was located in Stump's personal pickup truck, located at the other mine site.
An excavator from another work site was brought to the accident site and used to pull the roof bolting machine out of the working place, to remove the installed canopy and to remove the fallen roof rock. The victim was recovered at approximately 6:00 p.m. and transported via McDowell County Ambulance Service. The McDowell County Medical Examiner pronounced the time and cause of death at the accident site. The victim was taken to the State Medical Examiner located at Charleston, West Virginia.
INVESTIGATION OF THE ACCIDENT
On Thursday, December 15, 2005, at 1:45 p.m. Jules Gautier, Supervisory Mine Safety and Health Inspector, MSHA Pineville Field Office, was notified of the accident. MSHA accident investigators were immediately dispatched to the mine. A 103(k) order was issued to insure the safety of all persons at the mine. The investigation was conducted in cooperation with MSHA Technical Support personnel, the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety, and Training (WVOMHST), with the assistance of the mine operator and mine employees. Persons who participated in the accident investigation can be found in Appendix A. Photographs and relevant measurements were taken, the accident site was surveyed and drawings were made. Interviews were conducted the evening of December 15, 2006 and continued the following day at the MSHA, Pineville Field Office. Seven persons, who had knowledge relevant to the accident, were interviewed.
DISCUSSION
Mine Planning and Development
On May 31, 2005, Riverside Energy Company, LLC submitted to MSHA a request for a mine identification number for the purpose of opening the Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A. Riverside Energy Company submitted a ground control plan and T & S Contractors Inc. was hired to perform earthwork activities for the initial development of the mine site.
Excavation of the mine access road, mine bench and development of the highwall began on June 1, 2005, by T & S Contractors Inc. under the direct supervision of Riverside Energy Company, LLC. The work was supervised by Dave Dalton, Supervisor for Riverside Energy Company, LLC. The site development was completed on August 18, 2005. During the mine site development, Riverside Energy Company, exercised full control over the design and construction of the mine bench, highwall and side slopes, and the mine access road.
In August 2005, Riverside Energy Company contacted Marco Mining, Inc. to operate the new mine. Kenneth Coe, President of Marco Mining examined the highwall, bench, and surroundings area of the projected mine site. Coe was concerned with the narrow mine bench. The projected mine portals were marked off by the land owner, Riverside Energy Company, LLC, to indicate the location where mining operations were to begin. Coe, in a meeting with Sam Hatcher, President of Riverside Energy Company, Inc., asked Hatcher to redevelop the bench and highwall to give him more working room on the bench, but Hatcher declined his request. Although Coe decided not to pursue mining efforts at this site, some initial plans were submitted to MSHA at this time.
In September 2005, O. A. Stump Jr., lessee of the mining equipment leased by Arjay Mining, Inc., traveled to the mine face-up and met with Hatcher and Robbie Ortiz, Mining Engineer for Riverside Energy Company, LLC, to discuss the operation of the new mine. Due to the outcome of the meeting, Michael Tolbert, President of Arjay Mining, Inc., signed a contract with Riverside Energy Company, LLC to operate the mine.
Robbie Ortiz of Riverside Energy Company, LLC was given authorization as an agent for Arjay Mining to submit and sign any documents pertaining to Arjay Mining, Inc., in a letter submitted to MSHA concerning the ground control, roof control, training, and ventilation plans. Ortiz submitted a letter on behalf of Arjay Mining, Inc. to MSHA requesting to adopt the approved plans previously issued to the mine under Marco Mining, Inc.
During the month of November 2005, Tolbert and Stump began moving mining equipment to the Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A mine site. On November 30, 2005, Stump hired three employees, J. C. Woolridge, Mine Foreman; Roger Sexton, electrician; and Ricky Johnson, trainee-general outside laborer. The same day, all mining equipment, a substation, a parts trailer, and an office trailer had arrived on the mine site. The three employees and Stump performed maintenance work on the mining equipment located on the mine bench for seven working days from November 30, 2005 to December 9, 2005.
On December 12, 2005, Stump informed Woolridge that he had received an approval letter from MSHA concerning the roof control, ventilation, and training plan. Stump informed Woolridge that the mining would start on December 12, 2005. By the end of the day, mine openings had been developed. Mining continued, developing the numbers two through four entries during the next two days.
Plan Submittals
Michael Tolbert, President/Owner of Arjay Mining, Inc., signed a contract with Riverside Energy Company, LLC to mine the Lower War Eagle coal seam at the Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A. Tolbert submitted a letter to MSHA, received November 8, 2005, stating that Robbie Ortiz of Riverside Energy Company, LLC was authorized to sign any documents for Arjay Mining, Inc., concerning ground control, roof control, training and ventilation plans. An additional letter, signed by Robbie Ortiz, was received by MSHA which stated, "Arjay Mining, Inc., is requesting to adopt the approved plans issued to Marco Mining, Inc., Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A, MSHA ID No. 46-09106. We will be operating the mine under Arjay Mining, Inc., Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A." The plans adopted by Ortiz for the mine had not been read by Tolbert and Stump.
Ground Control Plan
Arjay Mining, Inc., did not establish and follow a ground control plan for the safe control of the highwall at this mine that was consistent with prudent engineering design and insured safe working conditions. Persons were allowed to work beneath an unstable highwall which consisted of weathered, jointed formations. The formations contained dirt and unconsolidated small rocks in the face of the highwall.
Roof Control Plan
A roof control plan was approved by MSHA for the Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A on December 8, 2005. The approved roof control plan required that "all unstable material shall be removed from the highwall above intended mine openings and areas between openings where miners travel or are required to perform work. A substantially constructed canopy shall be provided at all intended drift or slope openings before penetrating the coal seam." The loose, unconsolidated materials, comprised of dirt and rocks, were allowed to exist over and between the new mine openings. Substantially constructed canopies were not provided at the intended drift openings before the mine openings were created.
Workplace Examinations
A substation, a transformer, a parts trailer, an office trailer, and the mining equipment were on the mine site by November 30, 2005. Four employees of Arjay Mining worked at the mine bench from November 30, 2005, through December 9, 2005, excluding Saturday and Sunday, for a total of seven days. They performed maintenance work on the mining equipment on the bench of the highwall where the four mine portals were to be developed. During this time, persons were exposed to the dangerous highwall and ground conditions; however, there were no records of examination and no documentation of hazardous conditions for this period.
Woolridge conducted a preshift examination on December 12, 2005, from 6:30 a.m. to 6:40 a.m. The examination record indicated that the "travelway from office appears safe to travel." The preshift examination record was signed by J. C. Woolridge, as the examiner and was countersigned by J. C. Woolridge as the mine manager/mine foreman. The examination record did not indicate the condition of the unstable highwall.
The daily and on-shift examination record conducted by Woolridge on December 12, 2005, did not list any violations and other hazardous conditions. It did show that the working places were examined at approximately two-hour intervals and 0% methane was recorded. The record also included the remark, "Went over roof control plan with the bolt crew on spacing of bolts." Woolridge signed the on-shift examination record as the assistant mine foreman (examiner) and as the mine foreman-mine manager.
A preshift examination was conducted by Woolridge on December 13, 2005, of mechanized mining unit 001 (MMU-001) from 6:30 a.m. until 6:41 a.m. The examination record was illegible concerning the number two and number three mine entries beneath the sub-title, "Violations and Other Hazardous Conditions Observed and Reported." Under the sub-title, "Remarks," Woolridge reported that the faces were clear, no CH4 (methane) was detected, and self contained self rescuers (SCSRs) were checked. The condition of the highwall was not recorded. Woolridge signed as the examiner and countersigned as the Mine Foreman.
The daily and on-shift examination record for December 13, 2005, conducted by Woolridge was illegible under the sub-title, "Violations and Other Hazardous Conditions Observed and Reported." Also under the sub-title, "Examinations for Methane in Working Places", the record indicates 0% methane for the number two and three working places every two hours, starting at 7:15 a. m. The record does not indicate the hazardous condition of the unstable highwall.
On December 14, 2005, the preshift examination record was not legible under the sub-title, "Violations and Other Hazardous Conditions Observed and Reported." Beneath the sub-title, "Remarks," "Travel way across the yard appears safe to travel, no CH4 detected in #2 and #3, SCSR's were checked." The daily and on-shift examination record was also illegible under the sub-title "Violations and Other Hazardous Conditions Observed and Reported." Beneath the sub-title, "Examinations for Methane in Working Places," the number four working place was added to the examinations every two hours. Neither the preshift or on-shift examination record indicated the hazardous condition of the unstable highwall. The examinations were conducted by Woolridge.
On December 15, 2005, the day of the fatal accident, Woolridge reported on the preshift examination record that his examination was conducted from 6:05 a. m. to 6:29 a. m. Under the sub-title, "Violations and Other Hazardous Conditions Observed and Reported", Woolridge reported, "#2 partly bolted-danger off, #3 not bolted-danger off, #4 need bolt on left side-reported." The air reading at the fan was 72,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm). Woolridge reported beneath the sub-title "Remarks," "Roadway from office portal appears safe to travel, no CH4 detected in the faces." Woolridge signed as the examiner.
From December 12, 2005, through December 15, 2005, Woolridge conducted the preshift and on-shift examinations of the surface areas where the mine openings were to be started and of the highwall above the projected mine openings. However, the hazards of the unstable highwall and ground conditions were not reported, recorded or corrected. During the four day period, no hazardous conditions were reported in either the preshift or on-shift examination records.
Training
East began his employment at Adkins Branch Mine No. 1A on December 13, 2005. Training records indicated that Woolridge instructed him on newly employed experienced miner training, hazard training, and task training on the shuttle car, scoop, and roof bolting machine.
Gorsky, was hired by Stump on December 9, 2005. Training records showed Woolridge instructed him on experienced miner, hazard, and new task training on December 9, 2005. However, Gorsky did not receive newly employed experienced miner training before performing work, nor did he receive task training before performing roof bolting duties.
Woolridge, did not receive any training prior to performing work duties. Sexton's training records were up to date for newly employed experienced miner and hazard training.
Stump performed work duties at the mine site including, operating a shuttle car, hauling coal with a Joy shuttle car, operating a front-end loader, and roof bolting the mine roof. Stump did not receive any training before performing work at the mine site. In addition, Stump supervised employees and directed work assignments without any required training.
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
A root cause analysis was conducted to identify the most basic causes of the accident that were correctable through reasonable management controls. Listed below are root causes identified during the analysis and their corresponding corrective actions implemented to prevent a recurrence of the accident.
1. Root Cause: The operator did not adopt effective designs or procedures to ensure the stability of the highwall. Similarly, the operator's ground control plan did not include methods to control existing hazardous conditions or precautions to keep persons from being exposed to these ground hazards. The highwall was not developed in consolidated, competent rock for a height sufficient to insure stability above the mine openings. Some areas of the highwall had been developed in dirt, on a near vertical angle, and were not stable. A bench and a diversion ditch had been developed in dirt and unconsolidated material above the entries. The disturbed material from the ditch construction was left in place on the bank above the bench and highwall. Portions of the dirt bench had fallen to the floor of the mine bench.
The hazardous condition of the highwall created unsafe mine roof conditions in the mined entries.
Corrective Action: Arjay Mining, Inc., submitted a plan to safely remove all mining equipment from the mine site. Riverside Energy Company, LLC., current owner of the mine site, does not plan to pursue any further mining at this site and plans to reclaim it.
2. Root Cause: The operator did not have effective policies or procedures in place to ensure adequate examinations were conducted to identify and correct hazardous conditions. J. C. Woolridge, Mine Foreman, Preshift and On-Shift Examiner of the mine and work site, either did not recognize the hazardous conditions that were present during his examinations or chose to ignore them. From November 30, 2005, to December 9, 2005, as persons were performing maintenance work to the mining equipment on the mine bench, they were exposed to the dangerous highwall and ground conditions.
During the development of the four mine portals, from December 12, 2005 to December 15, 2005, Woolridge did not report the hazardous conditions that existed to persons while they were performing work at and near the unstable highwall. The hazardous conditions were not reported in the preshift/on-shift daily report record book.
Corrective Action: The hazardous conditions were discussed with the mine operator and Woolridge. The mine operator submitted a plan to safely remove all mining equipment from the mine site. Riverside Energy Company, LLC., current owner of the mine site, does not plan to pursue any further mining at this site and plans to reclaim the mine site.
CONCLUSION
The highwall used to access the underground mine was not developed in consolidated, competent rock for a height sufficient to insure stability above the mine openings. The ground control plan did not include methods to control the hazardous highwall conditions or precautions to be taken to keep persons from being exposed to the ground hazards. The hazardous condition of the highwall created unsafe mine roof conditions in the mined entries.
Mining conducted in the number one entry by Arjay Mining exposed weathered incompetent roof rock which fell during the initial installation of permanent roof supports in the mine entry. Additionally, the provided canopy installation was not sufficient to prevent injury to persons from the falling roof material. Hazardous conditions were either not recognized or ignored during numerous workplace examinations. The accident resulted from failure to follow proper mining practices, procedures, and applicable regulations. The lack of effective administrative controls contributed to the accident.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
1. A 103(k) order, No. 7247035 was issued to assure the safety of all persons at this operation until an investigation could be completed. The order prohibited all activity at the mine until MSHA determines that it is safe to resume normal mining operations in the affected area(s).
2. 104(d)(1) citation, No. 7247046 was issued to the mine operator, Arjay Mining, Inc., for a violation of 77.1000.
Condition or Practice: The operator did not establish and follow a ground control plan for the safe control of the highwall at the mine that was consistent with prudent engineering design and insured safe working conditions. The highwall above the Lower War Eagle coal seam constructed to face-up for the development of four entries to be used as portals for an underground mine was not developed in consolidated, competent rock for a height sufficient to insure stability above the mine openings. Some areas of the highwall had been developed in dirt, on a near vertical angle, and were not stable. A bench and a diversion ditch had been developed in dirt and unconsolidated material above the entries. The disturbed material from the ditch construction was left in place on the bank above the bench and highwall. The material was not stable. Portions of the dirt bench had fallen to the pit floor. Openings existed between the edge of the highwall and the canopies. The ground control plan for the mine dated November 8, 2005, did not include any methods to be used to control the above described conditions or precautions to be taken to keep persons from being exposed to these ground hazards.
O. A. Stump, Jr. was the person in charge of the mine site. Stump was the employer who hired all the employees, and directed the work force and mining operations on a daily basis. Stump was aware of the hazardous conditions of the underground mine face-up and the highwall which had been developed in dirt, on a near vertical angle and was not stable.
The hazardous condition of the highwall created an unsafe mine roof condition in the No. 1 entry where a fatal mining accident occurred on December 15, 2005.
3. 104(d)(1) order, No. 7247048 was issued to the mine operator, Arjay Mining, Inc., and to Mr. O.A. Stump, Jr., for a violation of 75.360(b)(3).
Condition or Practice: An inadequate preshift examination was performed at this mine site from December 12, 2005, through December 15, 2005. J. C. Woolridge, preshift examiner designated by the operator, did not identify, report, or correct the obvious hazards that existed to person performing work at and near the unstable highwall and to miners working inside the mine where the fatality occurred. No hazardous conditions were reported during the four-day period while the new mine openings were being created. Hazardous conditions did exist during this time period to persons working under and near the toe of highwall. The highwall above the bench was not developed in consolidated, competent rock. Some areas of the highwall had been developed in dirt, on a near vertical angle, and were not stable. A bench and diversion ditch had been developed in dirt and unconsolidated material above the entries where persons worked and traveled. The disturbed material from the ditch construction was left in place on the bank above the bench and highwall. The material was not stable. Portions of the dirt bench had fallen to the floor of the mine bench.
O.A. Stump, Jr., agent of the mine operator, was the person in charge for the mine site. Stump was the employer who hired all of the employees and directed the workforce and mining activities on a daily basis. Stump was aware of the hazardous conditions of the underground mine face-up and the highwall which had been developed in dirt, on a near vertical angle, and was not stable.
The hazardous condition of the highwall created an unsafe mine roof condition in the No. 1 entry where a fatal mining accident occurred on December 15, 2005.
4. 104(d)(1) order No. 7247049 was issued to the mine operator, Arjay Mining, Inc., and to Mr. O.A. Stump, Jr. for a violation of 75.362(a).
Condition or Practice: An adequate on-shift examination was not performed at this mine site from December 12, 2005, through December 15, 2005. J. C. Woolridge, on-shift examiner designated by the operator, did not identify, report, or correct the obvious hazards that existed to persons while performing work at and near the unstable highwall. No hazardous conditions were reported during the three days while the new mine openings were being created. Hazardous conditions did exist during this time period to persons working under and near the toe of the highwall. The highwall above the bench was not developed in consolidated, competent rock. Some areas of the highwall had been developed in dirt, on a near vertical angle, and were not stable. A bench and diversion ditch had been developed in dirt and unconsolidated material above the entries where persons worked and traveled. The disturbed material from the ditch construction was left in place on the bank above the bench and high wall. The material was not stable. Portions of the dirt bench had fallen to the pit floor of the newly created mine openings.
O. A. Stump, Jr., was the person in charge at the mine site. Stump was the employer who hired all the employees and directed the work force and mining activities on a daily basis. Stump was aware of the hazardous conditions of the underground mine face-up and the high wall which had been developed in dirt, on a near vertical angle, and was not stable.
The hazardous condition of the high wall created an unsafe mine roof condition in the no. 1 entry where a fatal mining accident occurred on December 15, 2005.
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB05C20
Fatality Overview: PowerPoint / PDF
APPENDIX A
List of persons furnishing information and/or present during the investigation:
Arjay Mining, Inc.
Michael Tolbert .......... Owner/PresidentMarco Mining, Inc.
O. A Stump .......... Superintendent
J. C. Woolridge .......... Mine Foreman
Donnie Coleman .......... Safety Consultant
Johnny Gorsky .......... Roof Bolting Machine Operator
Ricky Johnson .......... Outside General Laborer
Roger Sexton .......... Electrician/Mining Machine Operator
Kenneth Cole .......... PresidentT & S Contractors Inc.
Ted Blankenship .......... PresidentWest Virginia Office of Miner's Health, Safety and Training
Teford Belcher .......... Foreman
Jeff Glass .......... Foreman
Fred Stinson .......... Inspector-At-LargeMine Safety and Health Administration
Terry Farley .......... Accident Investigator
Bob Thornsbury .......... District Electrical Inspector
Jesse Cole .......... District Manager
James Humphrey .......... Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Roger Richmond .......... Supervisory Coal Mine Safety and Health Inspector
Sherman Slaughter .......... Mine Safety and Health Specialist
Jon Braenovich .......... Supervisory Mining Engineer/Roof Control
Donald Winston .......... Mining Engineer/Roof Control
Luther Marrs .......... Assistant District Manager