.....
UNITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR
MINE
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION
COAL
MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
REPORT
OF INVESTIGATION
Shaft
Construction for Underground Mine
Fatal Fall
of Persons
Frontier-Kemper
Constructors Inc. (A01)
at
Gibson
Mine
Gibson County
Coal
Princeton,
ID No.
12-02215
Accident
Investigators
Charles
H. Grace, P.E.
Assistant
District Manager, Technical Programs, District 7,
Michael
G. Kalich, CMSP
Senior Mining
Engineer, Headquarters Safety Division
J. Jarrod
Durig, P.E.
Civil
Engineer, Technical Support,
Michael
P. Snyder, P.E.
Mining
Engineer, Technical Support,
Kevin L.
Doan
Roof
Control and Ventilation Specialist, District 7
Originating
Office
Mine
Safety and Health Administration
Office
of the Administrator
Coal
Mine Safety and Health
Kevin G.
Stricklin, Administrator
At 10:43 a.m.
on Friday,
The accident
occurred when the three men were being lowered inside the sinking bucket into
the shaft to observe the bottom station concrete work...... A nylon sling and shackle attached to the
bottom of the sinking bucket lodged into a shaft collar door, thereby tipping
the sinking bucket...... This resulted in the
men falling from the bucket to the bottom of the shaft, a distance of
approimately 550 feet...... At the time of
the accident, the shaft had not yet been connected to the underground mine
workings.
The accident
occurred as a result of Frontier-Kemper's failure to ensure the hoist was under the control of the
hoistman at all times when persons were in the shaft...... The toplander was not at his station as the
bucket was being lowered through the shaft collar doors and the hoistman had no
visual contact with the bucket at this point...... The hoistman lost control of the bucket when the nylon sling and shackle
entangled with the shaft collar door...... The independent contractor also failed to ensure that adequate fall
protection was utilized while persons were transported in the sinking bucket.
.....
The principal officers for the mine
at the time of the accident were:
Gibson
.......... Jimmy
Allen Brown. Superintendent
.......... Mark
David Kitchen. Director,
Health & Safety
Frontier
Kemper Constructors, Inc.
.......... Galyn
Rippentrop. President
and CEO
.......... Christopher
T. Richardson Mine Development
Division Manager ..........
.......... George Zugel Corporate
Safety Director
Prior to the
accident, the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) completed the last
regular safety and health inspection of the Gibson Mine on
The Gibson Mine
Main Portal is located approimately 2 miles north of
The North
Portal 2 Shaft Sinking Project is operated by Frontier-Kemper Constructors,
Inc., a subsidiary of Deilmann-Haniel International Mining and Tunneling GmbH,
Crew A, led
by George Foster, Walker Boss, began work as usual at 8:00 a.m. on the day of
the accident...... Foster, Greg Clevidence (Miner/Driller),
Chris Girten (Mucker Operator), Daren Stout (Miner/Driller), Jerry Rhodes, Jr. (Miner/Driller),
and Cody Robinson (Miner/Driller) entered the shaft shortly after starting
time. The scheduled work in the shaft that day was to 'spade tights,� which
involved manually removing rock from the shaft wall that protruded ecessively
into the concrete pour area and to otherwise prepare for a concrete pour...... Work proceeded normally, with 2 pieces of 6-inch angle iron being called
for and subsequently lowered in a bucket, using a nylon sling and shackle
attached to the bottom of the sinking bucket. (See Ehibit 1)..... Cody Robinson exited the shaft at
approimately 10:30 a.m. to drop off some parts.
On the
surface, Jarred Ashmore, Project Engineer, was assisting and supervising Frank
Peavler, Parts Runner, and Cliff Schass, Electrician, in building forms for two
work deck hoist platforms...... This was
being done in preparation for splitting the work decks to construct the curtain
wall from the shaft bottom to the collar, since the shaft had reached its
approimate designed depth.
On the
day of the accident, Frontier-Kemper was celebrating the 100th Anniversary
of Kemper Construction Company and had several guests from their
Charles
(Chuck) Crandell, Hoistman, began lowering the bucket...... He stated he saw the hoist rope move in an
unusual manner and stopped the hoist...... He
net called Splittorff and asked him to look and see if anything was
wrong...... At the same time, John Branson,
Master Mechanic, and Robinson reportedly heard a clang and saw the ropes
slackening or 'shaking� and ran to the shaft collar...... Branson then went in the freeze cellar to get
a better view of the bucket and saw that the bucket was inverted and empty...... On the work deck, approimately 570 feet below
the collar, Foster and Girten reportedly saw objects falling and moved to
protected positions...... They net heard an
impact noise on the work deck...... They
moved from their separate positions behind the concrete forms and saw that
Ashmore was lying on the work deck......
Kyle
Wooten, Project Manager, and Rhodes subsequently traveled to the shaft bottom
so Wooten could verify the victims' conditions...... They located the third victim (Richardson) who was on the shaft bottom
net to the concrete forms and shaft wall......
George Zugel,
Corporate Safety Director, notified the MSHA call center of the accident at
10:53 a.m. CDT...... Jeff Williams, MSHA Roof
Control Specialist, learned of the possibility of an accident when he returned
to the surface after conducting normal inspection activities at the Gibson
Mine...... Williams traveled to the North Portal
2 site and immediately issued a 103(k) Order at 11:25 a.m...... Mark Odom, Mike Rennie and Ron Stahlhut, MSHA
Supervisors arrived on the scene a short time later...... The Gibson County Coal mine rescue team was also
called to the site and assisted in the recovery of the victims......
Stahlhut
had the hoist rope and attachments thoroughly checked before lowering anyone
into the shaft for recovery work...... A team
was assembled to perform the recovery work...... This team consisted of Rennie, Stahlhut, Don �Blink� McCorkle,
On
Preliminary
information was gathered from the MSHA District 8 Office, located in
Persons
were identified for the purpose of interviews...... Interviews were conducted with 11 persons thought to have pertinent
information regarding the accident...... The
interviews were conducted at the MSHA District 8 Office, at the Evansville
Marriot Hotel, at the Quality Inn Evansville North in
The accident
investigation team made site visits on
In order to
determine the actual manner in which the sling/shackle combination could have
lodged in the collar doors, several configurations were tested...... The collar doors were moved to the open position,
and the nylon sling and shackle were attached to the sinking bucket, as on the
day of the accident...... The arrangement
shown in the drawing labeled Ehibit 2 and the photograph, labeled Ehibit 3,
(with the shackle pin end down at the floor side of the Wide Flange section (I-beam)
and the rounded end atop the lower end of the I-beam, with the sling coming
over the top) would bind tightly with downward pressure and release easily with
upward pressure...... This confirmed witness'
statements that the sling/shackle tightly engaged with downward pressure and
released easily when the bucket was raised...... No other tested arrangement produced this result.
DISCUSSION
PHYSICAL
FACTORS:.....
1) GENERAL:..... Frontier-Kemper began making preparations for
sinking the shaft in October 2006...... The
design indicated the depth of the shaft from the top of the collar to the
bottom of the shaft to be 570 feet...... The
shaft log, maintained in the office trailer, indicated that as of
2) DESCRIPTION OF THE HOISTING
EQUIPMENT/OPERATION:..... The shaft is
enclosed at the top with a collar deck sub-frame and the deck. The collar deck
consists of one-half inch thick steel plates with a raised pattern on top to
resist slipping. Personnel hoisting and material removal for the shaft sinking
operation is primarily accomplished with the use of a sinking bucket...... Typically, the bucket remains idle on the
collar deck when no one is in the shaft...... When personnel, equipment, or supplies are transported into the shaft
with the bucket, the bucket is loaded, raised high enough to clear the two collar
doors, and then lowered into the shaft...... The collar door opening measured 10 feet 9 inches wide (north - south)
and 9 feet 6 inches long (east � west)...... Each collar door is 57 inches long (half of the 9�6�), hinged at
opposite sides of the collar deck (east � west) and opens upward...... Each door is opened with a pneumatically
driven jack into a vertical position (approimately 90 degrees from the closed
position)...... Each collar door activates an
electronic limit switch (Rockwell Automation, Allen-Bradley model 802M) mounted
to the head frame...... This provides an
indication to the hoist operator that the doors are in the open position...... Each door structure consists of a set of
perpendicular W6 25 steel beams running north � south and east � west and
welded to the one-half-inch steel plate...... The W6 25 section has an inside-flange depth of 5.47 inches...... When the doors are in the closed position,
these members are beneath the steel plate of the door and are not visible...... When the doors are open, these members are
eposed and face toward the shaft opening.
The bucket had a serial number of �045�
marked along the top outer portion...... Also, the number 6126, representing the listed weight of the bucket, was
marked on the top outer portion of the bucket,...... The inner dimensions of the bucket were measured to be 74 inches in
diameter with a height of 67 inches along the inside wall of the bucket...... The bucket was attached to a 25-ton swivel
hook with a master link and four 5-foot-long, �-inch link diameter chain
slings...... The chain slings were connected
to the bucket in pairs with a 1 ⅛-inch shackle attached to two eyes
welded to the inside of the bucket. The
swivel hook (self closing type) was integrated into the hoisting system with a
1 � - 1 ⅜-inch
resin-poured open-type wire rope socket...... A threaded pin connection and cotter pin secured the swivel hook to the
wire rope attachment...... With the bucket on
the collar deck, the hoist rope travels over the main sheave wheel to the hoist
house...... Approimately 245 feet of wire
rope is eposed with approimately 15 feet etending from just outside the
hoist house to the top of the hoist drum...... The hoist rope construction was listed as a 1 ⅜-inch diameter, 19 X 7 EEIPS IWRC,
Non-Rotating wire rope...... The hoist was a
model 4023 (FKCI No. 02-0021) manufactured by Ottumwa Iron Works,
..........
.......... Drum
Diameter .......... 120..... Inches
.......... Drum
Width .......... 120..... Inches
.......... Flange
Depth .......... 14..... Inches
.......... Bull
Gear .......... 351..... Teeth
.......... Pinion .......... ..... 21..... Teeth
.......... Rope
Size .......... .......... ..... 1.375..... Inches
.......... Gear
Ratio .......... .......... ..... 16.71
: 1
.......... Motor .......... .......... ..... 1,200 HP
.......... Motor
Speed .......... 591..... RPM
.......... Motor
Torque .......... ..... ..... 127,919..... Inch Pounds
.......... Drum
Torque .......... ..... 2,138,071..... Inch Pounds
.......... Drum
Speed .......... .......... 35.36..... RPM
.......... Wraps/Layer .......... ..... 85
Two additional hoists were used to
support and move the work deck in the shaft...... Both hoists were manufactured in
3) WIRE ROPE EXAMINATION:..... A visual examination was conducted on the
hoist rope, crosshead block and end attachment...... The visual examination did not reveal any broken wires or corrosion at
the load end attachment or crosshead block...... At the time of the examination, a field dressing was applied to these
areas of the rope to protect the rope from the environment...... Caliper measurements were also taken at
100-foot intervals along the entire working length of the rope, starting with
the bucket located just below the collar doors...... Table 1 shows the measurements along with the averages and a comparable
measurement location documented in the
Table 1.
Caliper measurements taken at 100-foot intervals with the sinking bucket
starting at the top of the shaft and traveling to the bottom.
|
Distance (Feet) |
#1 (Inches) |
#2 (Inches) |
#3 (Inches) |
Average (Inches) |
FKCI (Inches) |
|
0 |
1.375 |
1.374 |
1.377 |
1.375 |
1.375 |
|
100 |
1.378 |
1.378 |
1.378 |
1.378 |
1.375 |
|
200 |
1.363 |
1.363 |
1.362 |
1.363 |
1.365 |
|
300 |
1.369 |
1.369 |
1.370 |
1.369 |
1.370 |
|
400 |
1.368 |
1.371 |
1.369 |
1.369 |
1.370 |
|
500 |
1.375 |
1.377 |
1.375 |
1.376 |
1.375 |
4) HOIST ROPE SPEED TESTS:..... Tests were conducted to verify the speed of
the hoist rope under various conditions...... The hoist rope was marked (painted) in three 50-foot increments for a
total of 150 feet...... The distance for each
increment and total distance traveled were timed with a stopwatch to the
nearest half second...... Three tests were
conducted with the hoist operating at various speeds including the following:
Test 1 � The speed at which
personnel usually travel through the open doors.
Test 2 � The speed at which
personnel travel when they are within 100 feet of any stop.
Test 3 � The maimum speed at
which personnel are lowered.
During each of the tests the speed
indicated at the hoist operator's station was recorded along with a timed test
of the rope...... Each test was conducted
twice and the results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2...... Hoist Rope Speeds for Hoisting Personnel under various conditions.
|
|
0 � 50 feet |
50 � 100 feet |
100 � 150 feet |
0 � 150 feet |
Hoist House Speed |
|
Test 1
(a) |
55 FPM (55 sec) |
56 FPM (54 sec) |
57 FPM (53 sec) |
55 FPM (162
sec) |
20 FPM |
|
Test 1
(b) |
58 FPM (52 sec) |
59 FPM (51 sec) |
59 FPM (51 sec) |
58 FPM (154
sec) |
|
|
Test 2
(a) |
120 FPM (25 sec) |
136 FPM (22 sec) |
130 FPM (23 sec) |
129 FPM (70 sec) |
100 FPM |
|
Test 2
(b) |
130 FPM (23 sec) |
136 FPM (22 sec) |
136 FPM (23 sec) |
134 FPM (67 sec) |
|
|
Test 3
(a) |
333 FPM (9 sec) |
375 FPM (8 sec) |
400 FPM (7.5
sec) |
367 FPM (24.5
sec) |
380 FPM |
|
Test 3
(b) |
300 FPM (10 sec) |
375 FPM (8 sec) |
425 FPM (7 sec) |
360 FPM (25 sec) |
|
Additionally, the maimum
overspeed for lowering personnel in the shaft was verified...... Three tests were conducted by lowering the
bucket into the shaft at the maimum speed for personnel...... A tachometer was used to measure the rope
speed at the top of the shaft as the bucket was lowered...... The tachometer measurements of the rope speed
at the top of the shaft ranged from 450 to 465 fpm when the overspeed
controller activated...... The speed
indicator inside the hoist house for each of the tests was approimately 500
fpm.
5) EQUIPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION
MATERIALS:..... The sinking bucket was
typically used for lowering materials in the shaft...... Items that could not be readily lifted or
easily put into the bucket were rigged beneath it...... At the time of the accident, a 20-foot-long,
2-inch-wide nylon sling (SN 4230767) manufactured by Black Diamond Lifting
Products, Booneville, IN, was attached to the bottom of the bucket with a
shackle...... The sling was rated for 11,000
pounds in a vertical hold, and 8,800 pounds in a choker hold position...... A similar shackle, model S-209, manufactured
by The Crosby Group Incorporated, was attached through the eye of the sling and
allowed to hang freely from the bottom of the bucket when the sling was not
being used...... This shackle had an overall
length of 6.56 inches and a nominal diameter of 1 inch.
6) SHACKLE POSITION IN COLLAR
DOORS:..... Based upon eyewitness accounts,
the shackle attached to the end of the 20-foot nylon sling (free end) was found
in one of the collar door horizontal beams immediately after the accident...... Given the geometry of the shaft opening and
assuming the bucket is oriented in the center of this opening when entering the
shaft, a range of horizontal distances and swing angles necessary for the
shackle to become caught in the collar door structure was determined...... The shackle would have to travel between 20 ⅝ and 68 � �inches with swing angles
between 4.9 and 16.5 degrees (from vertical) to come to rest in the collar door
structure...... MSHA investigators used the
interview information and eamined several positions of the shackle in the door
in an attempt to recreate a possible final position of the shackle...... Three positions of the shackle were eamined
in the collar doors...... They are shown in Ehibits
4-6...... For each of the shackle positions
eamined, a force was applied to the sling in the up and down direction to
simulate the travel direction of the bucket.
Forces applied in the up and down direction to the sling as shown in
Position 1 (Ehibit 4) caused it to pull out of the beam...... Forces applied in the down direction to the
sling shown in Position 2 (Ehibit 5) caused it to pull out of the beam, while
forces applied in the up direction caused the shackle to wedge itself into the
beam, causing the sling to tighten...... Forces applied in the up direction to the sling shown in Position 3
(Ehibit 6) caused it to pull out of the beam, while forces applied in the down
direction caused the shackle to wedge itself into the beam, causing the sling
to tighten...... Based on these tests, it is consensus
of the accident investigation team that the sling was in Position 3, causing
the bucket to tip or overturn as it was lowered.
7) WEATHER AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT:..... According to the
SHAFT SINKING PLAN:
Frontier-Kemper's Shaft Sinking
Plan, which was in effect at the time of the accident, was approved on
However, the use of fall
protection (belts) and the requirements for the transporting of supplies and
materials are mandated by 30 CFR Sections 77.1908(o) and 77.1908 (i),
respectively.
The approved shaft sinking plan,
issued to Frontier-Kemper rather than the mine operator, was reviewed by the
accident investigation team...... Based upon
the circumstances and preliminary findings of the accident investigation, it
was determined that Frontier- Kemper's plan should be revised to adequately
address the use of fall protection equipment and the transporting of supplies
and materials...... In order to address the
investigators' concerns and to prevent a similar occurrence, the District 8 Manager
requested the plan be revised.
Additional safety precautions were
added to the shaft sinking plan to further enhance the safety of the miners
throughout the shaft sinking operation and included the following:
�
All
persons shall use a suitable full harness and be tied off when riding in the
shaft sinking bucket.
�
When
entering and eiting the shaft sinking bucket at the work deck, all persons
shall be tied off...... All persons must
remain tied off to the bucket until they are tied off to the deck.
�
Adequate
fall protection shall be in place or used when personnel are working on the
work deck, such as a third cable rail.
�
A
means shall be provided for safe footing when persons are embarking or
disembarking from the sinking bucket at the work deck, such as a chain securing
the bucket to the deck.
�
Permissible
wireless emergency communication devices shall be required between persons
riding the bucket, the hoistman and the toplander.
�
Straps,
lanyards or rigging shall not be attached to the bottom of the bucket when
transporting persons.
�
When
transporting personnel in the shaft, the toplander or other personnel will be
stationed at the collar, in communication with the hoistman and be able to
visually observe the bucket until it descends past the collar doors.
�
The
speed of the buckets transporting persons shall not eceed 500 feet per minute
and not more than 200 feet per minute when within 100 feet of any stop per
Title 30 Code of Federal regulations, Part 77, Subpart T, Section 1908,
Paragraph (j).
�
The
means for preventing these speeds shall be provided automatically by Lilly
controls or other similar means.
�
Training
shall be provided regarding these items and 5000-23 forms shall be completed
for the training.
These provisions were approved and made a part of the shaft
sinking plan on
FALL PROTECTION-ANSI STANDARDS
As previously stated, at the time
of the accident Frontier-Kemper's approved plan did not address the use of full
body harness fall protection...... Full body
harness protection is widely practiced throughout industry where fall hazards
of greater than four (4) feet are known to eist.
At the time of the accident,
standards of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and MSHA's own
regulations, (30 C.F.R. Section 77.1710(g) and 77.1908(o)), did not
specifically address the use of full body harness fall protection in
these situations......
In October 2007, ANSI implemented
new standards that now provide guidelines for fall prevention...... The ANSI Z359-2007 standard, which was not in
effect at the time of this accident, is designed to provide a proactive,
multi-faceted fall protection program with emphasis on training of both
supervisors and employees in work-at-heights activities...... Design of the work site with fall prevention
in mind is recommended as well as personal fall arrest systems when the
work-at-heights distance eceeds four feet.
The accident investigation team
recommends that these standards be considered when formulating and evaluating
all future shaft and slope sinking plans.
MECHANISM OF THE ACCIDENT:
The use of the sling suspended
from the bottom edge of the bucket created a medium for the introduction of
eternal forces and, combined with the absence/non-use of properly attached
fall protection (belts), contributed to the fatal accident.
A number of safety belts, with
attached lanyards, piled near the shaft collar and among the detritus of used
medical supplies and rescue equipment, were found by the investigation
team,...... However, at that time it could
not be positively determined to whom the belts were assigned or belonged, or if
they had been in use by the victims at the time of the accident...... Interviews revealed that full body harness
fall protection, although available at the site, was not routinely used by
miners being transported in the bucket prior to the accident.
A review of MSHA training videos
available at the time of the accident showed persons being transported in
sinking buckets, with and without use of fall protection...... However, the training videos did not show the
use of slings attached to the bucket while persons were being transported in
the bucket. ..... These training materials
were recalled by MSHA following this accident.
MSHA standards clearly address the
use of 'safety belts' when persons are required to work in or over a shaft
where there is a drop of 10 or more feet...... Use of safety belts in this instance may have either prevented or
mitigated the severity of this accident.
Use of the described sling, in and
of itself, is not directly contrary to any standard...... However, the presence of the unsecured sling
allowed for the loss of control of the bucket required by the standard found at
30 C.F.R. 1908-1...... During interviews, it
was revealed that, prior to the accident, the sling and accompanying materials
and supplies, had been frequently attached to the sinking bucket while persons
were being transported in the bucket......
Due to the geometry and weight of
the sinking bucket, absent the eertion of eternal forces (sling), it is
highly improbable that the bucket could have sufficiently tipped or inverted, to
cause its contents to fall.
TRAINING OF THE VICTIMS:.....
Frontier-Kemper's training records
were eamined by representatives of MSHA's Educational Field Services. The record
of eperienced miner training and task training for Ashmore and the hazard
training record for
An analysis was conducted to identify the most basic causes
of the accident that were correctable through reasonable management
controls...... During the analysis, root
causes were identified that, if eliminated, would have either prevented the accident
or mitigated its consequences...... The
following root causes were identified as a result of the investigation...... In each case, an effective management system,
procedure or policy was not in place to assure compliance with the regulation
or safe mining procedure.
Listed
below are root causes identified during the analysis and the respective
corrective actions implemented to prevent a recurrence of the accident:
- Root Cause:..... A nylon sling
and shackle used for lowering supplies were left attached to the sinking
bucket while transporting persons. ..... The lack of an effective administrative
control to assure that etraneous objects were not attached to the bucket
when transporting persons contributed to the loss of control of the hoist.
Corrective Action:..... The independent contractor's approved shaft sinking plan has been
revised to include provisions that persons will not be transported with
anything attached to the bucket.
- Root Cause:..... The toplander
was not at his duty station observing the mantrip as it passed through the
collar doors...... Inadequate policies
and procedures resulted in the hoist operating without the toplander and
contributed to the loss of control of the hoist.
Corrective Action:..... The independent contractor's approved shaft sinking plan has been
revised to require the toplander or other personnel to be stationed at the
collar, in communication with the hoistman and be able to visually observe the
bucket until it descends past the collar doors......
- Root Cause:..... The independent
contractor had no policy in place requiring the use of fall protection
when personnel are transported in the sinking bucket.
.....
Corrective Action:..... The independent contractor's approved shaft sinking plan has been
revised to include the use of fall protection when persons are transported in
the sinking bucket.
CONCLUSION
The accident
occurred as a result of Frontier-Kemper's failure to ensure that the hoist was under the control of
the hoistman at all times when persons were in the shaft...... The toplander was not at his station as the
bucket was being lowered through the shaft collar doors and the hoistman had no
visual contact with the bucket at this point...... The hoistman lost control of the bucket when the nylon sling and shackle
entangled with the shaft collar door...... The contractor also failed to ensure that adequate fall protection was
utilized while persons were transported in the sinking bucket.
.....
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
1. A 103(k) Order, No.
7489388 was issued to ensure the safety of the miners until the
investigation could be completed.
2. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7502227,
was issued to Frontier-Kemper Constructors Inc. for a violation of 30 CFR 77.
1908 � 1, stating that the independent contractor failed to ensure that the
hoist was under the control of the hoistman when men were in the shaft.
During the course of the investigation of a multiple
fatality accident which occurred on
The independent contractor failed to assure that the hoist
was under the control of a hoistman at all times when men were in the
shaft...... The sinking bucket from which
three victims fell to their deaths was not visible to the hoistman, due to
distances and structural obstructions between the hoistman's operating station
and the shaft collar. In addition, the �toplander�, whose duties include
advising the hoistman of the positions of men and equipment, was not at his
station at the time of the accident...... Finally, control of the hoist was lost when a sling and shackle,
attached to the bottom of the sinking bucket, became entangled with the shaft
collar door, resulting in the sinking bucket tipping over and causing three
victims to fall to their deaths...... In
addition to the three persons in the sinking bucket, five other men were
working at or near the shaft bottom at the time of the accident and were
eposed.
3. A 104(a) Citation, No. 7502228, was issued to
Frontier-Kemper Constructors Inc. for a violation of 30 CFR 77.1908(o) stating
that the Contractor allowed persons to ride the sinking bucket without proper
fall protection.
During the course of the investigation of a multiple
fatality accident which occurred on
The independent contractor failed to require the use of
properly attached fall protection when persons were riding the sinking
bucket...... Three persons traveling in the
sinking bucket fell approimately 550 feet to their deaths after the bucket
inverted...... None of the victims wore
properly attached fall protection.
Related Fatal Alert Bulletin:
FAB07C12-14
List of Persons Participating in the Investigation
Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc.
George Zugel Corporate Safety Director
Kyle Wooten.. Project Manager
Scott Harrell.. Corporate Human Resources
Director
R. Brian Hendri Attorney, Patton-Boggs, LLP
Mark Savitt. Attorney, Patton-Boggs, LLP
Henry Chajet. Attorney, Patton-Boggs, LLP
H. John Head. Consulting Engineer, Continental Placer
Inc.
Gibson
Mike Stanley. General Manager
Don �Blink� McCorkle Deputy Commissioner
MSHA
Charles Grace Assistant District Manager,
District 7
Carl Boone. Acting District Manager, District 8
David Whitcomb.. Assistant District Manager, District 8
Mike Rennie Supervisory C. M. S. & H., District 8
Ronald Stahlhut Supervisory C. M. S. & H.,
District 8
Edward Ritchie Conference and Litigation Officer,
District 8
Bryan Sargeant Supervisory Special Investigator,
District 8
Bruce Harris. Special Investigator,
District 8
Michael Kalich Mining Engineer, Headquarters Safety
Division
Jarrod Durig.. Civil Engineer, Technical
Support
Michael Snyder.. Mining Engineer, Technical Support
Leyland Payne Supervisory Training Specialist
Javier Romanach. Office of the Solicitor
Kevin Doan.. Mining Engineer, District 7